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ABSTRACT 
 
CHERYL BISHOP: Internationalizing the Right to Know: Conceptualizations of Access to 
Information in Human Rights Law  
(Under the direction of Cathy Packer, Pd.D.) 
 
Currently there exists a global movement promoting institutional transparency and 
freedom of information legislation.  Conceptualizing access to government-held information 
as a human right is one of the latest developments in this global trend promoting access to 
information.   The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and analyze the various 
conceptualizations being used to promote access to government information as a human 
right.  This dissertation also assesses the strength and weaknesses of each conceptualization 
and assesses which conceptualization holds the greatest promise for ensuring the broadest 
right of access to information.  
Conceptualizations were identified by examining international human rights law 
(particularly human rights treaties), normative arguments of international inter-governmental 
organizations (particularly the United Nations), and nongovernmental organizations.  Four 
conceptualizations were identified:  the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, which 
bases a right to information on the right to  freedom of expression; the information-privacy 
conceptualization, which bases a right to information on the right to privacy; the right-to-a-
healthy environment conceptualization, which links information rights to a right to a healthy 
environment; and the right-to-truth conceptualization, which bases a right to information on 
individual and societal rights to know about serious human rights abuses.  
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CHAPTER I 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
 
In the first opinion of its kind from an international human rights tribunal, the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights1 ruled that access to government information is a human 
right.  The September 2006 ruling stated: “[T]he right to freedom of thought and expression 
includes the protection of the right of access to State-held information.”2  The case began in 
1998 when the Chilean government refused to release information regarding a major U.S. 
logging project in Chile to a Chilean environmental organization.3  A number of South 
American human rights groups filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights4  claiming that the withholding of information violated Chileans’ human 
                                                 
1 The Inter-American Court is an organ of the American Convention on Human Rights. It consists of seven 
judges and hears individual and state complaints against state parties to the convention. The court can settle 
controversies about the interpretation and applications of the Convention, and give opinions regarding 
compatibility of state law and the Convention provisions. Under its advisory jurisdiction, it interprets the 
provisions of the American Convention and other human rights treaties within the Inter-American system. 
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, chap. 8, 1144 UNT.S. 123 [hereinafter American 
Convention]. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 544-55 (6th ed. 2003). 
 
2 Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006); see also Open Society 
Justice Initiative, International Tribunal Makes Landmark Ruling on Access to Information (Oct. 12, 2006), 
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=103448. 
 
3 The requested information was about the Río Cóndor Project, an extensive timber logging operation by U.S. 
company Forestal Trillium on the Island of Tierra del Fuego in Chile.  
 
4 In 1959 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was established as an independent organ of the 
Organization of American States, and it held its first session one year later. In 1969 the American Convention on 
Human Rights was adopted. The convention further defined the role of the commission and created the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. According to the convention, once the commission determines a case is 
admissible and meritorious, the commission will make recommendations and, in some cases, present the case to 
the Inter-American Court for adjudication. The Inter-American Court hears these cases, determines liability 
2 
 
rights.  In March 2005, the Inter-American Commission found that Chile had violated the 
plaintiffs’ rights under Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which 
states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression.  This right includes 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”5  The commission 
urged Chile to release the information and recommended that Chile bring its domestic laws 
into conformity with the American Convention so as to guarantee citizen access to public 
information.6  After Chile refused, the commission referred the case to the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights.  Agreeing with the commission, the court ruled that Chile’s failure to 
release the information violated citizens’ rights to freedom of expression.7  
 The court’s decision that access to government-held information is a human right is 
the latest development in a global movement promoting access to information.8  This 
movement has contributed to the proliferation of freedom of information (FOI) statutes and 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to information.  Currently, nearly 70 countries 
have adopted access laws, over half of which were adopted within the last ten years.9  Today 
rights to official government information also are guaranteed in at least 49 national 
                                                                                                                                                        
under relevant regional treaties and agreements, and assesses and awards damages and other forms of reparations 
to victims of human rights violations. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 544-55. 
 
5 American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13. 
 
6 Marcel Claude Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Case 12.108, Report No. 60/03, ¶ 222 (2003). 
 
7 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 15 (2006).  
 
8 This movement includes several international and regional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) promoting 
access to government information, such as Transparency International, Article 19’s Global Campaign for 
Freedom of Expression, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the Global Transparency Initiative, Access-Info 
Europe, and the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.  See also ANN FLORINI, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: 
TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD (2007); ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW RULES FOR 
RUNNING A NEW WORLD (2003); BURKART HOLZNER & LESLIE HOLZNER, TRANSPARENCY IN GLOBAL CHANGE: 
THE VANGUARD OF THE OPEN SOCIETY (2006). 
 
9 David Banisar, Freedom of Information Around the World (2006), available at  
http://www.privacyinternational.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
 
3 
 
constitutions, 80 percent of which were written after 1989.10  Within the past five years, 
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank 
also have changed their policies to allow greater access to their official records.11  According 
to legal scholar and access expert Thomas Blanton: “[M]aking good use of both moral and 
efficiency claims, the international freedom-of-information movement stands on the verge of 
changing the definition of democratic governance.  The movement is creating a new norm, a 
new expectation, and a threshold requirement of any government to be considered a 
democracy.”12     
 It is not surprising that such developments are occurring now.  Within the last century, 
democracy has spread around the globe.  Today, 64 percent of all governments worldwide are 
democratic.13  According to foreign relations scholar Fareed Zakaria, “What was once a 
peculiar practice of a handful of states around the North Atlantic has become the standard 
form of government for humankind.”14   Zakaria explained that “democratization” entails not 
                                                 
10
 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; A SERIES OF UPDATED TEXTS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHRONOLOGIES AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES, 20 vols. (A.P. Blaustein  & G.H. Flanz, eds., 1971-2006).  
 
11 International economic organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
World Trade Organization, also are being pressured by international NGOs and legal experts to be more 
democratic and accountable to the public. In order for this to occur, it is argued, transparency, which often 
includes access to official documents, is essential. See Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the 
World Trade Organization, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927 (2004); John W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment 
of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary Fund, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 521 (2004); Hetty Kovach et al., 
One World Trust Global Accountability Report: Power without Accountability (2003), available at 
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/documents/GAP20031.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); Ngaire Woods & Amrita 
Narlikar, Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, 53 IN’T SCI. J. 
569 (2001). 
 
12 Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POLICY 50, 56 (July/Aug 2002). 
 
13 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008: Selected Data, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
 
14 FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 13 (2003).  
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just politics, but “a way of life.”15   In the process of democratization, he argued, “hierarchies 
are breaking down, closed systems are opening up, and pressures from the masses are now the 
primary engine of social change.”16   
 Conceptualizing access as a human right is one of the latest developments in the 
global trend promoting access.  Many international nongovernmental organizations,17 legal 
scholars,18 and reports from United Nations entities19 have argued that access to information 
is an emerging human right.  Many of those making this claim argue that access to 
information is linked to the right to freedom of expression.20  This conceptualization of a right 
to access is illustrated by the aforementioned Inter-American Court of Human Rights opinion, 
which explicitly linked a right of access to the right to freedom of expression.21  However, 
linking a right of access to rights of free expression is only one of several conceptualizations 
being used to advance access as a human right.  Access as a human right also has been linked 
to a right to a healthy environment22 and a right to good health.23  
                                                 
15 Id. at 14. 
 
16
 Id. 
 
17 E.g. the Commonwealth Human Right Initiative, a non-partisan, international nongovernmental organization, 
stated in a document, What is the Right to Information?: “Many people believe that access to information is a 
fundamental human right. This belief is reflected in international human rights instruments, the most significant 
being the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. . . .  Freedom of expression presupposes something to 
express. Therefore, access to information is inextricably tied to freedom of expression. The words ‘to seek, 
receive, and impart’ are set out in the Universal Declaration as if they were the constituent parts of one 
indivisible right.” Available at  http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/rti/what.htm#1 (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2008). 
 
18 See infra at pp. 17-37. 
 
19 See, e.g., infra pp. 49-50 and notes 198-203.  
 
20 See infra pp. 20-28. 
 
21 Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
22 See infra pp. 32-35. 
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 The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and analyze the various 
conceptualizations being used to promote access to government-held information24 as a 
human right.25  This dissertation also assesses the strength and weaknesses of each 
conceptualization and assesses which conceptualization holds the greatest promise for 
ensuring the broadest right of access to the information.  Conceptualizations were identified 
by examining international human rights law (particularly human rights treaties), normative 
arguments of international inter-governmental organizations (particularly the United Nations) 
and nongovernmental organizations, and the work of legal scholars.   
                                                                                                                                                        
23 See infra pp. 29-32. 
 
24 This includes a general right to access information held by the government, including information provided at 
meetings, as well as rights that create positive obligations on government to proactively provide important 
information. This dissertation is not investigating a right to access to information that is generally available to 
the public or a right of individuals and/or the media to gather and provide information. The term “access to 
information” and “right of access” will be used to mean access to government-held information. The term 
“freedom of information” is not being used. This is to ensure that there is no confusion between the right of 
access to government-held information and the term “freedom of information,” which was first used in a 1946 
UN General Assembly resolution, which stated, “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and the 
touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” G.A. Res. 59(I), ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1946). 
This statement often has been used to argue that access to government-held information is a human right, but the 
following paragraph states that the right “implies the right to gather, transmit, and publish news anywhere and 
everywhere without fetters.” Id. at ¶ 2. In 1948 the United Nations also hosted a freedom of information 
conference that was charged in part with creating a Convention on Freedom of Information, of which a final 
draft was never created. This convention was mostly concerned with the free flow of information across borders 
and said nothing about government information. See generally INGER OSTERDAHL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
IN QUESTION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CALLS FOR A NEW WORLD 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER (NWICO) (Vol. 11, 1992); HILDING EEK, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION AS A PROJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 
(1953). 
 
25 I leave for future research the larger “meta questions” concerning the creation of new human rights. These 
questions include the underlying process of and means of creating new human rights (and whether access to 
government information is a human right as a matter of law) and arguments for and against a proliferation of 
new rights, as opposed to a core of well-entrenched and more widely-accepted ones. For the purpose of this 
investigation, I take as self-evident that human rights do exist and that new rights can be and are created within 
the context of the international legal community. See infra pp. 13-4 for a brief discussion of soft law. The 
following is a sampling of the variety of discussions related to these larger questions. COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2000); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press 2005, 1999) (1971); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma. 
The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principle, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 
(1992); Arthus M. Weisburd, The Significance and Determination of Customary International Human Rights 
Law: The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of Human Right, 25 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (1995).  
   
6 
 
Identifying and analyzing the different conceptualizations of access in human rights 
law and within the global debate regarding access is important for several reasons.  Although 
he did not use the term “conceptualization,” legal scholar and former judge for the 
International Court of Justice Christopher Weeramantry argued that identifying the 
conceptualizations of access to information is important.26  He stated that “an examination of 
the right to information will reveal at once that there are numerous facets of this vast topic 
which range beyond the purely political, into the realm of social, economic, cultural and 
technological information.”27  Weeramantry argued that several “formulations” of this right 
exist and need to be delineated in order to understand “its status in international law and 
domestic legal systems.”28   
This research can help improve the quality and clarity of the current international 
discussions regarding access to information and, more specifically, regarding access as a 
human right.  Access to information as a human right is a new and innovative way of 
envisioning access, but as Judge Weermantry observed, this right has not been fully 
identified.  He wrote, “Its concepts and procedures have yet to be developed considerably but 
the first broad brush strokes delineating the right have appeared on the canvas of human 
rights.”29 
Also, this research can bring clarity to lawmaking, thereby improving its results.  
Understanding the principles and assumptions of the different conceptualizations can help 
                                                 
26 Christopher Gregory Weeranmanty, Access to Information: A 5ew Human Right. The Right to Know, 4 ASIAN 
Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 99, 101 (1994). 
 
27 Id. 
 
28 Id. at 99-100. 
 
29 Id. at 111.  
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lawmakers understand the different purposes of access, informing the drafting and 
implementation of national access legislation as well as international treaties.   
Finally, international human rights law often has an impact on other areas of the law.  
For example, governments may pass national legislation in order to comply with human rights 
law or to respond to the pressures of its normative influence.  Several new democracies have 
incorporated specific provisions from human rights treaties into their constitutions.30   
What occurs in international law can also have an effect on national courts.  In the 
recent United States Supreme Court case Roper v. Simmons,31 involving the constitutionality 
of the use of the death penalty for those under 18 years of age, the Court’s opinion was 
influenced by international laws and norms.  Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy stated: “It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty. . . . The opinion of the world community, while not 
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”32   In his opinion, Kennedy referred to provisions against the death penalty in 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and “parallel prohibitions contained 
in other significant international covenants,” citing the Political Covenant, among others.33     
                                                 
30 E.g. The Bulgarian constitution states, “Citizens shall be entitled to obtain information from state bodies and 
agencies on any matter of legitimate interest to them which is not a state or official secret and does not affect the 
rights of others.” Konstitutsiya na Balgariya [Constitution] art. 41(2) (Bulgaria ); The Columbian constitution 
states, “Every person has a right to access to public documents except in cases established by law.” Political 
Constitution of Columbia art. 74. 
 
31 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 
32 Id. at 578. 
 
33 Id. at 576. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (arguing that a 1981 European Court of Human 
Rights case is an example that Western civilization does not condemn homosexuality); see generally, e.g., Sarah 
H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie 
Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). But see Simons v. Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 
624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the basic premise of the Court's argument – that American law 
8 
 
An Introduction to International Human Rights Law 
 In order to identify, analyze, and compare the different conceptualizations of access to 
information as a human right, it is essential to examine and understand international human 
rights law and the role of non-governmental organizations.  The following section will 
provide a brief overview of the history of international human rights law, the different sources 
of human rights law, and the contributions of nongovernmental organizations in human rights 
norm setting, promotion, and monitoring.   
 
The History of Human Rights Law 
Although the concept of basic human rights has been around for centuries,34 the 
Charter of the United Nations,35 which created the United Nations, laid the foundation of 
current international human rights law.  Article 55 of the Charter states, in part, that the 
United Nations shall promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”36  
Article 56 of the Charter requires member nations to “pledge themselves” to this goal.37  
Although some human rights were protected by treaties before the Charter, according to legal 
scholar Thomas Buergenthal, the Charter “ushered in a worldwide movement in which states, 
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations are the principal players in an ongoing 
                                                                                                                                                        
should conform to the laws of the rest of the world – ought to be rejected out of hand”); Republican Senator Tom 
DeLay called the Roper decision “outrageous” in part because it referred to international law (Jesse J. Holland, 
DeLay Criticizes Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, Activist Republican Judges, ASSOC. PRESS (Apr. 20, 2005)). 
34 See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 4-28 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 
35 UN Charter, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993 (entered into force 24 Oct., 24 1945). 
 
36 UN Charter, art. 55(c). 
 
37 UN Charter, art. 56. 
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struggle over the role the international community should play in promoting and protecting 
human rights.”38 
 Buergenthal described human rights as a “dynamic and ongoing process that has its 
normative basis in the Charter of the United Nations.  The Charter in turn has given rise to a 
vast body of international and regional human rights law and the establishment of numerous 
international institutions and mechanisms designed to promote and supervise its 
implementation.”39  
 The United Nations Charter also mandated the creation of a commission to promote 
human rights.  Thus the Commission on Human Rights was created in 1946.40  Its first task 
was to create formal human rights standards, which ultimately became the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN Declaration).41  The UN Declaration is considered by 
many as one of the greatest achievements of the last century.42  Adopted in December of 
1948, the catalysts for the UN Declaration, according to scholar Johannes Morsink, were the 
horrors of World War II and the Nazi Holocaust, which created a need for a “reaffirmation 
and reiteration of the existence of human rights.”43  Enshrined within the UN Declaration’s 30 
                                                 
38 Thomas Buergenthal, The 5ominative and Institutional Evolution of Human Rights, 19 HUM.RTS. Q. 703, 703-
04 (1997). 
 
39 Id. 
 
40 See supra note 4. 
 
41 SCOTT N. CARLSON & GREG GISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS (2003). 
 
42 See, e.g., Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Fourth Session of the U5 Commission on Human Rights, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 246 (1999); John Humphrey,  The Revolution in International Law of Human Rights, Address Before 
the American Bar Association, in 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 205 (1974). 
 
43 Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 257, 258 (1993). 
 
10 
 
articles are universal rights for all peoples including rights to political participation, privacy, 
and freedom of expression.44    
 Although the UN Declaration has tremendous influence globally, it is not legally 
binding.45  After drafting the UN Declaration, the Commission was assigned the task of 
creating a legally-binding human rights instrument.  After years of negotiations among UN 
member states, two treaties were adopted in 1966:  the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (the Political Covenant)46 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights47 (the Social Covenant).  Both treaties clarify the rights set out in 
the UN Declaration.  Collectively, the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter, 
the UN Declaration, the Political Covenant, and the Social Covenant are referred to as the 
“International Bill of Human Rights.”  The fact that about three quarters of the UN member 
states (more than 150 of the total 192 states) 48  have ratified the two legally-binding 
covenants demonstrates human rights’ universal appeal.49  Since the ratification of these two 
                                                 
44 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/RES/217 A (III) (Dec.10, 
1948) [hereinafter UN Declaration]. 
 
45 Some scholars argue that some or all of the provisions of the UN Declaration are now international customary 
law. See, e.g., John Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Judicial 
Character in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE DECLARATION ( B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979); Louis B. 
Sohn, Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 129 (1977). 
 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter Political 
Covenant]. The covenant is a United Nations treaty based partly on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
It consists of 51 articles, which guarantee the right to own property, the right to nationality, and the right to 
freedom of expression, among others. 
 
47 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Social and Cultural Covenant]. 
 
48 UN Press Release, UN Doc. Org/1469 (July 3, 2006). 
 
49 Anne Peter, Why Obey International Law? Global Constitutionalism Revisited, 11 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 39, 
48-49. For more on the historical evolution of human rights, see Buergenthal, supra note 39; Theodoor C. van 
Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43 
(Karel Vasak ed., vol. 1). 
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treaties, several more human rights treaties have been adopted under the auspices of the 
United Nations, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,50 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,51 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.52  Several regional treaties also have been 
created, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,53 the American 
Convention on Human Rights,54 and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 55 
 Although specific human rights have been codified into legally-binding instruments, 
debates often arise regarding how individual human rights provisions ought to be interpreted.  
As human rights law evolves, new arguments are constantly being made regarding what 
constitutes specific human rights.  These arguments often reinterpret specific human rights 
provisions as giving more expansive rights than originally intended.  The arguments regarding 
rights of access to information – arguments made by legal scholars, nongovernmental 
organizations, and human rights tribunals and treaty committees alike –illustrate the 
evolutionary nature of human rights law.56 
                                                 
50 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
513 [hereinafter Women’s Convention]. 
 
51 Convention on the Right of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Children’s Convention]. 
 
52 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Convention against Racism]. 
 
53 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].  
 
54 American Convention, supra note 1. 
 
55 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Nov. 4, 1950) 
[hereinafter European Convention]. 
 
56 See, e.g,. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Advisory Opinion, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the 
Framework of Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, OC-16/99, ¶ 114 (Oct. 1, 1999) (arguing that “[h]uman 
rights treaties are living instruments, the interpretation of which has to follow the evolution of times and the 
conditions of present-day life”).  
12 
 
Sources of Human Rights Law  
There are several sources of international human rights law.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation the following sources of law were examined: treaty law, which is a form of hard 
law and is legally binding, and soft law, which is influential but not legally-binding.57   
Treaties are the most common source of international human rights law.  Treaties 
impose legally-binding obligations on countries that sign them.58  According to international 
law, a treaty is “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”59   It is important to note that not 
all treaties are called treaties.  They also are known as conventions, agreements, or charters.  
What matters is that those states that ratify such an agreement agree to be bound by law.  
Although treaties are legally-binding, provisions for monitoring compliance vary widely.  
Some treaties, such as the European Convention, have created traditional judicial mechanisms 
such as the European Court on Human Rights.60  Other treaties have committees that hear 
individual complaints and monitor compliance.61  Still others have no complaint or 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
57 There also are customary law and “general principles of law.” Customary law is developed when provisions of 
international treaties, declarations, or resolutions become pervasive on an international scale.  Some have argued 
that many of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is not legally binding, have 
become customary law. See supra note 45. These sources of law will not be examined because, in general, 
arguments that access is a human right under international customary law or general principles of law are not 
being made, and the evidence is difficult to retrieve.   
 
58 In 1969, a UN conference adopted the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which codifies the 
rules nations were using in their treaty practices. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23, 1969) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 
59 Id. at art. 2. 
 
60 European Convention, supra note 55, at arts. 33-4. 
 
61 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 
383 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 
13 
 
compliance mechanisms at all.  As will be discussed below, non-governmental organizations 
often play a powerful role in monitoring compliance with human rights treaties.  
 Soft law, though not legally-binding, can be very influential.62  Legal scholar Francis 
Snyder defined soft law as “rules of conduct which in principles have no legally binding force 
but which nevertheless may have practical effects.”63  This “practical effect” can occur 
through the normative influence of soft law.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
an example of soft law because it creates no obligations on governments, yet it has come to be 
very influential.64  Soft law can include international declarations and the recommendations 
and general comments of committees created by human rights treaties, such as the Human 
Rights Committee, which hears individual complaints65 and monitors66 compliance of the 
Political Covenant.67  The reports and decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights are also examples of soft law.  It also can include the decisions of UN special 
rapporteurs.68  It is within soft law that many of the arguments that access to information is a 
                                                 
62 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 
421 (2000). 
 
63 Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of EC Law, in IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE UK (1995). 
 
64 See Morsink, supra note  43. 
 
65 If a state party to the Political Covenant is also a party to the First Optional Protocol, then the Committee can 
receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be the victims of violations of any of the 
rights in the Covenant. First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 
66 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 41.   
 
67 Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-
BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 449-63, 451 (2000). 
 
68 Id. 
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human right are made.  Human rights law is constantly evolving, and soft law can greatly 
influence the direction of that evolution.69 
 
The Role of 5on-governmental Organizations  
Non-governmental organizations contribute to human rights in three distinct ways.  
They help create the agenda regarding human rights laws and norms; they promote the 
importance of human rights; and they help monitor nations’ compliance with human rights 
laws.   
According to legal scholar Dinah Shelton, international human rights law generally 
“progresses through similar stages: issue identification, debate, adoption of nonbinding 
declarations, negotiation of binding agreements (treaties), establishment of supervisory 
institutions and procedures, and further elaboration of the rights through decisions and 
judgments of the supervisory institutions.”70  Non-governmental organizations are influential 
at every step of this process.  Shelton maintained that non-governmental organizations are the 
“engine for virtually every advance made by the United Nations in the field of human rights 
since its founding.”71        
Menno Kamminga argued that NGOs “often play a key role in creating awareness of 
the need to adopt international instruments and even in the drafting of such instruments.”72  
                                                 
69 See A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L AND COMP. LAW Q. 
901 (1999) (arguing that the “role of soft law as an element in international law-making is now widely 
appreciated, and its influence throughout the international law is evident”). 
 
70 Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES 424, 438-42 (P.J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge 
Oudraat eds., 4th ed. 2001). 
 
71 Id. 
 
72 Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of 5OGs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State 
System?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 93, 101 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
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Kamminga further maintained, “It is no exaggeration to suggest that some of the most 
important international legal instruments of recent years would not have seen the light without 
the input of NGOs.”73 
NGOs also are particularly influential in the creation and propagation of soft law.  
They are often the organizers of and major participants in international conferences that 
produce resolutions and declarations.  For example, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, which enumerates specific rights to a healthy environment, is the product 
of such a conference.74   
Nongovernmental organizations also play a large role in monitoring states’ human 
rights practices.  According to Ann Marie Clark, NGOs were involved at “crucial junctures in 
strengthening the expectation that states be held accountable for human right practices in the 
20th century, as international and regional human rights norms were elaborated in response to 
problematic country cases.”75  For example, some international nongovernmental 
organizations have pressured countries to add access-to-information provisions to their 
national constitutions in order to uphold the countries’ international human rights obligations.  
In 2005 the international NGO Article 19, Global Campaign for Freedom of Expression,76 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
73 Id. 
 
74 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (June 3-14, 1992), Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]. The declaration stems from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also 
known as the Rio Summit, Earth Summit.  Along with 172 governments, more than 2,400 NGOs participated. 
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 
75 Ann Marie Clark, 5on-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society, 48 J. OF 
INT’L AFFAIRS 507, 508 (1995). 
 
76 Article 19, the Global Campaign for Freedom of Expression, is an international NGO that promotes “freedom 
of expression and the free flow of information as fundamental human rights that underpin all others.” Available 
at  http://www.article19.org.  
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wrote to the Zambian Constitutional Review Commission, which was re-writing Zambia’s 
constitution, stating that Zambia’s constitution should include an access-to-information 
provision in order to comply with international human rights law.  The letter argued that “it is 
well-established under international law that democracy requires that the public has access to . 
. . information.”77  While it is still under debate whether “it is well-established” that access to 
information is, in fact, a universal human right under international human rights law,78 it is 
clear that NGOs are vigorously propagating it as such.79 
 This review of the history of human rights, sources of human rights law, and the role 
of nongovernmental organizations reveals the evolutionary nature of human rights.  
Consequently, it is clear that when exploring conceptualizations of a right of access in human 
rights law, it is important to examine not only hard law but also soft law and the contributions 
of non-governmental organizations.  According to Hurst Hannum, “Whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ 
law, binding or nonbinding, each set of norms and principles contributes to the evolving 
definition of human rights.”80 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
77 Nov. 8, 2005, letter from Article 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression to the Secretariat of the 
Constitutional Review Commission of Zambia, available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/letters/zambia-
constitution-letter.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 
78 See infra p. 22. 
 
79 Ultimately, the Zambian government rejected the proposal to add a provision guaranteeing access to 
information, arguing that such a provision would compromise national security. See Government opposing 
constitutional guarantees for access to information, press freedom and confidentiality of sources, available at 
http://www.ifex.org/frleftz/content/view/full/70237/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 
80 Hurst Hannum, Implementing Human Rights: An Overview of 5GO Strategies and Available Procedures, in 
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 19 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004). 
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Access to Information as a Human Right: A Review of the Literature  
There exists a large body of literature discussing both the growth of transparency as an 
international norm and the importance of access to government information.81  However, very 
little scholarly work examines the proposition that access to government information is a 
human right, and only one author has attempted to delineate explicit conceptualizations of 
such a right.  Although scholarly literature directly relevant to this dissertation is scare, the 
literature does include writings by three prominent national and international judges who 
indicate that the concept of access to information as a human right may be a significant area 
for more in-depth analysis.  As of this writing, only one legal expert, former judge for the 
International Court of Justice C.G. Weerantmantry, has endeavored to identify various 
conceptualizations of access to information as a human right.  The other scholars undertaking 
this topic mainly investigate whether, as a matter of law, access to information is a human 
right.  Several find that access to government information as a human right is not broadly 
recognized in international human rights law; nonetheless, they asserted that a right of access 
is emerging.  Other scholars argue that access currently is a human right.  Although these 
scholars, with the exception of Weerantmantry, do not explicitly discuss conceptualizations of 
access in their analyses, various conceptualizations often are implied within their work.    
This literature review will begin with a discussion of Weerantmantry’s 
conceptualizations of access to information as a human right.  Then the literature review will 
examine additional literature that implies four distinct conceptualizations.  These 
conceptualizations are freedom of expression, the right to health, the right to a healthy 
environment, and the right to information privacy.  
                                                 
81 See generally Florini (2003), Florini (2007), Holzner & Holzner, supra note 8. 
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Conceptualizing Access 
Legal scholar and former judge for the International Court of Justice C.G. 
Weeramantry is the only legal expert who explicitly articulated different conceptualizations of 
access.82   Weeramantry argued that a right to information has been evolving over time in 
human rights law.  He stated that “concepts and procedures have yet to be developed 
considerably but the first broad brush strokes delineating the right have appeared on the 
canvas of human rights.”83  There are several “conceptual underpinnings” of a right to know, 
he argued, and they need to be delineated in order to understand “[the right’s] status in 
international law and domestic legal systems.”84  Weeramantry also argued that although the 
expression “right to know” is well established in legal scholarship, it generally has been 
understood in terms of political rights, for example, a right linked to freedom of expression.  
He maintained that “an examination of the right to information will reveal at once that there 
are numerous facets of this vast topic which range beyond the purely political, into the realm 
of social, economic, cultural and technological information.”85   
Although Weeramantry use the term “conceptual underpinnings,” not 
“conceptualization,” he did delineate six conceptualizations of access to information as a 
human right.  Weeramantry’s conceptualizations are based on his view that a right of access is 
an ancillary right to a variety of other human rights, which can be found at the global, 
national, and individual level. 
                                                 
82 Weeramantry, supra note 26, at 111. 
 
83 Id.  
 
84 Id. at 99-100. 
 
85 Id. at 101. 
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First, at the international level, Weeramantry conceptualized access to information as 
ancillary to the human right to world peace.  If world peace is a human right, he argued, this 
right is incomplete without a right to know.  He argued that “[d]istorted or incomplete 
information results in distorted or unbalanced attitudes and from these result tensions of 
international peace.”86  Second, at the national level, Weeramantry conceptualized access to 
information as ancillary to the right to self-governance.  “[I]f self-government is a human 
right,” he argued, “it can therefore be similarly argued that access to information on which 
self-government depends is likewise a human right.”87  This is because self-government relies 
on the consent of informed citizens.  If citizens are not informed, they cannot truly consent to 
be self-governed.  Third, on an individual level, Weeramantry conceptualized access to 
information as an ancillary right to numerous rights such as the right to health and a healthy 
environment.  In all cases, these rights require “ancillary rights” to the information necessary 
for the exercise of the right in question.88   
Weeramantry’s fourth conceptualization is the right to information about all human 
rights.  In order for any given human right to be exercised, citizens must have access to 
information about that specific right; therefore, governments are obligated to inform citizens 
about human rights.89  The fifth conceptualization is individuals’ right to personal information 
gathered about them by governments.90  The sixth conceptualization is the right to 
information needed to ensure a “right to communicate.”  Weeramantry argued that the right to 
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87 Id. at 102. 
 
88 Id.  
 
89 Id.  
 
90 See infra pp. 101-28, for a discussion of information privacy. 
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communicate and the right of access to information are corollaries of one another.  Although 
Weeramantry did not define the right to communicate, his discussion indicates that the right to 
communicate is based on the right to freedom of expression.  This right is guaranteed for 
individuals as well as media.   
In discussing these conceptualizations, Weeramantry maintained that a right to 
information imposes obligations not only on government, but also on “all those who withhold 
information which an individual is entitled to receive – be they governments, corporations, 
quasi-governmental agencies or individuals.”91  This suggests that a right to information also 
applies to private entities, such as corporations.92  
Unlike the scholars whose works will be examined next, Weeramantry envisaged 
rights of access in sweeping terms.  These rights include both individual and collective rights.  
For example, the right to world peace is a collective right, whereas the right to information 
privacy exists as an individual right.  Weeramantry also understood a right of access in terms 
of social and economic rights, not just political rights.  Several of the conceptualizations 
outlined by Weeramantry also are suggested by several of the scholars discussed below.  
 
Freedom-of-Expression Conceptualization 
Seven scholars specifically discussed a human right of access to government 
information as being linked to the political right of freedom of expression.  Only one scholar 
argued that access to information is a fundamental human right.  The other scholars argued 
                                                 
91 Weeramantry, supra note 26, at 111.  
 
92 See Ejan Mackaay, The Public’s Right to Information, in INFORMATION LAW TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 167, 171-72 (Willem F. Korthals Altes, et al. eds., 1991) (discussing a right to information from non-
governmental sources). 
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that access to information is an emerging right.  These arguments suggested several rationales 
for linking a right of access to freedom of expression, all of which envisage access purely as a 
political right.  The rationales include the concepts that access is essential for self-governance, 
prevention of government abuse, and direct political participation in decision-making.  Also, 
similar to Weeramantry’s analysis, most scholars understood access as a supporting right.  
Only one scholar explicitly stated that access is a right with an independent value.  Arguments 
discussing access to information as a human right are discussed first followed by the 
suggested rationales for linking access to freedom of expression.    
International lawyer and legal scholar Toby Mendel has been at the forefront of 
arguing that access to information is a human right.  As head of the law program of the 
nongovernmental organization Article 19, the Global Campaign for Freedom of Expression,93 
he has authored numerous reports on access to information as a human right, many in 
cooperation with United Nations programs.  Although his scholarly publications are limited, 
his international influence regarding access to information issues is not.94   
According to Mendel in the Comparative Media Law Journal, governments are under 
increasing obligation to give effect to the right to freedom of information.95  After surveying 
several international human rights instruments96 and national court rulings, he concluded that 
                                                 
93 Article 19, supra note 76. 
 
94 Mendel has authored numerous papers and books for the United Nations, including a model Freedom of 
Information Law that was adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee.  He also regularly presents workshops 
on access to information.    
 
95 Toby Mendel, Freedom of Information: An Internationally Protected Human Right. 1 COMP. MEDIA L.J., 39 
(2003). 
 
96 The European Court of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression. 
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“freedom of information is now widely recognized as a fundamental human right.”97  He 
maintained that “[t]he primary human right or constitutional source of the right to freedom of 
information is the fundamental right to freedom of expression.”98  As an example of the right 
to freedom of information grounded in the right to freedom of expression, Mendel referred to 
article 19 of the Political Covenant.99  He argued that article 19 implies a right to freedom of 
information: 
[F]reedom to receive information prevents public authorities from interrupting 
the flow of information to individuals and . . . freedom to impart information 
applies to communications by individuals.  It would then make sense to 
interpret the inclusion of freedom to seek information, particularly in 
conjunction with the right to receive it, as placing an obligation on government 
to provide access to information it holds.100 
 
Former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia Anthony Mason also argued that 
the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of information is evident in 
international human rights treaties, such as the Political Covenant, which include the freedom 
to “seek, receive and impart information.”101  That being said, after careful examination of 
article 19 of the Political Covenant,102 Mason concluded that as a matter of human rights law, 
access to government information is not a human right.  Instead the language of article 19 
only implies a right to receive otherwise “generally accessible information,” not an obligation 
on governments to impart information, unless that information pertains to the individual 
                                                 
97 Mendel, supra note 95, at 66. 
 
98 Id. at 40. 
 
99 See Political Covenant, supra note 46. 
 
100 Mendel, supra note 95, at 40. 
 
101 Anthony Mason, The Relationship Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information, in  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 225, 225 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000).  
See Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(2). 
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seeking the information.103  Nonetheless, Mason maintained that the “essentiality of freedom 
of expression and information to modern liberal democratic government” as well as the 
emergence of freedom of information legislation and disclosure requirements of international 
institutions “may lead to the implication in article 19 of such an obligation.”104   
Alasdair Roberts, legal scholar and international freedom of information expert, also 
acknowledged that access to government information, although currently not a human right, is 
an emerging one.105  Roberts also argued that Article 19 of the Political Covenant106 implies 
that the right to information is an “adjunct of the right to freedom of expression and 
opinion.”107  Although currently there exists no positive obligation on governments to provide 
information, he argued, such an obligation “would not impose a burden greater than that 
already imposed by existing policies to promote freedom of expression.”108  Governments 
have often interpreted the right to freedom of expression as creating positive obligations on 
government, such as establishing public broadcasting facilities or restricting media 
concentration; therefore, he argued, it is not inconceivable that a positive obligation to 
disclose information could emerge.109  
Current European Court of Human Rights (European Court) Judge Loukis Loucaides 
also wrote that there is an emerging trend to recognize access to government information as a 
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104 Id. at 227. 
 
105 Alastair Roberts, Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information, 513 U OF TORONTO L.J. 243, 260 (2001). 
 
106 See Political Covenant, supra note 46. 
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human right.110  He also understood the right to information and the right to freedom of 
expression as corollaries of one another.111  Writing in 1995, he acknowledged that the 
European Court had not ruled that governments have a positive obligation to provide 
information, but he also stated that the court had not ruled it out.112  Nonetheless, Loucaides 
argued that article 10 of the European Convention,113 the freedom of expression provision,114 
should include positive obligations on governments.  He stated:  
[I]t is submitted that the correct approach should be that the State has an 
obligation to impart information in areas of public interest to the press and to 
all other persons that have a legitimate interest in such information except in 
cases where the imparting information is restricted by law in accordance with 
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10.  This should be so in 
order to make the right of the individual and the public to receive information 
and ideas meaningful. 115 
 
After surveying the legal landscape of U.S. Supreme Court, Swiss Supreme Court, and 
European Court of Human Rights decisions, legal expert Ton A.L. Beers also concluded that 
although access to government information is not yet a fundamental right, it is an “emerging” 
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111 Id. at 20. 
 
112 In 1998 the European Court ruled that article 10 generally does not impose a positive obligation on 
governments to impart information. It only prohibits governments from interfering with a person’s freedom to 
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114 Id. at art. 10 (stating in part, “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.”) 
 
115 Loucaides, supra note 110, at 22-23. 
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right.116  Legal expert Ejan Mackaay also argued that currently there is no fundamental human 
right of access to information, but he maintained, the right does exists “in principle, in 
furtherance of the openness of government required in a society based on democracy and the 
rule of law.”117  
In making their arguments about access to information as a human right, these authors 
implied several rationales for linking a right of access to the right to freedom of expression.  
All of these rationales related to the process of democratic self-governance.  Some arguments, 
such as those of Mendel and Beers, include several rationales.  Other scholars’ arguments 
were more specific, such as access preventing government abuse and promoting political 
participation.  
Mendel argued that without freedom of information, democracy and the entire 
system that protects human rights will not function properly.  According Mendel, this 
makes access to information a “foundational human right, upon which all others 
depend.”118  He asserted that this right to information can be broken down into three 
distinct, yet related, rights.  The first is a broad right of access to information from 
public bodies.  According to Mendel, this right “reflects the principle that public 
bodies do not hold information on their own behalf, but rather for the benefit of all 
members of the public.”119  Only an overriding public interest in withholding 
information can limit this right.  The second right is the right to receive important 
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information from the government.  This right creates a positive obligation on 
governments to “publish and widely disseminate key categories of information of 
public interest.”120  Although Mendel gave no examples of this right, it seems likely 
that information on environmental hazards or human rights obligations would be 
included in this right.  Mendel referred to the third right, a “right to truth,”121 as an 
emerging right.  This right requires governments to give the public accurate facts 
about “serious incidents of human rights abuse and other traumatic social events, such 
as a major rail disaster or sickness.”122  Mendel argued that this right goes beyond 
simply allowing the public access to public documents; it requires that governments 
thoroughly investigate the incident and make the results public.123  Mendel’s rationale 
for linking freedom of expression and freedom of information is the broad concept that 
information is essential for democratic functioning.   
Just as Mendel did, Beers distinguished among different types of access.  He argued 
that in order to understand access rights, it is important to differentiate among types of 
                                                 
120 Id.; contra Thomas M. Antkowiak, Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23 
MIJIL 977, 977 (2002) (arguing that “[o]ne might expect to encounter such a privilege in our victim-centered 
system of international human rights protection  – especially within the progressive jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court. Yet, it is simply not to be found as a substantive, explicit right.”). 
 
121 Many scholars have argued that governments have an obligation to investigate and prosecute gross human 
rights violations as a necessary step in the remedial process, and some have argued that these obligations exist 
under international customary law. See generally Viviana Krsticevic, How Inter-American Human Rights 
Litigation Brings Free Speech to the Americas, 4 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 209 (1997); Juan Méndez, 
Responsibility for Past Human Rights Violations: An Emerging “Right to the Truth”, in TRUTH AND JUSTICE: IN 
SEARCH OF RECONCILIATION IN SURINAME 43 (Alfredo Forti & Georgine de Miranda eds., 1999); Jo 
Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and 5othing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 333 (1994). 
 
122 Mendel, supra note 95, at 39 
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access.124  Beers found that there is official access, party access, personal access, and public 
access.125  Official access refers to the right of public officials to obtain government 
documents.  For example, under official access, legislators are often granted access to highly 
sensitive documents to which ordinary citizens are denied access.  Party access is access to 
documents that are of interest to a party engaged in an administrative or judicial procedure.  
The right to one’s own personal information in control of the government is the right of 
personal access.  Finally, public access refers to the right of all members of the public to 
access government information.   
Beers argued that these distinctions are important for several reasons.  First, the legal 
basis and purpose for granting access often changes based on who receives the information:   
official access promotes the “proper fulfillment of the duties of the public authorities;” party 
access ensures the rights of parties regarding legal matters; and personal access is aimed at 
protecting the right to privacy.126  There are six basic rationales for public access to 
documents, according to Beers.  These are: furthering free expression, thwarting abuse of 
government power, ensuring an informed electorate, improving public debate, enabling 
effective participation in the creation of law and policy, and furthering good governance 
                                                 
124 Beers also defined the terms “government” and “government information.”  Government “signifies all 
activities of a legislative, executive and judicial nature on the national, regional and local levels.”  Beers 
distinguished between two types of government information, “documentary” information and “non-
documentary” information.  The former includes any written record or recording, whereas the latter consists of 
“any information not documented on a record or recording which can be obtained when one is present at a 
meeting or a proceeding, as well as by visiting a building or some other facility.”  Examples of the latter include 
non-recorded statements made during a meeting, the atmosphere in a courtroom, and conditions in a prison. 
Beers, supra note 116, at 180-81. 
 
125 Id. at 178. 
 
126 Id. 
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practices.127  Second, he maintained that the “value and weight of the rights can vary, which 
may have an influence on the scope of each right and the corresponding degree of secrecy.”128   
Mackaay and Loucaides specifically argued that a right of information is essential to 
thwart government abuse.  According to Mackaay, “[T]he origin of the public’s right to 
information  . . . [i]s born out of struggle against the abuse of government power, of which 
secrecy is one element.”129  Loucaides argued that without a presumption of government 
openness, the “way will be open to abuses by the State”130  One of the main functions of 
openness is the effective functioning of democracy, he maintained, “through a proper exercise 
of political rights and a control of the government by a well informed press and public.”131   
Both Mason132 and Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University professor and former senior 
vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, argued that a right of access to 
information is essential to promote democratic participation.  According to Stiglitz, the 
“meaningful participation in a democratic process requires informed participants.”133  In a 
democratic society, he reasoned, there is a basic right to know about what the government is 
doing and why.134   
                                                 
127 Id. at 179. 
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129 Mackaay, supra note 92, at 170. 
 
130 Loucaides, supra note  110, at 19.  
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132 Mason, supra note 101, at 230. 
 
133 Joseph Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Disclosure: The Role of Transparency in Public 
Life, Oxford Amnesty Lecture Address at Oxford U.K. (Jan. 27, 1999) (transcript available at 
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2001_On_Liberty_the_Right_to_Know_and_Public.pd
f). 
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Stiglitz also argued that information “gathered by public officials at public expense is 
owned by the public.”135  This argument is similar to Mendel’s contention that governments 
hold documents in the interest of the public.136  Mason further argued that in non-democratic 
jurisdictions the introduction of rights to freedom of expression and information rights can 
lead to democratic governance.137   
Although most of the scholars agreed that access to information currently is not a 
human right, most argued that it is an emerging right linked to the right of freedom of 
expression.  Their arguments indicated several rationales for linking a right of access to 
freedom of expression.  These included facilitating democracy, prevention of government 
abuse, and political participation.  These rationales demonstrate that the authors understood a 
right of access to be a political right in the sense that it is necessary to enable effective 
democratic governance.  One author suggested that access rights were not limited to citizens 
of democratic societies.  In fact, he argued, the enforcement of freedom of expression and 
access rights in nondemocratic cultures could actually be a catalyst for democratic change.  
Most scholars understood access as a supporting right in that it was necessary to give effect to 
other rights.  This is in line with the literature on access to environmental and health 
information.  Only one scholar explicitly stated that access is a right with an independent 
value.   
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Right-to-Health Conceptualization 
 One scholar has written about the relationship between the right to health and the right 
to information.138  Legal expert Sandra Coliver specifically discussed women’s right to 
reproductive health information.  Just as some of the previous scholars have argued, Coliver 
maintained that the right to freedom of expression includes a right to information.139  She also 
conceded that historically the right of access to information has not included positive 
obligations on government to provide information.  But when rights of freedom of expression 
and access to information are taken together with a cluster of several other recognized human 
rights,140 she argued, “concrete and immediate obligations on governments” emerge. 141 
According to Coliver, the rights to freedom of expression and information acts as a “channel 
through which other fundamental, though less well-defined, rights can be made the subject of 
immediate protection by” international and national courts.142  The government obligations 
created by this cluster of rights include not only negative obligations, such as not interfering 
with abortion information, but also positive obligations on government to provide the 
“information necessary for reproductive health and choice.”143  Citing several decisions from 
                                                 
138 Cf. Geoffrey A. Hoffman, In Search of an International Human Right to Receive Information, 25 LOY. L.A. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 165 (2003) (arguing that several international conventions give women the right to 
receive health and reproductive information, but these rights to do necessarily create positive obligations on 
governments to provide information). 
 
139 Sandra Coliver, The Right to Information 5ecessary for Reproductive Health and Choice Under International 
Law, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION, 38 
(Sandra Coliver ed., 1995). 
 
140 These rights comprise: freedom of expression and information, equality and non-discrimination, right to life, 
right to health, right to dignity, liberty and security, right to private and family life, and the right to decide freely 
and responsibly on the number and spacing of one’s children. Id. at 45-57. 
 
141 Coliver, supra note 139, at 39. 
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regional human rights courts,144 she argued that these positive obligations “draw support from 
the growing recognition that governments are obliged to take positive measures to ensure that 
individuals are able to exercise their fundamental rights.”145   
Coliver enumerated several affirmative government obligations regarding women’s 
reproductive health and choice, one of which specifically requires governments to proactively 
provide information.  According to Coliver, “Governments are obliged to take concrete steps 
towards providing adequate and accessible information, education and counseling about 
reproductive health, especially to adolescents, women in rural areas and other at high risk.”146   
These specific obligations, she argued, stem directly from the combined rights of freedom of 
expression and information, health, privacy, and the right to be free from discrimination.147   
Although a right to health is a social right as opposed to a political right, Coliver 
concluded, in part, that the rights to freedom expression and information are necessary to give 
effect to this right.  Again, the right of access is understood as a supporting right.  Coliver also 
argued that governments have an obligation to proactively provide important information.  
This is similar to arguments made by the following scholars’ discussions of a right to 
environmental information.   
 
                                                 
144 See, e.g., Gaskin v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 38 (1989) (stating that “there may be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life”); Velάsquez Rodrίguez  Case,  
Inter-Am. C.H.R.(ser. C), No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988) (ruling that “an illegal act which violates human 
rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a 
private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State” and that the state’s responsibility was not predicated on the act itself, but 
instead was due to “the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond as required by the 
Convention”). 
 
145 Coliver, supra note 139, at 62. 
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147 Id. at 71. 
 
32 
 
Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization 
There is a growing trend toward recognizing a human right to a healthy 
environment,148 and three scholars specifically argued that a right to a healthy environment 
includes a right of access to information.  This right creates a positive obligation on 
governments to provide environmental information to the public.149   
According to legal scholar Sumudu Atapattu, the source of this right to information 
stems from citizens’ rights to participate in environmental decision-making processes and the 
right to “seek redress for the vindication of environmental rights . . . recognized” under 
international environmental law.150  In this light, according to Atapattu, the purpose of the 
right to information is to promote “principles of transparency and accountability which are 
essential in a democratic society.”151  Legal scholar Richard Desgangne agreed that access to 
information about the environment facilitates citizen engagement in environmental decision-
making.   Desgangne understood a right to information as one of the procedural 
“environmental rights.”  These procedural rights comprise a right to information about 
activities that may cause environmental harm for persons likely to be affected, a right to 
                                                 
148 See Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 96 (2002); Richard 
Desgangne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 263 (1995); John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (2000). See generally 
Barry E. Hill et al., Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (2004). 
 
149 See Rio Declaration, supra note 74, and Aarhus Convention, infra note 526 and accompanying text. 
 
150 Atapattu, supra note 148, at 96.  
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participate in the decision-making process when actions are likely to cause environmental 
harm, and a right of recourse before administrative or judicial agencies.152 
After analysis of the European Convention, Desgangne concluded that three separate 
rights to environmental information exist under the convention.  First, there is right of access 
to information held by all public authorities.  Second, there exists a positive obligation on 
governments to provide environmental information without the need for a formal request.  
Finally, a right to a healthy environment creates a positive obligation on governments to 
provide opportunities for public participation in environmental decision-making.  This 
includes providing the information necessary for effective public engagement.153  In other 
words, governments must not only provide information when it is requested, they must also 
proactively disseminate information.  
Legal scholar Michelle Leighton Schwartz argued that a right to environmental 
information is an evolving right.154  Like several of the previously discussed scholars, 
Schwartz based her argument on the idea that access to information is a necessary component 
of the right to political participation.  For this right to be fully realized, she argued, 
governments must disclose relevant information when citizens request it, as well as 
proactively provide information when necessary to avert “potentially serious harm.”155  
According to Schwartz, this right stems from two separate sources of law.  The first is 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression recognized in many international 
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154 Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse, 18 YALE J. 
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instruments.156  She acknowledged that historically the right to freedom of expression has not 
obligated governments to disclose information sought by the public.  Nevertheless, she argued 
that the right of individuals “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media regardless of frontiers” 157 should include a “‘right of access’ to government-held 
environmental information where that information would affect the health of a specific 
individual or group of individuals.”158  Similar to Weeramantry’s articulation of economic and 
social rights, Schwartz understood freedom of expression as a supporting right to the right to a 
healthy environment.   
Schwartz took her argument one step further than Atapattu and Desgangne and argued 
that a second potential source of law providing a right to environmental information is 
international customary law.159  Although, historically, international environmental law has 
been limited to obligations that governments have toward one another, according to Schwartz, 
there is an emerging trend in customary international law that “recognizes the informational 
duties that states owe to individuals within and outside their borders.”160  Schwartz further 
argued that numerous international instruments advance governmental obligations to ensure 
public access to environmental information and decision-making,161 concluding: 
Read together, the great number of treaties and international instruments that 
enshrine this principle evidence an evolving right under customary 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., UN Declaration, supra note 44, at art. 19; Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(2). 
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161 See, e.g., Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 30 I.L.M. 800 (Feb. 
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international law – a right that obligates states to provide the public with 
information and access to governments’ environmental decisions. This right 
should be incorporated into human rights doctrine, because it is fundamental to 
the enjoyment and protection of other human rights.162 
 
Similar to several of the previously discussed scholars, these authors view a right of 
access as facilitating political participation.  However, in this conceptualization, the type of 
information involved is quite narrow.  Desgangne referred to access as a procedural right.  
This is similar to the idea of access as a supporting right proposed by other scholars.  Just as 
Coliver argued, both Desgangne and Schwartz concluded that a right to environmental 
information also includes positive obligations on government to proactively provide crucial 
information.   
 
Information-Privacy Conceptualization 
Four authors suggested an information-privacy conceptualization that involves the 
right to obtain personal information held by the government.  According to legal scholars 
David Banisar and Simon Davies, a general right to privacy is a growing international trend.  
They observed that “nearly every country in the world recognizes a right of privacy in their 
constitution.”163   Rights to privacy also are recognized in international and regional human 
rights treaties.  The authors asserted that “privacy has become one of the most important 
human rights issues of the modern age.”164  A more recent related trend is to recognize rights 
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of access to personal information held by the government.165  For example, the Chechnyan 
Constitution states, “[C]ollection, storage, utilization and dissemination of information about 
the private life of individuals is not allowed without their prior consent.”166  This idea of 
information privacy involves the establishment of rules governing the collection and handling 
of personal data such as credit information and medical records. 
Several of the previously discussed authors suggested a human right of access to 
personal information held by the government.  Both Mason and Weeramantry argued that the 
rapid growth of information technologies has created a significant relationship between 
freedom of information and rights to privacy that needs to be addressed.  This relationship, 
Mason argued, is one of the more important developments in understanding access to 
information as a human right.167  According to Weeramantry, the “dramatic increase in our 
ability to collect and store data” is leading to an “information-based society . . . in which 
information means power.”168  This power can be used responsibly only in the context of a 
“right to full information, on which that power depends.”169  Weeramantry’s discussion of this 
right suggests that people have a right to personal information that others – governments or 
corporations – gather about them.  Beers’ framework, discussed above, also suggests 
information privacy as a conceptualization of access to information.170     
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Conclusion 
Several scholars have assessed whether access to government information is a human 
right.  Although not always explicitly stated, several conceptualizations were suggested from 
these arguments.  Of these conceptualizations, four main conceptualizations were identified.  
These comprise: freedom of expression, right to health, right to a healthy environment, and 
right to information privacy.  
Most of the scholars understood a right of access to information as a supporting right 
that is essential in order for other human rights to be truly realized.  Some scholars referred to 
a right of information as an “ancillary right”; another called it a “procedural” right.  Both 
imply that access to information plays a subordinate role to the right or rights that it is 
facilitating.  Nonetheless, the arguments make clear that other human rights are dependent on 
access to information in order to ensure that human rights are guaranteed.  Mendel referred to 
a right of access as a “foundational right,” which, based on the above arguments, seems more 
accurate.  
With the exception of Weeramantry, none of the scholars attempted to explicitly 
delineate conceptualizations of a human right of access to information.  It is clear from the 
literature that access as a human right is an emerging concept, yet there is no consensus 
regarding the rationales and limitations of the right and to whom the right applies.  Clearly, 
there is a need for research that precisely identifies, analyzes, and compares the various 
emerging conceptualizations of access as a human right.  That is the goal of this dissertation. 
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Research Questions 
This dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
RQ1: How has access to information as a human right been conceptualized? 
To fully explicate each conceptualization identified through this research, the following 
subset of research questions is asked of each conceptualization: 
A. What is the rationale behind the right of access?   
B. Who has the right to information?   
C. To what type of information does the right apply? 
D. What are the limitations of the right?  
RQ2: What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualization? 
RQ3: Which conceptualization (or set of conceptualizations) holds the greatest promise for 
ensuring the broadest right of access to the information?  
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Method 
This dissertation presents a legal analysis of human rights treaties, documents, and 
reports from international and regional human rights entities; decisions of regional human 
rights courts; and materials from nongovernmental organizations that promote access to 
information (see Appendix I for a detailed list).  Documents were assessed for explicit and 
implicit references to access to government information as a human right.  Specifically, the 
dissertation includes analysis of documents from four broad sources.  
The first source of documents is the United Nations Charter-based bodies.  UN 
Charter-based bodies are entities created by the UN’s founding document, the Charter of the 
United Nations.  These documents include minutes and resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly and documents of the Human Rights Council and Commission on Human Rights.  
In 2006, the council replaced the commission.  The mission of the council, as well as the now-
defunct commission, is to address human rights violations.  This is accomplished, in part, 
through reports from nations regarding the status of human rights in their countries and 
reports about individual nations’ human rights compliance from the council (and commission 
prior to 2006).   This dissertation analyzes these reports as well as the minutes of meetings 
during which they were discussed. 
The UN international human rights treaties and their monitoring bodies are the second 
source of documents.  Currently, there are six UN international human rights treaties in force 
(see Appendix I).  Each of these treaties has a committee that monitors implementation of the 
treaty.  The committees are created in accordance with the provisions of the specific treaty 
that they monitor.  Similar to the Human Rights Council and the Commission on Human 
Rights, the committees monitor compliance and address human rights violations.  The main 
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difference is that the committees’ mandates are limited to the specific treaty that created them.  
The treaty committees generate several different types of documents.  These include general 
comments, which interpret specific provisions of the treaty; annual reports about the work of 
the committee, which are submitted to the UN General Assembly; reports to state signatories 
of the treaty regarding compliance; and minutes of meetings with state signatories regarding 
state compliance.  State signatories also provide reports about their compliance to the 
committee.  One UN treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
empowers the committee to hear individual complaints and issue opinions regarding state 
violations of the treaty provisions.  Only countries that signed the Optional Protocol are 
subject to the complaint process.  All of these documents – general comments, the reports, 
minutes, and opinions – are included in the analysis.   
The third source of documents is the three regional human rights treaties – the 
American Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights – and their monitoring bodies.  Two of these 
treaties have human rights courts that hear individual complaints – the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  Each of these treaties also has 
a body that issues reports regarding states’ compliance.       
Finally, this study assessed documents of seven international nongovernmental 
organizations (see Appendix I).  These organizations were chosen because they are the most 
prominent and influential organizations in this area.  This was determined by their high 
profiles within the human rights literature and UN documents.  
Only documents generated after 1985 were assessed because, according to preliminary 
research, no pertinent documents were generated before 1985.  This also is consistent with the 
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development of a global movement promoting access to information, which began in the late 
1980s to early 1990s.171 
Documents from United Nation entities and the treaties were retrieved from three 
different UN databases.172  Documents from the three regional human right instruments were 
retrieved from their online databases.173  Documents pertaining to the American Convention 
on Human Rights were limited to those documents that have been translated into English.  
Documents from the nongovernmental organizations were collected by searching their 
websites174 and the database Factiva, which includes press releases and news from 
nongovernmental organizations.   
 
Study Limitations 
This dissertation has several limitations.  First, it is beyond the scope of this research to 
determine the specific parameters of the human right of access to information in international 
or regional human rights law.  Instead the focus was on identifying, analyzing, and comparing 
the various conceptualizations pertaining to access to information as a human right.   
                                                 
171 See infra pp. 2-3 and accompanying notes 8-16.  
 
172 The UN Official Document System database at http://documents.un.org/welcome.asp?language=E; the UN 
Bibliographic Information System at http://unbisnet.un.org/; and the UN treaty database at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
 
173 These include: European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights from 
HUDOC Portal at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/; Council 
of Europe at http://www.coe.int/t/e/general/search.asp; Inter-American Court of Human Rights at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/buscadores.cfm; Inter-American Commission at 
http://www.cidh.org/search/advcidh.asp; American Human Rights Database available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/digest/; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at  
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/news_en.html. 
 
174 Because not all websites have high-quality search engines, these searches were conducted through Google 
Advance Search, which allows one to search a specific website or domain. 
http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en. 
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This research also does not assess the various conceptualizations of access that are 
suggested by the recently enacted statutory and constitutional law of several countries.  Half 
of all governments that have passed freedom of information legislation have done so within 
the last ten years; many governments have created new constitutions that include rights of 
information; and several constitutional courts have interpreted constitutional provisions as 
implying rights of access.  These statutes, constitutions, and court decisions are not analyzed 
in this research.  
Finally, this research does not explore whether governments are complying with 
international human rights law or their own national access-to-information legislation.  While 
that is an important question, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  
 
Analysis of international human rights documents identified four conceptualizations of 
access to government-held information as a human right:  the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization, the right-to-the-truth conceptualization, the information-privacy 
conceptualization, and the right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization.  Although each 
of these conceptualizations stands on its own, their elements often overlap.  For example, 
rationales for the freedom-of-expression and right-to-a-healthy-environment 
conceptualizations both include the importance of information in facilitating democratic 
participation.  The rest of this chapter is dedicated to explicating the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization.  The other conceptualizations are explicated in subsequent chapters. 
 
THE FREEDOM-OF-EXPRESSIO* CO*CEPTUALIZATIO* 
The most common conceptualization of access to government-held information as a 
human right links a right of access to government information to the right of freedom of 
expression.  Central to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization is the idea that citizens 
must have access to government information in order to effectively exercise their right to 
freedom of expression.  This conceptualization understands freedom of expression and 
information as tantamount to a free society.  For example, according to a 1985 ruling of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “[A] society that is not well informed is not a society 
44 
 
that is truly free.”175  The UN Special Rapporteur176 on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression wrote in his 1994 annual report: “Freedom will be 
bereft of all effectiveness if the people have no access to information.  Access to information 
is basic to the democratic way of life.   The tendency to withhold information from the people 
at large is therefore to be strongly checked.”177  Within this conceptualization, the right to be 
informed includes access to government information.  Without government information, 
according to the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression for the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, “the political benefits that flow from a climate of free 
expression cannot be fully realized.”178  The following sections will discuss the 
conceptualization’s rationales, to whom this right to information is conferred, the type of 
information to which the right applies, and the limitations of the right. 
 
Freedom-of-Expression Conceptualization – Rationales of the Right 
 The freedom-of-expression conceptualization includes three rationales for linking a 
right to government-held information to the right to freedom of expression: the seek-and-
receive, self-governance, and good-governance rationales.  These rationales are not mutually 
                                                 
175 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for 
the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 70 (Nov. 13, 1985).  
 
176 The United Nations and several other international bodies use the term special rapporteur as a title for an 
expert with a specifically mandated function.   
 
177 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/32, ¶ 35 (Dec. 14, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 
Report of the UN Sp. Rapp.].  This view was reiterated in the special rapporteur’s 1996 report, ECOSOC Comm. 
on H.R. Report of the Sp. Rapp., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/31, ¶ 5 (Feb. 4, 1997). 
 
178 2003 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2003 Report of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression [hereinafter 2003(a) Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp.], at 4, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.3790/03 (Aug. 29, 2003). 
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exclusive, and concepts that are part of one rationale often overlap with concepts that are part 
of the other rationales.     
 
Seek-and-Receive Rationale 
The most common rationale for linking a right of access to information to the right to 
freedom of expression is the idea that citizens must be able to seek and receive information if 
they are to enjoy a meaningful freedom of expression.  The seek-and-receive rationale of the 
freedom-of-expression conceptualization links the rights to seek and receive information 
found in several human rights instruments to a right of access to government-held 
information. 
The rights to seek and receive information are explicitly present in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN Declaration),179 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Political Covenant),180 and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention).181  All of those human rights instruments proclaim a right to freedom 
of expression that explicitly includes the freedom “to seek, receive and impart 
information.”182   
                                                 
179 UN Declaration, supra note 44. 
 
180 Political Covenant, supra note 46. 
 
181 American Convention, supra note 1.  
 
182 Article 19 of the UN Declaration states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Supra note 44, at art. 19. Article 19 of the Political 
Covenant states, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of choice.” Supra note 46, at art. 19(2). Article 13 of the 
American Convention states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression.  This right includes 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.” Supra note 1, at art. 13(1). 
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The freedom of expression provision of the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (African Charter)183 only guarantees a right to receive information, but recently, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights184 (African Commission) moved to 
include the right to seek information as well.  In 2002, it adopted the Declaration of Principles 
on Freedom of Expression in Africa, which states, “Freedom of expression and information, 
including the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas . . . is a fundamental and 
inalienable human right and an indispensable component of democracy.”185  The European 
Convention on Human Rights contains rights to receive and impart information but not a right 
to seek information.186 
Several human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
(Inter-American Court) and the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression (UN freedom of expression special rapporteur),187 
                                                 
183 Article 9 states that “[e]very individual shall have the right to receive information” and that “[e]very 
individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.” African Charter, supra 
note 53. The Charter was adopted by the Organization of African Unity [hereinafter OAU], an intergovernmental 
organization that was formed in 1963 and comprised 53 African states. As of July 2001, the OAU has been 
succeeded by the African Union. 
 
184 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights [hereinafter African Commission] oversees the 
compliance and implementation of the treaty.  It has promotional and quasi-judicial functions, which include the 
power to interpret the treaty in terms of current international law. According to the African Charter, the 
responsibilities of the African Commission include the duties “to formulate and lay down, principles and rules 
aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which 
African Governments may base their legislations” and “[i]nterpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the 
request of a State party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organization recognized by the OAU.” Id. at art. 
45.   
 
185 African Commission Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
in Africa, ACHPR/Res. 62 (XXXII) (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter African Declaration]. 
 
186 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights states in part: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 
10.  
 
187 This special rapporteur interprets article 19 of the UN Declaration and the Political Covenant.  In 1993 the 
UN Commission on Human Rights created the position of special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the rights to freedom of opinion and expression. The resolution that created the position stated that the special 
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as well as numerous NGOs, have linked the rights to seek and receive information to a right 
of access to government information.  This places a positive obligation on governments to 
provide information.  Often it is not clear what this obligation specifically entails, but at a 
minimum it seems to include passage of freedom-of-information legislation.  The difference 
between a right to receive information and a right to seek information is not always clear, but 
as will be discussed below, it does appear that a right of access is more contingent on the right 
to seek information than on the right to receive it.     
 The Inter-American Court was the first international human rights court to rule that 
access to information is a human right.188  The 2006 ruling was based on the rights to seek and 
receive information that are guaranteed in the American Convention.  In Reyes et al. v Chile, 
the court ruled: 
By expressly stipulating the right to “seek and receive information,” article 13 
of the Convention protects the right of all individuals to request access to 
State-held information. . . .  Consequently, this article protects the right of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
rapporteur is to “gather all relevant information . . . of discrimination against, threats or use of violence and 
harassment, including persecution and intimidation, directed at persons seeking to exercise or to promote the 
exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression as affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and, where applicable, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” ECOSOC, Comm. on 
H.R. Res. 1993/45, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1993/45, ¶ 13 (Mar. 5, 1993).  He also is mandated to gather 
information and lobby governments regarding these rights, and to accept individual complaints. The resolution 
also requests that the special rapporteur submit an annual “report covering the activities relating to his or her 
mandate, noting the work being conducted by other mechanisms of the Commission and Sub-Commission which 
touches on the right to freedom of expression and opinion, containing recommendations to the Commission and 
providing suggestions on ways and means to better promote and protect the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression in all its manifestations, as affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, where 
applicable, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Id at ¶ 13-18. In 2002, the special 
rapporteur was further mandated to “transmit urgent appeals and communications to states with regard to 
individuals or professionals in the field of information who have been reported to be discriminated against, 
threatened with the use of violence, persecuted, intimidated or harassed for seeking to exercise or to promote the 
exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; undertake fact-finding country visits; and submit 
annual reports on activities, identification of trends and methods of work, and addressing specific thematic issues 
to the Commission.” ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 2002/48, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/48 (Apr. 23, 2002). 
The mandate has continued to be extended. See ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 2003/42, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2003/42 (2003); ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 2004/42, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/42 (Apr. 
19, 2004); and the Human Rights Council Res., UN Doc. A/HRC/7/L.24, ¶ 4 (Mar. 25, 2008) (encouraging the 
special rapporteur to “consider approaches taken to access to information with a view to sharing best practices”). 
 
188 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
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individual to receive such information and the positive obligation of the State 
to provide it.189   
 
Although the court did not elaborate on this line of reasoning, it did rely heavily on the 
conclusions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American 
Commission).190  The Inter-American Commission also had reviewed the case and submitted 
its conclusions to the Inter-American Court.  Those conclusions are detailed in the court’s 
decision.191   
The Inter-American Commission’s submission to the court distinguished between the 
words “seek” and “receive,” arguing, “Given that the freedom to receive information should 
prevent public authorities from interrupting the flow of information to individuals, the word 
seek would logically imply an additional right.”192  This additional right, the commission 
further reasoned, creates a positive obligation on government to provide information.  This is 
because the American Convention requires that the least restrictive interpretation193 be applied 
to the convention’s provisions;194 therefore, the commission stated, “an interpretation of the 
word ‘seek’ that protects the right of access to state-held information is appropriate.”195 
                                                 
189 Id. at ¶ 77. 
 
190 In 1959 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was established as an independent organ of the 
OAS, and it held its first session one year later. In 1969 the American Convention on Human Rights was 
adopted. The convention further defined the role of the commission and created the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. According to the convention, once the commission determines a case is admissible and 
meritorious, the commission will make recommendations and, in some cases, present the case to the Inter-
American Court for adjudication, which is what occurred in Reyes. The Inter-American Court hears these cases, 
determines liability under relevant regional treaties and agreements, and assesses and awards damages and other 
forms of reparations to victims of human rights violations. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 544-55. 
 
191 Reyes et al. v. Chile at ¶ 58. 
 
192Reyes v. Chile Inter-Am. Comm. Application to the Inter-Am. Ct., ¶ 57 (July 8, 2005). 
 
193 American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 29.  
 
194 Id. 
 
195 Reyes v. Chile Inter-Am. Comm. Application to the Inter-Am. Ct., supra note 192, at ¶ 59.  
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 The Inter-American Commission Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression (OAS 
special rapporteur)196 also has discussed why article 13 of the American Convention creates a 
positive obligation on governments to provide information.  According to the special 
rapporteur, arguments that article 13 only creates negative rights, for example the right to be 
free from government interference, are problematic because “government is always obliged to 
take positive steps to ensure that individuals may safely exercise their fundamental rights.”197  
In other words, the very act of signing the American Convention creates positive obligations 
on governments. 
 The UN Commission on Human Rights (UN Commission)198 and the UN freedom of 
expression special rapporteur also have linked the rights to seek and receive information199 to 
a right of access to government information.  The interpretation of this right has evolved over 
time from a right to generally accessible information to a right that specifically includes 
government information.  In 1994 the UN freedom of expression special rapporteur wrote that 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
196 Created by the Inter-American Commission, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 
and Information is a permanent office with functional independence and its own budget. The Inter-American 
Commission created the office, and it operates within the juridical framework of the commission. See articles 40 
and 41 of the American Convention.  See also article 18 of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. See generally Santiago A. Canton, The Role of the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression in Promoting Democracy in the Americas, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 307 (2002). 
 
197 2003(a)  Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 178, at 5.  
 
198 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was created in 1946 in response to the United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter, signed June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945)). The 
charter mandated that a commission promoting human rights be established. The commission is the only human 
rights organ that is mandated by the UN Charter.  It was the first international body empowered to promote 
human rights internationally and was responsible for the drafting of the covenant and the declaration.  Although 
as a policymaking entity its pronouncements are not legally-binding, it has been very successful in drafting 
international human rights norms. HOWARD TOLLEY, THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS xiii (1987). The 
Commission on Human Rights was a subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council and was assisted 
in its work by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The commission was the 
primary mechanism to promote human rights compliance at the United Nations until March 2006, when it was 
replaced by the Human Rights Council. See G.A. Res. 251, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Doc. A/Res/60/252 (Apr. 
2006). See generally Special Issue: Reform of the U5 Human Rights Machinery, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 7 (2007). 
 
199 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(2). 
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the right of access to information “entails the right to seek information inasmuch as this 
information is generally accessible.  It is subject to debate whether the press and other media 
can derive any privileged right to seek information above and beyond generally accessible 
information.”200  Four years later, in his 1998 report, the special rapporteur, for the first time, 
explicitly stated that access to government information is a human right.  He wrote that “the 
right to seek, receive and impart information imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure 
access to information, particularly with regard to information held by Government.” 201  He 
further stated that “in countries where the right to information is most realized, access to 
governmental information is often guaranteed by freedom of information legislation.”202  In 
his 2004 report, he wrote: 
Although international standards establish only a general right to freedom of 
information, the right of access to information, especially information held by 
public bodies, is easily deduced from the expression “to seek [and] receive . . .  
information” as contained in articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.203 
 
Since then, the special rapporteur has continued to state that access to government 
information is a human right linked to the right of freedom of expression.  Often these 
                                                 
200 1994 Report of UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 177, at ¶ 34. In reference to the special rapporteur’s report, a 1995 
resolution of the Commission on Human Rights requested that the special rapporteur “develop further his 
commentary on the right to seek and receive information and to expand on his observations.” ECOSOC, Comm. 
on H.R. Res. 1995/40, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1995/40, ¶ 17 (Mar. 3, 1995). The commission reiterated its 
request in two subsequent resolutions. See ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 1996/53, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1996/53, ¶ 12(d) (Apr. 19, 1996);  ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 1997/27, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1997/27 (Apr. 11, 1997). 
 
201 ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. 1998 Report of Sp. Rapp., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/40, ¶ 12 (Jan. 28, 1998). This 
was reiterated in the special rapporteur’s 1999 report, ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. 1999 Report of Sp. Rapp., UN 
Doc.  E/CN.4/1999/64 (Jan. 29 1999). 
 
202 Id. at 1998 Report of UN Sp. Rapp., ¶ 12. 
 
203 2004 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 203, at ¶ 39. 
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statements link governments’ passage of freedom-of-information legislation to ensuring the 
right to freedom of expression. 
The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur’s statements on this matter have 
been approved by the UN Commission on numerous occasions.204  The UN Commission also 
has recognized the right of access to government information.   In a 2005 resolution, the 
commission stressed “the importance of full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information, including the fundamental importance of access to information, to 
democratic participation, to accountability and to combating corruption.”205  The resolution 
further called on states to “adopt and implement laws and policies that provide for a general 
right of public access to information held by public authorities” 206 in order to comply with 
article 19,207 the freedom of expression provision of the Political Covenant. 
 The special rapporteur undertakes fact-finding visits to countries and then submits 
reports on these visits to the countries and the commission.  In several reports, the special 
rapporteur has stated that the right to seek and receive information includes a right of access 
to government information.  For example, in the 2000 report on a visit to Sudan, the special 
rapporteur expressed concern over the lack of freedom-of-information legislation.  He stated 
that “everyone has the right to seek, receive and impart information and that this imposes a 
                                                 
204 ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 1995/40, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1995/40, ¶ 2 (Mar. 3, 1995); ECOSOC, 
Comm. on H.R. Res. 1997/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/27 (Apr. 11, 1997); ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 
1998/42, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/42, ¶ 2 (Apr. 17, 1998). 
 
205 ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. Res. 2005/38, preamble, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/38 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 
206 Id. at ¶ 4(l). 
 
207 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(2). 
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positive obligation on States to ensure access to information.”208  He urged the government to 
ensure that future legislation comply with article 19 of the Political Covenant.   
The Human Rights Committee,209 which monitors the implementation and compliance 
of the Political Covenant, also issues reports on states’ compliance with the Political 
Covenant.210  Although the committee has not explicitly stated that the rights to seek and 
receive information include the right of access to government information, it often has made 
strong statements linking the passage of freedom-of-information legislation to compliance 
with article 19, which guarantees a right to freedom of expression.211   It also is clear that 
many states understand article 19 as creating a positive obligation on states to provide access 
                                                 
208 ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. 2000 Report of Sp. Rapp, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63/Add.1, ¶ 42 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
See also the 2000 Ireland report, which praised Ireland’s freedom-of-information law, stating that the “right to 
freedom of opinion and expression includes the right to seek and receive information, which also means that 
citizens have the right to obtain information of public interest and have the right to inspect official documents.” 
ECOSOC, Comm. on H.R. 2000 Report on the Mission to Ireland, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63/Add.2, ¶ 53 (Jan. 
10, 2000). In a 1999 report on Hungary, the special rapporteur expressed concern about Hungary’s state secrets 
legislation.  The report stated that “[t]he right to freedom of opinion and expression includes the right to seek and 
receive information, which also means that citizens have the right to get information of public interest and have 
the right to inspect official documents.”  This statement was in reaction to a newspaper editor being jailed for 
publishing government information on a proposed hydroelectric dam. The report also stated that a document 
cannot be considered non-public unless it was classified through an official procedure. ECOSOC, Comm. on 
H.R., 1999 Report of UN Sp. Rapp, Report of the Mission to Hungary, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64/Add.2, ¶ 47-9 
(Jan. 29 1999). 
 
209 The committee consists of eighteen experts who are elected by states but do not represent any nation. See 
Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 28.  
 
210 These reports, called concluding observations, are in response to required reports from signatory 
governments.  Under article 40 of the Political Covenant, states are required to submit reports to the Human 
Rights Committee detailing implementation of the covenant within one year of ratification and then when the 
committee requests reports.  In practice this has been about every four years.  The committee then meets with 
government representatives to discuss compliance and the reports submitted by governments about their 
compliance.  The committee then issues its concluding observations about the governments’ compliance.  See 
Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 40. 
 
211 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) Summary Minutes, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1478, ¶ 20-24 (Apr. 4, 
1996); UN HRC List of Issues for Liechtenstein, UN Doc. CCPR/C/81/L/LIE (May 7, 2004); UN HRC 
Summary Minutes, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1478, ¶ 20 (Apr. 4, 1996); UN HRC Concluding Observations on 
India, CCPR/C/70/Add.81, ¶ 12 (Aug. 4, 1997); UN HRC Concluding Observation of  Ukraine, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.52 (July 26, 1995); UN HRC Concluding Observations on Ireland, UN Doc. A/55/40, ¶ 442-51 
(July 24, 2000); UN HRC Concluding Observations on Lithuania, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.87 (Nov. 19, 
1997). 
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to government information.212  For more than a decade, states have been including in their 
reports references to access to information when discussing their compliance with article 19.  
Although ten years ago these references were scarce, they are now commonplace.  Many 
states simply list in their discussions of article 19 that they have freedom-of-information 
legislation.213  Others specifically explain that freedom-of-information legislation is part of 
complying with article 19.  For example, a 2000 report from Trinidad and Tobago specifically 
stated that the “right to receive information” was given legal recognition by a new freedom-
of-information law, which gave the public access to government information.214   
 Other states have detailed their court decisions and elaborated state positions on access 
to information.  In its 1998 report, Israel detailed its supreme court precedent on the right of 
the public to receive information.  The Israeli Supreme Court held that the “right to know” 
                                                 
212 Although it is clear that many states understand article 19 of the Political Covenant as creating a positive 
obligation, a few states have explicitly stated that it does not. The United Kingdom, in its 1994 fourth periodic 
report, went even further and stated that measures ensuring open government “may assist freedom of opinion and 
expression but . . . they are not measures which are required to give effect to the rights conferred by article 19.”   
The report stated that the right to seek, receive, and impart information did not refer to “guaranteeing access to 
information owned by another.”  UN HRC State Report of the United Kingdom, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/Add.3, ¶ 
72 (Dec. 19, 1994).  The 1997 Austrian report to the Human Rights Committee stated that decisions of the 
Austrian Constitutional Court understood a right of access to information only for publicly accessible 
information.  The Austrian report gave an example of a recent case involving a customs officer who seized an 
individual’s periodical.  According to the report, the court ruled that “while there is no obligation on the part of 
the state to ensure access to information or to provide information itself, an obstruction through the active 
intervention by state organs of the procurement of and search for publicly available information was only 
admissible if provided for by law.” UN HRC State Report of Austria, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/Add.3, ¶ 204 (Oct. 
15, 1997). The report stated that “[a]s far as particular cases are concerned, the question of how far the freedom 
to seek information extends is still not settled.”  The report did explain that the Austrian Constitution provided a 
limited obligation on the part of the state to impart information about its activities, but that this obligation was 
not derived from the right to freedom of information. Id. 
 
213 For example, Canada listed federal as well as all provincial legislation relating to access to government 
information in its fourth periodic report. UN HRC State Report of Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/103/Add.5 (Oct. 
15, 1997).  The government of Georgia detailed its freedom-of-information legislation and pointed out 
weaknesses to be amended. UN HRC State Report of Georgia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GEO/2000/2, ¶ 459 (Feb. 26, 
2001). The 1995 Hong Kong report highlighted recent measures taken to improve public access to information 
including an administrative code on public access to government information. UN HRC State Report of United 
Kingdom, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/Add.4, ¶ 242-244 (Aug. 7, 1995). 
 
214 UN HRC State Report of Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc. CCPR/C/TTO/99/3, ¶ 246 (Feb. 22, 2000).  The 
third and fourth periodic reports were submitted as one document. 
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includes “publicizing of the decisions and actions of government authorities and the access of 
the media to information held by public bodies on matters of public interest.”215  The report 
admitted that “disclosure of information by government authorities has not yet become as 
firmly rooted in practice as it is in the decisions of the Supreme Court.” 216  In order to remedy 
this, the report stated, the government was in the process of enacting freedom-of-information 
legislation.217 
The Human Rights Committee also has the authority to receive and rule on individual 
complaints regarding human rights abuses.218  To date, it has only heard one complaint 
pertaining to government information and article 19.  That complaint was filed after a 
newspaper publisher was refused the same access as other reporters to the Canadian Press 
Gallery, a private organization that administers the accreditation for journalists to attend 
Canadian parliamentary proceedings. 219  Robert Gauthier argued that his rights under article 
19220 were violated because “the government of Canada prevents him to seek and receive 
                                                 
215 UN HRC State Report of Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.13, ¶ 604 (Apr. 9, 1998). 
 
216 Id. at ¶ 605. 
 
217 Id. 
 
218 The ability to hear individual complaints is created by the First Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant. 
Only citizens of signatory nations to the Covenant that also sign and ratify the First Optional Protocol can bring 
complaints. The United States is not a signatory nation. Although these decisions are binding, there is no 
enforcement mechanism except diplomatic pressure. Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 UN Doc. GAOR Supp. (no. 16), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976. 
 
219 UN HRC Communication no. 633/1995, Gauthier v. Canada, CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (May 5, 1999). 
Gauthier fought for more than ten years to receive membership in the Parliamentary Press Gallery. Canada, in its 
submission to the committee, said Gauthier did not receive a press pass because he had been uncooperative in 
providing enough information to determine whether he was eligible. Gauthier contended that he had cooperated 
and that the rules were whimsical. Id. at ¶ s 2.5 and 4.9.  
 
220 “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(2). 
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information and observe proceedings on behalf of his readers, and prohibits his access to 
facilities and services provided for the media”221 including access to press releases, itineraries 
of public officials, and the Library of Parliament.  Canada argued that all citizens have access 
to Parliament through a three-tiered pass system.  The press pass grants access to the media 
facilities of Parliament and is only given to accredited members of the Press Gallery.  Canada 
also claimed that Gauthier was not significantly disadvantaged because parliamentary 
proceedings were broadcast to the public. 
 The committee did not accept Canada’s argument.  It stated, “[I]n view of the 
importance of access to information about the democratic process . . . the Committee does not 
accept the State party’s argument and is of the opinion that the author’s exclusion constitutes 
a restriction of his right guaranteed under paragraph 2 of article 19 to have access to 
information.”222  Although this ruling is narrow in that it applies to a government restriction 
on information that was accessible to other journalists, it does indicate that in some 
circumstances, the Human Rights Committee understands the right to seek and receive 
information as including a right of access to information held by the government.  
As stated above, the African Charter includes a right to receive information but not a 
right to seek information.  The 2002 African Commission’s adoption of the Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, an elaboration of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression within the African Charter,223 changed that.  Not only did the declaration 
incorporate the right to seek information, it also explicitly stated that “respect for freedom of 
                                                 
221 Id. at ¶ 8.2. 
 
222
 Id. at ¶ 13.5. 
 
223 See African Charter, supra note 53 
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expression, as well as the right of access to information held by public bodies and [private] 
companies, will lead to greater public transparency and accountability, as well as to good 
governance and the strengthening of democracy.”224  
In 2007, the African Commission also expanded the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Africa225 to include overseeing implementation and 
compliance of the right of access to government information.226  The resolution states in part 
that the “right of access to information, which is a component of the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression, is indeed covered by the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.”227 
Many NGOs also argue that the rights to seek and receive information include a right 
of access to government information.  Several NGOs have stated this proposition in 
communications to governments regarding freedom-of-information legislation.  For example, 
the NGO Article 19 wrote in a memorandum to the Ugandan government: 
In these international human rights instruments, freedom of information was 
not set out separately but was instead included as part of the fundamental right 
to freedom of expression. Freedom of expression, as noted above, includes the 
right to seek, receive and impart information. Freedom of information, 
including the right to access information held by public authorities, is a core 
element of the broader right to freedom of expression.228 
                                                 
224 African Declaration, supra note 185, at preamble and section 4. 
 
225 The OAS special rapporteur was created in 2004 to investigate and analyze member states’ compliance with 
the right to freedom of expression.  The rapporteur’s mandate includes country visits, public interventions, and 
the submission of country reports to the African Commission. See African Commission Resolution on the 
Mandate and Appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Africa, ACHPR/Res. 71 
(XXXVI) 04 (Dec. 2004). 
 
226 African Commission Resolution the Expansion of the Mandate and Re-appointment of the Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, ACHPR/Res. 122 (XXXXII) (2007).  
 
227 Id. at preamble. 
 
228 Article 19, Memorandum on the Ugandan Access to Information Bill, 2004 (Bill 5o. 7), 3 (May 2004), 
available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/uganda-bill-no.-7.pdf (lasted visited Oct. 10, 2008). See also  
Access Info Europe, Analysis and Recommendations For Strengthening Montenegro’s Law on Free Access to 
Information,  5 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.access-info.org/?id=23 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); 
Access Info Europe, Submission to UK Government on Draft Regulation on Limits and Fees for FOI Requests 
(Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.access-info.org/?id=23 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Article 19, 
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Numerous NGO reports on access to information also explicitly state that the 
rights to seek and receive information found in the UN Declaration and Political 
Covenant includes a right of access to government information.229  Several 
acknowledge that the right to government information is vague but then use the 
statements from the UN freedom of expression special rapporteur230 to argue that the 
right has evolved over time to include a right to government information.231 
                                                                                                                                                        
Memorandum on the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on “Principles of and Guarantees for Freedom of 
Information,” 2-4 (June 2004) available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/uzbekistan-law-on-protection-
of-state-secrets-.pdf (lasted visited Oct. 10, 2008); Article 19, Memorandum on the Draft Malawian Access to 
Information Bill, 3 (March 2004), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/malawi-access-to-info-bill-
march-2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Article 19, Memorandum on the Proposal for the Adoption of the 
Law on Free Access to Information of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1 (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/macedonia-freedom-of-information-oct-2004.pdf  (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008); Article 19, Memorandum on the Macedonian Law on Free Access to Public Information, 2 (Nov. 2003), 
available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/macedonia-freedom-of-information-oct-2004.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2008); Article 19, Memorandum on Mozambique’s Draft Bill on Access to Sources of Information, 2 
(June 2005), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/mozambique-july-2005.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008); Article 19, Memorandum on the Draft Paraguayan Free Access to Public Information Law, 2 (Feb. 
2004), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/paraguay-access-to-information-feb-2004.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008); Article 19, Memorandum on 5epal’s Draft Public Information Act, 2 (Jan. 2004), 
available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/nepal-information-act-jan-2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008); Article 19, Memorandum on Two Drafts of the Law on Access to Public Information of Argentina,  4 
(July 2005), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/argentina-access-to-public-information.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 
229 See, e.g., Banisar, Freedom of Information around the World 2006, supra note 9, at 9-10; Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative,  Open Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth, 12-13 
(2003), available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2003/default.htm (lasted 
visited Oct. 10, 2008); Maja Daruwala & Venkatesh Nayak (eds.), Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Our 
Rights, Our Information: Empowering people to demand rights through knowledge, 10 (2007), available at 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/rti/our_rights_our_information.pdf  (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008); Open Society Justice Initiative, The Rising Tide: Freedom of Information in Southeast Europe, Report of 
a Meeting held in Zagreb, Croatia, 20-22 March 2003,  2 (July 2003), available at 
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102074 (lasted visited Oct. 10, 2008); Article 19, Under 
Lock and Key: Freedom of Information and the Media in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 10-1 (Apr. 2005), 
available at http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/FOI_and_Media_in_the_South_Caucasus_English.pdf  (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 
230 See 1998 Report of UN Sp. Rapp, supra note 201. 
 
231 At least two NGO reports state that the rights to seek and receive information do not currently include a right 
to government information. “There is as yet no fixed international standard governing the right of access to 
information held by public bodies. International treaty law, as it currently stands, establishes only a general right 
to freedom of information.” Open Society Justice Initiative, Transparency & Silence, A Survey of Access to 
Information Laws and Practices in 14 Countries, 27 (2006), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/osji/articles_publications/publications/transparency_20060928 (lasted visited 
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Thus far the European Court of Human Rights has not ruled that the right to freedom 
of expression explicitly recognized in the European Convention includes a right to 
government information.  Unlike the Political Covenant and the American Convention, the 
European Convention contains only the right to receive information, not the right to seek 
information.232  Although the court has repeatedly recognized that the right to receive 
information includes “the right of the public to be properly informed”233 and “the public’s 
right to be informed of a different perspective,”234 thus far, the court has refused to recognize 
a right of access to government information.  In three separate cases, the court has ruled that 
the freedom of receive information cannot be construed as imposing on the government 
positive obligations to collect and disseminate information.235  In each case, the court used 
language to limit the holdings to “circumstances such as those of the present case.”236  This 
                                                                                                                                                        
Oct. 10, 2008); “Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – a universal right of all ‘to seek, 
receive and impart information …’ – is a starting point for legislating for access to information, but it only takes 
us so far. It is aimed at curtailing government censorship rather than promoting government transparency. Thus 
the task of the reformer is to place flesh on the bones of Article 19, and to do so for social as well as economic 
reasons.” Transparency International, 2003 Global Corruption Report, 9 (2003), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2003 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  
 
232 European Convention, art. 10, supra note 55. According to Giorgio Malinverni, European Court of Human 
Right Ad Litem Judge representing Switzerland, drafters of article 10 purposely left out the right “to seek” 
information because of fear that it might create positive obligations on governments. Giorgio Malinverni, 
Freedom of Information in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 443, 449 (1983). 
 
233 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 64-6 (1979); Open Door and Dublin Well 
Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 55 (1992). See also Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A), ¶ 41 (1986); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 63 (1992). 
 
234 Sener v. Turkey, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 377, ¶ 46 (2000). 
 
235 See Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 74 (Mar. 26, 1987) (holding that “article 10 does not, in 
circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on the individual a right of access to a register containing 
information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such 
information to the individual.”); Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 52 (1989) (holding “in 
the circumstances of the present case, Article 10 does not embody an obligation on the State concerned to impart 
the information in question to the individual”); Guerra and others v. Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357, ¶ 53 (1998) 
(holding that “freedom [to receive information] cannot be construed as imposing on a State, in circumstances 
such as those of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion.”) 
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suggests that the court has not definitively ruled out such an obligation.237  In fact, in a 2006 
ruling determining the admissibility of a complaint under the European Convention,238 the 
court held that article 10, the freedom of expression provision of the European Covenant,239 
granted a Czech environmental NGO a right of access to government documents regarding the 
design and construction of a nuclear reactor.240  Referring to previous court precedent, the 
court stated that “it is difficult to deduce from the Convention a general right of access to data 
and documents of an administrative nature.”241  This notwithstanding, the court held that, 
under the circumstances of the case – in which the NGO was a party to an administrative 
proceeding reviewing the environmental impact of the reactor – the rejection of the NGO’s 
request for information  interfered with “its right to receive information” under article 10.242  
Ultimately, the court ruled that the Czech authorities had properly justified their refusal to 
provide the information, but the important point is that article 10 was considered to be 
applicable in the first place.243   
                                                                                                                                                        
236 Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 74 (Mar. 26, 1987). 
 
237 According to the court, “While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in the 
interest of legal certainty, forseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, 
from precedents laid down in previous cases. . . . It is of critical importance that the Convention is interpreted 
and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by 
the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or 
improvement.” Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 74 (2002).  
 
238 Committees of three judges act as a filter for applications.  By unanimous vote, the judges may declare 
individual applications inadmissible in clear circumstances, and their decision is final. See European Convention, 
supra note 55, at art. 35. 
 
239 European Convention, supra note55, at art. 10. 
 
240 Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. no. 19101/03 (July 10, 2006). 
 
241 Id. at ¶ 26. 
 
242 Id. at ¶ 10. 
 
243 Some scholars argue that the recent decision by the Inter-American Court, Claude Reyes v. Chile, will have a 
significant impact on the European Human Rights System. “The Court's decision may prompt the European 
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The following sections will discuss the self-governance rationale and the good-
governance rationale.  The self-governance rationale is based on the idea that access to 
government information is essential for democracy because in order for citizens to give their 
consent or to participate in the political process, they must have access to government 
information.  The good-governance rationale is based on the concept that access to 
government information is necessary in order to hold governments accountable for their 
actions and to help prevent government abuse and corruption.  The two rationales are not 
mutually exclusive and are often presented together in human rights documents.  Certainly 
government corruption will hamper citizen participation; nonetheless, these two concepts 
represent two separate rationales because the latter rationale is not always contingent on the 
former.  In other words, democratic governance is not essential in order for access to 
government information to help prevent and expose government corruption.   
 
Self-Governance Rationale 
In a variety of areas, the Inter-American human rights system has emphasized the role 
of access to government information for effective self-governance.   In the Reyes et al. v. 
Chile decisions, both the Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission 
emphasized the role of freedom of expression and information in a democracy.  Both cited the 
following Inter-American Court advisory opinion when declaring that freedom of expression 
includes a right to government information:  
Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a 
democratic society rests. It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court to broaden its interpretation of the right to access information in all instances, and not only in cases where 
the lack of information threatens the exercise of other fundamental human rights.” Anna Cabot & Suzanne 
Shams, Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems, 14 NO. 2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 60, 61 (2007). 
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It is also a conditio[n] sine qua non for the development of political parties, 
trade unions, scientific and cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to 
influence the public. It represents, in short, the means that enable the 
community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. 
Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is not a 
society that is truly free.244 
 
The Inter-American Court ruling further declared in Reyes that the “State’s actions should be 
governed by the principles of disclosure and transparency in public administration that enable 
all persons subject to its jurisdiction to exercise the democratic control of those actions.”245  
The court’s decision in Reyes also referred to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 
which was adopted in 2001 by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
(OAS).246  The legally-binding Democratic Charter247 sets forth principles of democracy as 
well as a framework for political action by the OAS when the democratic practices of a 
member country are jeopardized.  The Reyes court linked two articles of the charter to 
contend that access to government information is essential for healthy democracies and for 
                                                 
244 Inter-Am. Ct. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 175, at ¶ 70 (Nov. 13, 1985). 
 
245 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 86 (Sept. 19, 2006).  
 
246 Id. at ¶ 79. The Organization of American States (OAS) is an international organization headquartered in 
Washington, D.C.  Its members are the 35 independent states of the Americas. The OAS is a multilateral forum 
“for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights, and confronting shared problems such as poverty, 
terrorism, illegal drugs and corruption.” The general assembly is its supreme decision-making body whereby 
member countries set major policies and goals. It gathers the hemisphere’s ministers of foreign affairs once a 
year in regular session. Ongoing actions are guided by the permanent council, made up of ambassadors 
appointed by the members. See http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng/. 
 
247 The Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted on Sept 11, 2001, by a special session of the General 
Assembly of the OAS in Lima, Peru. It is an Inter-American instrument with the central aim of strengthening 
and upholding democratic institutions in the nations of the Americas. The charter, which is binding on all 34 of 
the currently active OAS member states, spells out what democracy entails and specifies how it should be 
defended when it is threatened. The charter pronounces maintenance of “the rule of law” and “the separation of 
powers and independence of the branches of government” as essential to any democracy, and it prohibits any 
“unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member 
state.” Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII-E/01), 40 ILM (2001) 
1289, art. 19 (Sept. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Democratic Charter]. The charter is a resolution of the general 
assembly of the OAS.  The charter sets forth principles of democracy and a framework for political action by the 
OAS when the democratic order of a member state is at risk or unconstitutionally interrupted. See T. D. Rudy, A 
Quick Look at the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS: What Is It and Is It ‘Legal’? 33 SYRACUSE J 
INT'L L AND COMMERCE 237 (2005). 
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citizens to participate politically in society.  Article 4 of the charter states that “[t]ransparency 
in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on the part of 
governments, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are 
essential components of the exercise of democracy.”248  Article 6 states:  “It is the right and 
responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their own development.  
This is also a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy. Promoting 
and fostering diverse forms of participation strengthens democracy.”249  These two provisions, 
when taken together, according the court, create a right of access to government information. 
Also, starting in 2003, the OAS general assembly every year has passed a resolution 
on strengthening democracy through access to public information.250  These resolutions set 
out specific mandates to promote passage and effective implementation of access-to-
information legislation of member countries.251  Each of these resolutions emphasizes the 
relationship between self-governance and access to government information.  For example, a 
2003 resolution stated: 
[A]ccess to public information is a requisite for the very functioning of 
democracy, greater transparency, and good governance and that, in a 
representative and participatory democratic system, the citizenry exercises its 
constitutional rights, inter alia, the rights to political participation, the vote, 
                                                 
248 Democratic Charter, id. at art. 4. 
 
249 Democratic Charter, id. at art. 6. 
 
250 OAS G.A. Res., Access to Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, AG/RES.1932 (XXXIII-O/03) 
(June 10, 2003); OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2057 (XXXIV-O/04) (June 
8, 2004); Access to Public Information, OA.S Doc. AG/RES. 2121 (XXXV-O/05) (June 7, 2005); OAS G.A. 
Res. Access to Public Information, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2252 (XXXVI-O/06) (June 6, 2006); OAS G.A. Res. 
Access to Public Information, OAS Doc. AG/RES.2288 (XXXVII-O/07) (June 5, 2007). 
 
251 See, e.g., OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, AG/RES. 2057 (XXXIV-O/04) (June 8, 2004) 
(instructing the special rapporteur to help member countries draft and implement freedom-of-information 
legislation). 
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education, and association, by means of broad freedom of expression and free 
access to information.252 
 
The first paragraph of each resolution states that the general assembly resolves to “affirm that 
everyone has the freedom to seek, receive, access, and impart information and that access to 
public information is a requisite for the very exercise of democracy.”253 
 As mandated by several OAS general assembly resolutions,254  the OAS special 
rapporteur includes a section on access to information in his annual reports.  In light of these 
mandates, the OAS special rapporteur’s 2003 annual report included a section on the 
theoretical framework behind a right of access to government information.  The role of 
government information in a democracy was heavily emphasized in his analysis.  According 
to the report: 
It is widely acknowledged that without access to state-held information, the 
political benefits that flow from a climate of free expression cannot be fully 
realized. . . . Access to information promotes accountability and transparency 
within the States and enables a robust and informed public debate.  In this way, 
access to information empowers citizens to assume an active role in 
government, which is a condition for sustaining a healthy democracy.255 
                                                 
252 2003 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, supra note 250, at the preamble. 
 
253 Id. at ¶ 1. See also 2004 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, 2005 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public 
Information; 2006 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information; 2007 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public 
Information, supra note 250.  
 
254 2003 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, supra note 250, at ¶ 6; 2004 OAS G.A. Res. Access to 
Public Information, supra note 250, at ¶ 7; 2005 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information,  supra note 250, 
at ¶ 6 (June 7, 2005); 2006 OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, supra  note 250, at ¶ 9; 2007 OAS 
G.A. Res. Access to Public Information, supra note 250, at ¶ 10 (June 5, 2007). The OAS special rapporteur has 
been including sections on access to information in its annual reports since the first report in 1998. The 2003 
resolution was the first time the general assembly mandated the inclusion of information on access to 
information. 
 
255 See 2003 Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm. on H.R., Vol. III, Report of the Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev, Chap. IV, ¶ 13 
(Dec. 29, 2003) [hereinafter 2003b Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp.]. The special rapporteur also has linked 
political participation to the right to information in several other annual reports. See, e.g., 1999 Annual Report of 
the Inter-Am. Comm. on H.R., Vol. III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev., 19-20 (2000) [hereinafter 1999 Report of 
the OAS Sp. Rapp.]; 2000 Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm. on H.R., Vol. III, Report of the Office of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev., 20 
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Several of the OAS special rapporteur’s reports on country visits have stated that 
access to information is one of the most effective instruments for strengthening democracy.256  
For example, in its 2005 report on Columbia, he wrote that access to information “enables 
robust and informed debate” and “empowers citizens to assume an active role in government, 
which is a condition for sustaining a healthy democracy.”257  A report on Venezuela also 
stated that access to government information strengthens democratic institutions and therefore 
Venezuela should ensure that effective guarantees of access exist.258   
The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,259 which interprets article 13 
of the American Convention and was approved in 2000 by the Inter-American Commission, 
also makes this link between access to information and democracy.  The preamble to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2001) [2000 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp.]. The special rapporteur also has made this link in reports of country 
visits on compliance. See, e.g, the 2001 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on the Situation of Freedom of Expression 
in Paraguay,  OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.110, Doc.52, ¶ 27 (Mar. 9, 2001) [hereinafter OAS Sp. Rapp. Report 
on Paraguay]; 2003 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Panama, OAS 
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, Doc. 47, ¶ 130-1 (July 3, 2003) [hereinafter OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Panama]; 2003 
Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Haiti, OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, Doc. 48, ¶ 28 (July 15, 2003) [hereinafter OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Haiti]. 
 
256 OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Paraguay, id. at ¶ 27; OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Panama, id. at ¶ 131; OAS Sp. 
Rapp. Report on Haiti, id. at ¶ 28; Report of the OAS Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Freedom of 
Expression in Columbia,  OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 51, ¶ 127 (Aug. 31, 2005).  
 
257 OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Columbia, id.  at ¶ 127. 
 
258 2003 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Venezuela, OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 4 rev. 2, at ¶ 481-82 (Dec. 29, 2003) [hereinafter OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on 
Venezuela]. 
 
259 See 2000 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 255 at 19-23 [hereinafter Inter-Am. Comm. Freedom of 
Expression Declaration]. The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression was approved by the Inter-
American Commission at its 108th regular session in October 2000. According to the OAS special rapporteur, 
the declaration was created “[f]ollowing widespread debate among different civil society organizations” and 
“constitutes a basic document for interpreting Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Its 
adoption not only serves as an acknowledgment of the importance of safeguarding freedom of expression in the 
Americas, but also incorporates international standards into the Inter-American system to strengthen protection 
of the right [to freedom of expression].” Id. at 23. The declaration was also positively acknowledged by the UN 
special rapporteur. See ECOSOC Comm. H.R., 2001 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/64, ¶ 
11 (Feb. 13, 2001). 
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declaration states in part that “guaranteeing the right to access to information held by the State 
will ensure greater transparency and accountability of governmental activities and the 
strengthening of democratic institutions.”260  The fourth principle of the declaration states that 
governments have an obligation to guarantee a right of access to government information.261  
In his 2000 annual report, the OAS special rapporteur dedicated a section of the report to 
interpreting the principles of the declaration.  Regarding the fourth principle, the OAS special 
rapporteur wrote that “[w]ithout the information that every person is entitled to, it is clearly 
impossible to exercise freedom of expression as an effective vehicle for civic participation or 
democratic oversight of government management.”262 
The UN Human Rights Committee also has linked democratic self-governance to 
access to government information.  In its 1995 Gauthier v. Canada263 ruling, the committee 
linked article 25 of the Political Covenant, which guarantees a right to political 
participation,264 to article 19.265  According to the committee, the two rights together “impl[y] 
that citizens, in particular through the media, should have wide access to information and the 
opportunity to disseminate information and opinions about the activities of elected bodies and 
their members.”266  The committee also has stressed the importance of access to government 
                                                 
260 Inter-Am. Comm. Freedom of Expression Declaration, id, at preamble.  
 
261 Id. at principle 4.  
 
262 2000 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 255, at ¶ 19. 
 
263 UN HRC Commission no. 633/1995, Gauthier v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (May 5, 1999). . 
 
264 See Political Covenant, supra note 46, art. 25. 
 
265 Id. at art. 19(2). 
 
266 UN HRC Commission no. 633/1995, Gauthier v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995, ¶ 13.4 (May 5, 
1999). 
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information in its responses to country reports.267  For example, during a meeting about 
Mauritius’ country report, a committee member, arguing that the country needed freedom-of-
information legislation in order to comply with article 19, stated that “there could be no 
democracy without freedom of information.”268  Several country reports also make this link.  
In discussing its compliance with article 19, Thailand’s country report stated its constitutional 
provision guaranteeing access to government information is important because “[i]n the 
democratic system of government, people are considered to be the owner of sovereignty.  
They have the right to check and have opinion on administration of the government and its 
agencies and officials freely.”269 
The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur, who issues reports on countries’ 
progress in guaranteeing a right to freedom of expression, also has stated that access to 
government information is essential for democracy.  For example, in his 2002 report on 
Argentina, he wrote that freedom-of-information legislation “was needed in order to comply 
with the internationally recognized principles of publicizing government acts, that freedom of 
access to information is a prerequisite for democratic participation.”270   
In a 2000 annual report, the UN freedom of expression special rapporteur stated that 
access to information “is a right upon which free and democratic societies depend. It is also a 
                                                 
267 See supra note 219, explaining country reports. 
 
268 UN HRC Summary Minutes, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1478, ¶ 24 (Apr. 4, 1996). See also UN HRC Concluding 
Observations on India, supra note 211; UN HRC Concluding Observations on Lithuania, supra note 211; UN 
HRC Concluding Observations on Ukraine, supra note 211. 
 
269 UN HRC Thailand Initial Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/THA/2004/1, ¶ 466 (Aug. 2, 2004). See also UN HRC 
Sri Lanka Fourth Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/LKA/2002/4, at ¶ 362 (Oct. 18, 2002); UN HRC 
Liechtenstein Initial Report, UN Doc. UN Doc. CCPR/C/LIE/2003/1, ¶ 147 (July 8, 2003); UN HRC Finland 
Fifth Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FIN/2003/5, ¶ 263 (July 24, 2003). 
 
270 UN Comm. H.R. Mission to Argentina, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/75/Add.1, ¶ 107 (Jan. 17, 2002); See also UN 
Comm. H.R., 2000 Report on Mission to Ireland, ¶ 75, supra note 208; UN Comm. H.R. 2004 Report on 
Mission to Poland, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/5, ¶ 334 (Jan. 26, 2004). 
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right that gives meaning to the right to participate.”271  In the 2005 annual report, the special 
rapporteur devoted a section of the report to the implementation of a right to access to 
information.  In that section he wrote that “the right of access to information held by public 
bodies has become a benchmark of democratic development.”272  A 2005 UN Commission on 
Human Rights resolution also stressed the importance of access to information for democracy 
and urged governments to pass legislation in order to comply with article 19.273 
Since 1999, the UN freedom of expression special rapporteur, the OAS special 
rapporteur, and the media representative on freedom of the media for the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)274 have issued eight joint declarations on 
freedom of expression, three of which address access to government information.  In all three 
of these, access is linked to democratic participation.275  For example, the 1999 declaration 
states, “Implicit in freedom of expression is the public's right to open access to information 
                                                 
271 2000 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 208, at 42. 
 
272 2004 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 203, at ¶ 38.  
 
273 UN Comm. H.R. Res. 2005/38, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/38, preamble and ¶ 4(l) (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 
274 The Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) is an inter-governmental organization with 56 
member countries from all over the globe.  According to its website, “It offers a forum for political negotiations 
and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation, and puts the political will of the participating States into practice through its unique network of 
field missions.” See OSCE website at http://www.osce.org/. 
 
275 1999 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression Joint Declaration by UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression, ESCOR Comm. on H.R., 1999 Report of the Sp. Rapp., Annex I, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63 (Jan. 18, 
2000) [hereinafter 1999 Freedom of Expression Joint Declaration]; 2004 FOE Joint Declaration by UN Special 
Rapporteur, Media Representative of OSCE, and OAS Special Rapporteur, adopted in Dec. 2004, ESCOR 
Comm. on H.R., 2005 Report of the Sp. Rapp., UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/55, Annex 1 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
2004 Freedom of Expression Joint Declaration]; 2006 FOE Joint Declaration by UN Special Rapporteur, Media 
Representative of OSCE, and OAS Special Rapporteur, Annual Report of the Inter-American Comm., 2006 
Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., Vol. II, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127 Doc. 4, 109 (Mar. 3, 2007) [[hereinafter 2006 
Freedom of Expression Joint Declaration]. 
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and to know what governments are doing on their behalf, without which truth would languish 
and people's participation in government would remain fragmented.”276   
The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa277 and the African 
Commission resolution adopting the Charter also make this link.  The resolution states that 
“freedom of expression, as well as the right of access to information held by public bodies and 
[private] companies, will lead to greater public transparency and accountability, as well as to 
good governance and the strengthening of democracy.”278 
Several NGO declarations also recognize the importance of access to government 
information to democratic participation.  Most notably are the 1995 Johannesburg 
Principles279 and the 1999 Public’s Right to Know Principles on Freedom of Information 
Legislation, 280 both of which have been influential with the UN Commission on Human 
                                                 
276 1999 Freedom of Expression Joint Declaration, id. at ¶ 5..  
 
277 African Declaration, supra note 185. 
 
278  
Id. 
 
279 UN Comm. H.R., 1996 Report of Sp. Rapp., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39, Annex (Mar. 22, 1996) [hereinafter 
Johannesburg Principles]. According to their introduction, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information were created in 1995 by “experts in international law, national 
security and human rights” and are “based on international and regional law and standards relating to the 
protection of human rights, evolving state practice, and the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations.”  The group of experts was convened by the NGO Article 19 in collaboration with the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. The 
Johannesburg Principles have been cited in numerous human rights documents. See, e.g., UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/37, ¶ 82 (Mar. 1, 1996) (stating that “[t]he [UN] Special Rapporteur will from time to time refer to 
these standards to the extent that they are applicable to his mandate”); UN Comm. H.R. Report on Mission to 
Malaysia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64/Add.1, ¶ 52 (Dec. 23, 1998) (suggesting that countries abide by the 
Johannesburg Principles); UN Comm. H.R. Report on the Mission to Turkey,  UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/31/Add., ¶ 
47 (Feb. 11, 1997); UN Comm. H.R. Report on Mission to Argentina, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/75/Add.1, ¶ 110 
(Jan. 17, 2002 ) (encouraging governments to refer to the Johannesburg Principles); OAS G.A. Res. Access to 
Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, 2004, supra note 250; OAS G.A. Res. Access to Public 
Information: Strengthening Democracy, 2006, supra note 250 (acknowledging the principles in preamble to the 
resolution); OAS Sp. Rapp. on Haiti, supra note 255, at ¶ 31 (referring to the Johannesburg Principles “as a 
guide to reconciling the competing interests of national security and freedom of information”). 
 
280 Article 19, Principle of Freedom of Information Legislation: The Public’s Right to Know (the Right to Know 
Principles”, available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/righttoknow.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  
The Principles of FOI have been cited in numerous human rights documents.  See, e.g., OAS 1999 Annual 
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Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  The Public’s Right Know: 
Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation states: “Information is the oxygen of 
democracy.  If people do not know what is happening in their society, if the actions of those 
who rule them are hidden, then they cannot take a meaningful part in the affairs of that 
society.”  The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information also state that freedom of information is vital to democratic society.281 
 
Good-Governance Rationale 
The good-governance rationale is based on the idea that access to information is 
necessary in order to hold governments accountable and to discover and prevent government 
corruption.282  Although closely linked to the self-governance rationale, the good-governance 
rationale is concerned with mitigating government abuse.  Within this rationale it often is 
                                                                                                                                                        
Report, Vol. III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, 
Doc. 3 rev., Vol. III, at 88; UN Comm. on H.R. Res. 2001/47, preamble, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/47 (2001). 
The principles were also endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur, UN Comm. H.R. 2000 Report of Sp. Rapp., 
supra note 208, at ¶ 44.  
 
281 See Johannesburg Principles, supra note 279, at preamble? 
 
282 It is important to note that there are several anti-corruption treaties, some of which have provisions on access 
to government information. Because they are not human rights treaties, they are beyond the scope of this 
research. The UN Convention Against Corruption calls on all member states to adopt legislation criminalizing 
various forms of corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, and concealment of 
proceeds. See UN Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 4, UN GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 108, UN 
Doc. A/RES/58/4 (2003). In March 1997, the Organization for American States adopted the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption, criminalizing transnational bribery in the Western Hemisphere. See Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, OAS, 35 I.L.M. 724 (Mar. 29, 1996). In May 1997, the European 
Union adopted the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union. See European Union Convention on the 
Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the 
European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1. The African Union adopted the African Union Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption, which came into force in August 2006. The Convention requires that signatories 
criminalize a wide range of public sector and private sector bribery, protect whistleblowers, and adopt a 
framework for cross-border enforcement. See Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 
2003, 2nd Sess., Afr. Union, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention%20on%20Combating%20
Corruption.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).  
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argued that access to information can help prevent governments’ despotic or authoritarian 
tendencies that undermine democratic governance.  
The argument that access to information can help mitigate government corruption is 
particularly evident within the Inter-American human rights regime.  The OAS special 
rapporteur has expressed concern about the level of corruption in Latin American countries.  
In his 2001 report, he stated that corruption had “seriously affected the stability of 
democracies in the hemisphere.”283  He further argued that access to information is necessary 
to combat this problem:  
[C]orruption can only be combated effectively through a combination of 
efforts designed to raise the level of transparency in respect of government 
activities. Accordingly, any policy designed to obstruct access to information 
with respect to government activities poses the risk of promoting corruption 
within the institutions of the state, and thus weakening democracies. Access to 
information represents a means of preventing such illegal practices, which are 
inflicting great harm on the countries of the hemisphere.284  
 
In 1998, the Inter-American Commission argued that access to information deters 
corruption.  The 1998 annual report stated, “The legitimacy of government decisions thus 
depends largely on the degree to which they are made public, since only through public 
scrutiny can the risks of corruption and despotism inherent in state secrets or acts of power 
not open to public view be avoided.”285  In the 1999 report, the OAS special rapporteur 
argued that “to abridge freedom of expression and information is to abridge or diminish the 
                                                 
283 Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm. H.R 2001, Vol. III, Report of the Sp. Rapp., Inter. Am. C.H.R. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev, 107 (Apr. 16, 2002). 
 
284 Id. 
 
285 Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. 1998 Annual Report, Inter. Am. C.H.R. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 Rev., ¶ 20 (Apr. 16, 1999). 
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citizens’ control over their public officials and to transform democracy into a system where 
authoritarianism can find fertile ground for imposing itself upon the will of society.”286 
The Inter-American Court’s decision in Reyes also suggested that access to 
information can help hold governments accountable.  As stated previously, the Inter-
American Court ruling in Reyes v. Chile stated that access to information is necessary for 
democratic participation.  The court’s decision further declared that access to government 
information is necessary so citizens “can question, investigate and consider whether public 
functions are being performed adequately.  Access to State-held information of public interest 
can permit participation in public administration through the social control that can be 
exercised through such access.”287  The OAS special rapporteur in several reports assessing 
countries’ compliance with the American Convention, also has stressed the importance of 
access to information to fight corruption,288 and the UN Commission on Human Rights and 
the current Human Rights Council289  have made the link between access to information and 
government corruption.290  
Several NGO publications also discuss the importance of access to information in 
helping to fight corruption.  For example, the NGO Transparency International, which 
                                                 
286 1999 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, supra note 255, at 19-20. 
 
287 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 87 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
288 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Paraguay, supra note 255, at ¶ 32; Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Panama, 
supra note 255, at ¶ 129; Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Columbia, supra note 256, at ¶ 130. 
 
289 For an explanation of the replacement of the Commission on Human Rights with the Human Rights Council, 
see supra note 198.  
 
290 Comm. H.R. Res. 2005/38, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2005/38, preamble (Apr. 19, 2005) (stating that access to 
information is “fundamentally important” to “combating corruption”); Human Rights Council Resolution 7/36, 
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, A/HRC/Res/7/36, preamble (Mar. 28, 2008) (stating that access to information is fundamental to 
preventing corruption). 
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publishes an annual report on the state of corruption globally, dedicated several chapters in its 
2003 report to the relationship between access to information and corruption.  Government 
secrecy, the report argued, is particularly problematic in countries that have recently 
transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democracies.  A healthy access-to-information 
regime is therefore necessary to prevent corruption and ensure healthy democracies.291  Three 
years later, Transparency International published a guide, Using the Right to Information as 
an Anti-Corruption Tool, that trains “anti-corruption” activists to effectively use and fight for 
access legislation.292 
The NGO Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative published a 2003 report, Open 
Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth, which argues that 
access to information is necessary to unearth corruption.  According to the report: “The right 
to access information acts as a source of light to be shone on the murky deals and shady 
transactions that litter corrupt governments.  It enables civil society and especially the media 
to peel back the layers of bureaucratic red tape and political sleight of hand and get to the 
‘hard facts.’”293  
 
 
Freedom of Expression Conceptualization – To Whom the Right is Conferred 
 
Within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the right of access to government 
information belongs to all citizens.  Citizens delegate responsibilities to government 
representatives who then act on the behalf of all citizens; therefore, any information or 
                                                 
291 Transparency International, 2003 Global Corruption Report, supra note 231, at 8. 
 
292 Transparency International, Using the Right to Information as an Anti-Corruption Tool (2006), 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_issues/access_information (last visited Aug. 10, 
2008) [TI Anti-Corruption Tool]. 
 
293 Open Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth, supra note 229, at 20. 
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documents generated in this process belong to the people.  In this sense, government 
information is understood as a public good.  Because government information is owned by 
the public, citizens do not have to show a direct interest in the information in order to have a 
right of access to it.    
It is not always clear whether a person must be a citizen in order to access government 
information.  The terms “citizens,” “everyone,” and “people” often are used interchangeably.  
Although within this conceptualization all citizens have equal rights to government 
information, there also is acknowledgement that those who are disadvantaged within society 
and the media have a special need for government information.  Government information is 
seen as empowering the disenfranchised to gain equality within society.  The media, on the 
other hand, are seen as facilitating citizens’ rights to government information.  This section 
will discuss citizens’ right to government information, the significance of this right to the 
disenfranchised, and the role of the media in facilitating the right. 
According the Inter-American Court in the Reyes decision the right to information is 
both an individual and a societal right.  The court stated:  
The delivery of information to an individual can, in turn, permit it to circulate 
in society, so that the latter can become acquainted with it, have access to it, 
and assess it. In this way, the right to freedom of thought and expression 
includes the protection of the right of access to State-held information, which 
also clearly includes the two dimensions, individual and social, of the right to 
freedom of thought and expression that must be guaranteed simultaneously by 
the State.294 
 
The OAS general assembly has repeatedly recognized that government information 
belongs to the people.  In all five of its resolutions on access to information, the first principle 
states that government information belongs to everyone.  The OAS special rapporteur also has 
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made it clear that government information belongs to the people.  Referring to the right of 
access to government information in his 2000 report interpreting the principles of the 
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,295 he wrote:  
This right acquires even greater significance because it is closely related to the 
principle of transparency in administration and the public nature of 
government activities. The State is a vehicle for ensuring the common good. In 
this context, the owner of the information is the individual who has delegated 
the management of public affairs to his or her representatives.296 
 
This exact language was reiterated in the OAS special rapporteur’s 2003 report on Panama’s 
implementation of the American Convention’s freedom of expression provision.297  In a 2003 
report on Haiti, he wrote that because access to information is “one of the basic pillars of any 
democracy,” it is the “Haitian people, who delegated to representatives the handling of public 
affairs, who should have the information. The State, in this regard, is a means for attaining the 
common well-being.”298    
The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur also has stated this view in 
numerous reports.  For example, in a section in his 2000 report on implementing a right of 
information, he wrote that he was 
concern[ed] about the tendency of Governments, and the institutions of 
Government, to withhold from the people information that is rightly theirs in 
that the decisions of Governments, and the implementation of policies by 
public institutions, have a direct and often immediate impact on their lives and 
may not be undertaken without their informed consent.299 
                                                 
295 See 2000 Report of the Sp. Rapp., supra note 208. 
 
296 Id. at 18. See also 1999 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 255, at 29 (stating that “[i]t is to the 
individual who delegated the administration of public affairs to his or her representatives that belongs the right of 
information”). 
 
297 2003 OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Panama, supra note 255, at ¶ 128. 
 
298 2003 OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Haiti, supra note 255, at ¶ 28.  
 
299 ECOSOC, UN Comm. H.R., 2000 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63, ¶ 43 (Jan. 18, 
2000). See also 2004 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 203, at ¶ 41, 1997 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., 
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A 2006 joint declaration of the UN special rapporteur, the OAS rapporteur, and the OSCE 
media representative also stated, “Public bodies, whether national or international, hold 
information not for themselves but on behalf of the public and they should, subject only to 
limited exceptions, provide access to that information.” 300  The African Commission’s 
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa also makes this point, stating: 
“Public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the public good and 
everyone has a right to access this information.” 301   
Several NGOs also have stated that everyone has a right to government information.  
For example, the NGO Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative’s 2003 report Open Sesame: 
Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth states: 
Information is a public good like clean air and drinking water.  It belongs not 
to the state, the government of the day or civil servants, but to the public.  
Officials do not create information for their own benefit alone, but for the 
benefit of the public they serve, as part of the legitimate and routine discharge 
of the government’s duties.  Information is generated with public money by 
public servant paid out of public funds.  As such, it cannot be unreasonably 
kept from citizens.302 
 
 The influential 1995 Johannesburg Principles303 and the 1999 Public’s Right to Know 
Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation also state that this right belongs to 
everyone.304 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
300 2006 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 2. 
 
301 African Declaration, supra note 185, at part 4, ¶ 1. 
 
302 Open Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth, supra note 299, at 10. 
 
303 See, Johannesburg Principles, supra note 279. 
 
304 See Right to Know Principles, supra note 280.  See also the Lagos Declaration on the Right of Access to 
Information, ¶ 1, available at Media Rights Agenda, http://www.mediarightsagenda.org/right%20to%20foi.html 
(lasted visited Oct. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Lagos Declaration]. According to the Lagos Declaration’s 
introduction, the declaration was adopted at the Regional Workshop on Freedom of Information Africa held 
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Within this conceptualization, the right to government information also means that the 
public does not have to show a direct interest in the information.  For example, the Inter-
American Court wrote in Reyes v. Chile, “The information should be provided without the 
need to prove direct interest or personal involvement in order to obtain it, except in cases in 
which a legitimate restriction is applied.”305   
In a 2003 report on the Panama, the OAS special rapporteur chastised the government 
for requiring that those requesting government information must show a “direct personal 
interest” in the information.  According to the special rapporteur, this requirement was 
“inconsistent” with the American Convention and international standards.306  The UN special 
rapporteur also has stated that no grounds for requesting the information should be 
required.307  This concept is reiterated in Article 19’s Principles of Freedom of Information 
Legislation,308 the Lima Principles,309 and the Lagos Declaration.310 
Within this conceptualization, the right to information is also seen as being 
particularly important for the poor and disenfranchised because government information can 
help the poor better their lives.  In a 2003 report, the OAS special rapporteur stated: 
                                                                                                                                                        
September 2006 and organized by Media Rights Agenda and the Open Society Justice Initiative. The workshop 
was attended by representative of 30 NGOs from 16 African countries. Expert presentations were given by 
representatives from FOI advocates from Albania, Bulgaria, and the United States. 
 
305 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
306 2003 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Panama, supra note 255, at ¶ 137-8. 
 
307 2005 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 275, at ¶ 41. 
 
308 Right to Know Principles, supra note 280, at 2. 
 
309 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/64, Annex II, principle 1 (2001) [hereinafter Lima Principles]. The Lima Principles 
were adopted by the Seminar on Information for Democracy held in Lima Peru in Nov. 2000.  The OAS Special 
Rapporteur helped draft the principles.  These principles have been referenced in all OAS General Assembly 
resolutions on access to information. They also were welcomed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression in his 2001 annual report, id. at ¶ 10.  
 
310 See Lagos Declaration, supra note 304, at ¶ 1.  
 
77 
 
[A]ccess to information is also a critical tool in the alleviation of 
socioeconomic injustice. The poor often suffer from a lack of access to 
information about the very services that the government offers to help them 
survive. Disenfranchised groups need access to information about these 
services as well as the many other decisions made by government and private 
agencies that profoundly affect their lives.311 
 
Often access to information is understood as ensuring that the poor are able to 
participate in society.  The OAS special rapporteur made this point in a 2002 report on 
freedom of expression and poverty.  “[I]t is the poor who are least able to obtain information 
about the decisions and public policies that affect them directly, thus denying them 
information that is vital to their lives, such as information about free services, awareness of 
their rights, access to justice, etc.”312  He went on to assert, “Encouraging and promoting 
information access among the poorest sectors of the hemisphere’s societies will enable their 
active and informed participation regarding the design of public policies and measures that 
directly affect their lives.”313  The OAS special rapporteur further asserted that the poor are 
disproportionately affected by government corruption, which can be ameliorated by access to 
government information.  “Lack of access to information clearly places the neediest sectors of 
society in a vulnerable situation vis-à-vis potential abuses by private citizens and acts of 
corruption on the part of state agencies and their officers,” he said.314 
The NGO Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative published a report in 2008 based 
on the premise that access to information empowers the poor.  The report provides numerous 
                                                 
311 2003b Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. Report, supra note 255, at chap IV, ¶ 17. 
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case studies to illustrate this point.  For example, in India, a group of the poorest citizens in 
New Delhi rallied together to demand information about why poor families were having 
problems obtaining basic necessities using their government food ration cards.  As a result of 
the organized inquiries, the New Delhi government changed its ration-card system.315   
Although within this conceptualization, media do not have greater rights to 
government information than individuals, the freedom-of-expression conceptualization does 
recognize that media play an important role in facilitating citizens’ right to government 
information.  This role is to act as a “watchdog” over government to prevent and uncover 
government abuse.  A report from the NGO Article 19 expresses this concept succinctly: 
[T]he media do not have a special right to information; rather it is a right 
pertaining to all people. Nevertheless, the media are key players in exercising 
this right. . . . The media are a vital force in the democratic system of checks 
and balances because they take a leading role in shaping public opinion. They 
help expose corruption and malpractice. Only with unobstructed access to 
government-held information can the media stimulate political debate and 
function as a communication channel between the authorities and the public.316  
 
In this sense, the media can be understood as facilitating the social dimension of the 
right to information as opposed to the individual dimension, as explained in the Inter-
American Court’s decision, Reyes v. Chile, 317 discussed previously.318 
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The OAS general assembly has repeatedly emphasized the role of media in 
disseminating government information.  In four of its five resolutions on access to 
government information, it has stated that media facilitate citizens’ right to information.319  
The Lima Principles also acknowledge that media facilitate a right to information.  The 
principles state that “in furtherance of the individual’s right to information, journalists must 
be guaranteed conditions and facilities to access information and have the right to disseminate 
it in the exercise of their profession.”320 In a report on access to information, the NGO 
Commonwealth Initiative wrote: 
Where the media is unable to get reliable information held by governments and 
other powerful interests, it cannot fulfill its role to the best of its abilities. 
Journalists are left to depend on leaks and luck or to rely on press releases and 
voluntary disclosures provided by the very people they are seeking to 
investigate. . . .  A sound access regime provides a framework within which the 
media can seek, receive and impart essential information accurately and is as 
much in the interests of government as it is of the people.321 
 
In facilitating citizens’ right to government information, the media are often seen as 
acting as a watchdog over government.   In several country reports, the UN special rapporteur 
has made this connection.  For example, in his report on Ireland, he wrote: 
[A] democracy can only work if the citizens and their elected representatives 
are fully informed. Therefore, with the exception of a few types of documents, 
it is desirable to make government documents public in order to allow the 
citizen to know how public funds are disbursed. Thus, the Special Rapporteur 
notes that it is indispensable that journalists should have access to information 
held by public authorities, granted on an equitable and impartial basis, so they 
can carry out their role as a watchdog in a democratic society.322 
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The OAS special rapporteur also has made this link.  In a 2002 report he wrote that the right 
of access to government information helps journalists to “expose corrupt practices for public 
scrutiny and to guarantee the participation of all segments of society in public policy 
decisions that affect their daily lives.”323 
 
Freedom of Expression Conceptualization – The Type of Information Guaranteed 
Within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, citizens have a right of access to 
all government information, except information that is explicitly limited for justifiable reasons 
that will be discussed in a subsequent section.  This presumption of disclosure is based on the 
idea that citizens are the owners of government information.  As discussed previously, 
information is understood as public good that governments hold on behalf of citizens.  For 
example, the OAS special rapporteur argued that the presumption of disclosure is based in the 
idea that “information held by public authorities is not acquired for the benefit of the officials 
that control it, but for the public as a whole.”324  The presumption of disclosure often is 
referred to as the principle of maximum disclosure.  Often this presumption extends to 
meetings of public bodies, courts, and legislative proceedings.  Sometimes the type of 
information included in this right is information held by private entities such as private 
corporations, although this claim has been made only by NGOs and not by any of the other 
human rights bodies.  The freedom-of-expression conceptualization also requires that 
governments proactively provide information that is of a public interest even when the 
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information is not requested.  This will be referred to as the proactive requirement.  The 
following sections will discuss the principle of maximum disclosure and the proactive 
requirement.  
 
The Principle of Maximum Disclosure  
The human rights bodies within the Inter-American system have consistently 
recognized the principle of maximum disclosure.  For example, in the Inter-American Court 
decision Reyes v. Chile,325 the court succinctly stated the principle, writing that “in a 
democratic society, it is essential that the State authorities are governed by the principle of 
maximum disclosure, which establishes the presumption that all information is accessible, 
subject to a limited system of exceptions.”326   
In a detailed 2004 report on implementing the right of access to information, the UN 
special rapporteur stated that all information held by public bodies should be public unless 
subject to legitimate exemptions.327  The 2004 joint declaration of the OAS and UN special 
rapporteurs and the OSCE media representative also emphasized this principle, stating that the 
“right to access information held by public authorities is a fundamental human right,” which 
                                                 
325 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
326 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 92 (Sept. 19, 2006); See also Inter-
American Comm. H.R. Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, ¶ 284 (Oct. 
22, 2002); 2002 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 312, at ¶ 129; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., 2004 Report of 
the OAS Sp. Rapp, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 doc. 5 rev. 1, 7 (Feb. 23, 2005); 2003a Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., 
supra note 178, at 7-8 (arguing that “the foundation of any compliant access to information law is a presumption 
that all information held by public bodies should be subject to disclosure, which is sometimes referred to as the 
‘principle of maximum disclosure’”). 
 
327 2005 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 275, at ¶ 39; See also 1998 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra 
note 201, at ¶ 12 (stating that the right of access to information should be the rule rather than the exception). 
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should be “based on the principle of maximum disclosure, establishing a presumption that all 
information is accessible subject only to a narrow system of exceptions.” 328 
 Maximum disclosure is the first principle of the NGO Article 19’s influential 
publication, The Public’s Right to Know: Principles of Freedom of Information Legislation.329  
This publication has been adopted or referred to by the OAS and UN special rapporteurs, the 
Inter-American Commission, and the UN Human Rights Committee. The publication states: 
The principle of maximum disclosure establishes a presumption that all 
information held by public bodies should be subject to disclosure and that this 
presumption may be overcome only in very limited circumstances. This 
principle encapsulates the basic rationale underlying the very concept of 
freedom of information and ideally it should be provided for in the 
Constitution to make it clear that access to official information is a basic 
right.330  
 
The principle of maximum disclosure also has been emphasized in communications to 
governments by the UN and OAS special rapporteurs and NGOS.  For example, in a 2001 
OAS special rapporteur report to Paraguay, the rapporteur chided the government for not 
having criteria for classifying information, arguing that the “general principle is that 
information should be public” except information that is legitimately limited by legislation.331   
                                                 
328 2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 1. 
 
329 Public’s Right to Know Principles, supra note 280. 
 
330 Id. at 2. 
 
331 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Paraguay, supra note 55, at ¶ 30. See also Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on 
Panama, supra note 255, at ¶ 130 (arguing that there must be a presumption of disclosure and that restrictions 
must be the exception rather than the rule); Open Society Justice Initiative, Comments on Macedonian Draft 
Freedom of Information,  2, available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102246 (lasted 
visited Oct. 22, 2008) (stating that “law must clearly establish that all information held by government bodies 
and other bodies performing public functions or receiving public funds are in the public domain” unless provided 
for by law); Access Info Europe, Mongolia: Draft Law on Freedom of Information, p. 2, available at 
http://www.access-
info.org/data/File/publications/Access%20Info%20Analysis%20Mongolian%20FOI%20draft%2029%20May%2
02006.doc. (May 29, 2006) (stating that “[t]his draft FOI law should be modified to introduce a clear 
‘presumption of openness’ that applies to all information held by public bodies”).  
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Often the principle of maximum disclosure requires that the term information be 
interpreted very broadly.  According to a 2003 OAS special rapporteur report, in order for 
governments to comply with the American Convention, they must pass freedom-of-
information legislation with “broad definitions of the type of information that is 
accessible.”332  Citing the Public’s Right to Know Principles, the report stated: 
The right of access to information that is protected by the American 
Convention implicitly contains a broad understanding of the word 
“information,” and States must match this breadth in their own laws.  The 
public should have access to all records held by a public body, regardless of 
the sources or the date of production. In addition, “information” encompasses 
all types of storage or retrieval systems, including documents, film, microfiche, 
video, photographs, and others.333   
 
The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur also stated that all information is included 
regardless of the “types of storage” or “retrieval systems.”334  This includes information from 
“all bodies performing public functions, including governmental, legislative and judicial 
bodies.”335 
Public attendance at meetings of governing bodies also is included in this right.  For 
example, according to the OAS special rapporteur, all meetings are open to the public, 
including administrative proceedings, court hearings, and legislative proceedings336 
                                                 
332 2003a Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 178, at 7. 
 
333  Id. at 8. Principle 1 of the Public’s Right to Know Principles state in part: “Information includes all records 
held by a public body, regardless of the form in which the information is stored . . . and the date of production. 
The legislation should also apply to records which have been classified, subjecting them to the same test as all 
other records.”  The principles further state that for “purposes of disclosure of information, the definition of 
‘public body’ should focus on the type of service provided rather than on formal designations.”  This includes 
“all branches and levels of government.” Supra note 280.  
 
334 1998 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 201, at ¶ 14.  
 
335 2005 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 275, at ¶ 39. 
 
336 2003a Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 178, at 8. See also Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 
supra note 326, at ¶ 287 (stating that all meetings of governing bodies are presumptively open); 2000 Report of 
the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 208, at ¶ 44 (stating that meetings of governing bodies also should be 
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Several NGO declarations and reports include information from private entities, which 
include corporations and international organizations, as part of the right to information.  The 
Public’s Right to Know Principles state: 
Private bodies themselves should also be included if they hold information 
whose disclosure is likely to diminish the risk of harm to key public interests, 
such as the environment and health. Inter-governmental organisations should 
also be subject to freedom of information regimes based on the principles set 
down in this document.337 
 
Often the right to information from the private sector is based on whether a private entity 
performs a “public function.”  For example, the Declaration of Cancun states that 
transparency principles should apply to “private businesses to the extent that the information 
is related to their public functions or use of public resources, or affects the enjoyment of 
human rights.”338    
                                                                                                                                                        
presumptively open); Right to Know Principles, supra note 280, at principle 5 (stating that “meetings of public 
bodies should be open to the public”). 
 
337 Right to Know Principles, supra note 280, at principle 5. See also TI Anti-Corruption Tool, supra note 292, at 
5 (arguing that the “right of citizens to know what governments, international organizations and private 
corporations are doing, and how public resources are allocated, directly reflects anti-corruption concerns. 
Corruption flourishes in darkness and so any progress towards opening governments and intergovernmental 
organizations to public scrutiny is likely to advance anti-corruption efforts.”). 
 
338 Declaration of Cancun, ¶ 5, available at www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102602 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2008). The Declaration of Cancun was adopted by NGOs at the third meeting of the Freedom of 
Information Commissioners held Feb. 22-24, 2005, in Cancun, Mexico. The meeting included FOI 
commissioners, ombudsmen, government officials, and NGOs. See also the Declaration of Chapultepec, 
principle 3, 1998 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, supra note 285, at annex F (arguing that “authorities must be 
compelled by law to make available in a timely and reasonable manner the information generated by the public 
sector”). According to the OAS Sp. Rapp., the Chapultepec Declaration “is receiving growing recognition 
among all social sectors of our hemisphere and is becoming a major point of reference in the area of freedom of 
expression.” 1998 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., id. at 27. The Declaration was drafted by the Inter-American 
Press Association and “contains 10 fundamental principles for the protection of freedom of expression in our 
hemisphere. Prominent persons are signing it in growing numbers. Numerous Heads of State and Government of 
the hemisphere have signed it.”Id. See also the Lagos Declaration, supra note 304, at principle 3 (arguing that 
the “right to information applies to all public bodies and private bodies performing public functions.”); Open 
Society Justice Initiative, Ten Principles on the Right to Know (2008), principle 3, available at 
www.justiceinitiative.org/Principles/index (lasted visited Oct. 22, 2008) (stating that the “public has a right to 
receive information in the possession of any institution funded by the public and private bodies performing 
public functions,  such as water and electricity providers”). According to the introduction to the Principles, “The 
Justice Initiative works with partner organizations to promote implementation of [FOI] laws and to press for 
adoption of robust laws that entrench the Right to Know. To assist these efforts, the Justice Initiative has 
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The Proactive Requirement  
Often governments also are obligated to proactively publish information even if the 
information is not requested.  Citing the Public’s Right to Know Principles, the OAS special 
rapporteur stated in a 2003 report that “public bodies should be under a presumptive 
obligation to publish key information, including: operational information, the types of 
information which the body holds, any requests, and the content of any decision or policy 
affecting the public, along with reasons for the decision and background material.”339  In a 
report to Panama, the OAS special rapporteur also recommended that the government amend 
its FOI legislation to include “provisions requiring that public agencies automatically publish 
certain types of documents that are of significant public interest.”340 
Also citing the Public’s Right to Know Principles, the UN freedom of expression 
special rapporteur has stated that the right of access to information includes an obligation on 
government to proactively provide information: “Freedom of information implies that public 
bodies publish and disseminate widely documents of significant public interest, for example, 
operational information about how the public body functions and the content of any decision 
or policy affecting the public.”341    Both the 2004342 and 2006343 joint declarations of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
developed the following principles, in consultation with our partners, based on international law and standards 
and the comparative law and practice in these 68 countries. These principles represent evolving international 
standards on how governments should respect the Right to Know in law and practice.” Id. See also the Right to 
Know Principles, supra note 280, principle 1 (arguing that “public bodies” include “private bodies which carry 
out public functions (such as maintaining roads or operating rail lines”).   
 
339 2003a Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 178, at 8. The Public’s Right to Know Principles principle 2 
states in part, “Public bodies should be under an obligation to publish key information.” This includes publishing 
and disseminating widely documents of “significant public interest.”  At a minimum this information should 
include “operation information,” “requests, complaints or other direct actions” from the public, guidelines for 
public input, the type of information the public bodies hold, and all decisions or policies affecting the public. 
Public’s Right to Know Principles, supra note 280, at principle 2. 
 
340 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. to Panama, supra note 255, at ¶ 131. 
 
341 2000 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 208, at ¶ 44. 
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OAS and UN special rapporteurs and the OSCE media representative state that governments 
should make available information on topics of public interest.  
 
Freedom-of-Expression Conceptualization – Limitations on the Right 
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization does not recognize that the right of 
access to information is absolute and includes limitations on the right.  In order for these 
limitations to be valid, governments must clearly define each restriction within the law.  
When information is withheld, the government must provide a justification and ensure that an 
appeal process is in place.  These will be referred to as procedural obligations.  In order to be 
considered legitimate, limitations must satisfy a significant public interest, which must be 
narrowly drawn and balanced with the public’s interest in receiving the information.  
Governments carry the burden of proof to show that the limitation serves a legitimate interest 
that outweighs the public’s right to know.  The specific limitations that are considered 
legitimate within this conceptualization include “protection of national security, public order, 
or public health or morals” and “respect for the reputation of others.”344  Of these limitations, 
only national security has been addressed in detail within the human rights documents; 
therefore, the discussion on the specific limitations will be limited to national security.  The 
following section will discuss the procedural obligations required of governments, general 
requirements ensuring that limitations are legitimate and properly applied, and the national 
security exception.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
342 2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 2. 
 
343 2006 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 3. 
 
344 See Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(3); American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13(2).  
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Procedural Obligations 
 
 The freedom-of-expression provisions of article 13345 of the American Convention and 
article 19346 of the Political Covenant require that restrictions on the right to seek and receive 
information must be established in law.  In the Reyes decision, the Inter-American Court 
reiterated this requirement after the Chilean government did not cite provisions of Chilean law 
or legal precedent to justify withholding information.  The court argued that restrictions “must 
have been established by law to ensure that they are not at the discretion of public authorities.  
Such laws should be enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the 
purpose for which such restrictions have been established.”347  Citing one of its advisory 
opinions, the court further explained that the term “law” is not “synonymous for just any legal 
norm, since that would be tantamount to admitting that fundamental rights can be restricted at 
the sole discretion of public authorities; authorities with no other formal limitation than that 
such restriction be set out in provisions of a general nature.”348  
 The Inter-American Commission stated in its Reyes decision that the government’s 
decision to withhold information was clearly discretionary, stating: 
The Commission considers that such broad powers of discretion conferred on 
governmental agencies regarding whether or not to disclose public information 
                                                 
345 Id. at Political Covenant, art. 19(2). 
 
346 American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13. See also Comm. on H.R. Res., UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.52, ¶ 
3(l) (Apr. 15, 2005) (calling upon states to “adopt and implement laws and policies that provide for a general 
right of public access to information held by public authorities, which may be restricted only in accordance with 
article 19 of the [Political Covenant].”). 
 
347 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 89 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
348 Id. at ¶ 89, citing The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-6/86, Ser. A, No. 6, ¶ 34 (May 9, 1986). Article 30 of the American Convention states, “The 
restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or 
freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general 
interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been established.” See American 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 30.. 
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make it possible for public officials or agencies to withhold information that 
may be of great public interest, but that officials or agencies prefer to remain 
confidential for personal or other reasons. This frustrates the nature and 
purpose of the guarantee of access to information, which is to enable the public 
to oversee the actions of public officials and agencies to ensure the proper 
functions of the government in a democracy. An access to information law 
should provide clear guidance for public officials, setting forth specific 
categories of information that are exempt from disclosure.349 
 
 On several occasions, the OAS special rapporteur has communicated to governments 
that they are required to enact laws that explicitly detail any restrictions on the right to 
information.350  The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur also has emphasized this 
requirement.  For example, in a report regarding countries’ implementation of access-to-
information legislation, the rapporteur expressed concern that laws were being implemented 
poorly.  He wrote: 
Several countries have indeed adopted legislation on the right of access to 
information, but concern remains about their capacity to implement those laws 
in an effective way. In many countries, public bodies and bodies performing 
public functions continue to retain information and treat it in a confidential 
manner, even though there is no legal or other reason for this.351  
 
Several NGO principles also reflect this idea.  For example, the Johannesburg Principles state 
that “any restriction on expression or information must be prescribed by law. The law must be 
accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly and with precision so as to enable individuals to 
                                                 
349 Reyes v. Chile Inter-Am. Comm. Application to the Inter-Am. Ct., supra note 192, at ¶ 21. See also Inter-
Am. Ct. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 175, at ¶ 39(b) (stating that any restrictions must be established 
by law). 
 
350 See 2003 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Panama and 2003 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Haiti, supra 
note 255. See also 2003 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp. on Venezuela, supra note 258, at ¶ 482.  
 
351 2004 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp. , supra note 203, at ¶ 39. See also 2000 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63, ¶ 44 (Jan. 18, 2000), African Declaration, supra note 185, at section IV, part 1. 
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foresee whether a particular action is unlawful.” 352  According to the Lima Principles, 
“information shall not be kept secret on the basis of unpublished regulations.”353   
 When information is withheld, the government body withholding the information must 
provide a justification.  As stated previously, in the Reyes decision, the Inter-American Court 
argued that article 13 includes a right to information.  According to the court, this right places 
an obligation on the governments to provide a “justification when, for any reason permitted 
by the Convention, the State is allowed to restrict access to the information in a specific 
case.”354  According to the facts of the case, the government of Chile had not supplied a 
reason for withholding the information until required to do so by the court.  The court 
concluded that the government  
did not prove that the restriction responded to a purpose allowed by the 
American Convention, or that it was necessary in a democratic society, 
because the authority responsible for responding to the request for information 
did not adopt a justified decision in writing, communicating the reasons for 
restricting access to this information in the specific case.355  
  
The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur also has stated that justification for 
withholding information is required.  For example, a 2005 report stated that “refusals should 
be made in writing and detail the grounds for not disclosing the information, as established in 
law.”356  According to the Lima Principles, “Any person or official who refuses to provide 
                                                 
352 See Johannesburg Principles, at supra note 279, at principle 1.1(a).  See also Right to Know Principles, supra 
note 280, at principle 4. 
 
353 See Lima Principles, supra note 309, at principle 8. See also Lagos Declaration, supra note 304, at principle 
6;  OSJI Comments of the Macedonian Draft FOI Law, supra note 228, at 2; Access Info Europe, Mongolia: 
Draft Law on Freedom of Information, supra note 228. 
 
354 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, at ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
355 Id. at ¶ 95 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
356 2004 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 203, at  ¶ 42. See also 1998 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra 
note 201, at ¶ 14.  
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access to requested information will have to justify this refusal in writing and demonstrate 
that the information is included in the restricted category of exceptions.”357  
 The right to information also includes a right to appeal a government decision that 
denies information.  This right to appeal requires that appeals are provided by an independent 
and impartial body.  According to the 2006 joint declaration of the OAS and UN special 
rapporteurs and the OSCE media representative: “Individuals should have the right to submit 
a complaint to an independent body alleging a failure properly to apply an information 
disclosure policy, and that body should have the power to consider such complaints and to 
provide redress where warranted.”358  The Lima Principles state that “[i]f the person seeking 
the information so requests, an impartial and competent judicial authority may review such 
refusal and may order the release of the information.”359    
 
Legitimate Limitations and the Public Interest 
 Under the freedom-of-expression conceptualization of a right of access, limitations on 
the right to information must be narrowly constructed and serve a significant public interest 
that outweighs the public interest in receiving the information.  Governments have the burden 
of proof to show that the interest in withholding the information outweighs the public’s right 
to know.  
                                                 
357 See Lima Principles, supra note 309, at principle 8. See also Lagos Declaration, supra note 304, at principle 
6. 
 
358 2006 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 5. See also 2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 7 
(arguing that there must exist a right to appeal to “an independent body with full powers to investigate and 
resolve such complaints”); 2005 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 275, at ¶  42; 1998 Report of the UN 
Sp. Rapp., supra note 201, at ¶ 14; African Declaration , supra note 185, at section IV, part 2. 
 
359 Lima Principles, supra note 309, at principle 8. See also Lagos Declaration, supra note 304, at principle 8; 
Right to Know Principles, supra note 280, at principle 5. 
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In the Inter-American Court’s Reyes decision, the court stated that restrictions 
imposed on the right to information must correspond to a purpose outlined in article 13, 
paragraph two, which permits restrictions “necessary to ensure . . . respect for the rights and 
reputation of others” or “the protection of national security, public order, or public health or 
morals.”360  According to the court, restrictions on information also 
must be necessary in a democratic society; consequently, they must be 
intended to satisfy a compelling public interest. If there are various options to 
achieve this objective, that which least restricts the right protected must be 
selected. In other words, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest 
that justifies it and must be appropriate for accomplishing this legitimate 
purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the 
right.361 
 
The court further stated that governments carry the burden of proof to show that the restriction 
complies with these requirements.362 
 The Inter-American Commission, in its Reyes decision, argued that the 
“proportionality principle” means that governments must not only show that the restriction 
relates to one of the stated aims in article 13, paragraph two, they must show that “disclosure 
threatens to cause substantial harm to that aim and that the harm to the aim must be greater 
than the public interest in having the information.”363  As did the court, the commission 
concluded that Chile failed to show that withholding the information was justified by an aim 
stated in article 13:   
[T]he state did not present any arguments to show that disclosure of the 
information would cause substantial harm to these aims and that such harm 
                                                 
360 See American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13(2). 
 
361 Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151, at ¶ 91 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 
362 Reyes et al. v. Chile, at ¶ 93. 
 
363 Reyes v. Chile Inter-Am. Comm. Application to the Inter-Am. Ct., supra note 192, at ¶ 21. See also Inter-
Am. Ct. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 175, at ¶ 69. 
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would outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the information. On the 
other hand, it is clear to the Commission that there is a substantial public 
interest in the disclosure of the information requested.364  
 
The 2003 OAS special rapporteur’s annual report included a section on the theoretical 
framework behind a right of access to government information.  The rapporteur’s 
discussion on limitations on the right to information closely corresponds to the 
arguments of the Inter-American Court and Commission in the Reyes365 decisions.366  
In making his arguments, the rapporteur relied heavily on the NGO Article 19 Right to 
Know Principles, which established a three-part test to determine when information 
can be limited: (1) “the information must relate to a legitimate aim listed in the law;” 
(2) the “disclosure must threaten to cause substantial harm to that aim;” and (3) “the 
harm to the aim must be greater than the public interest in having the information.”367  
In interpreting the test, the rapporteur argued that a legitimate justification to withhold 
information not only must be compatible with article 13 of the convention, it also must 
be “defined narrowly and precisely, both in terms of content and duration.”368  For 
                                                 
364 Reyes v. Chile Inter-Am. Comm. Application to the Inter-Am. Ct., id. at ¶ 21. See also Inter-Am. Ct. 
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, id. at ¶ 46 (arguing that a “compelling government interest” is not simply a “law 
that performs a useful or desirable purpose”; it must also must “clearly outweigh the social” need for freedom of 
expression and information and be “proportionate and closely tailored to the accomplishment of the legitimate 
government objective necessitating it”). 
 
365 See Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19, 2006); Reyes v. Chile Inter-
Am. Comm. Application to the Inter-Am. Ct., id. 
 
366 See also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 326, at ¶ 286-87 
(arguing that the three-part test of principle 4 of the Right to Know Principles applies to restrictions on article 13 
of the American Convention). 
 
367 See 2003b Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 255, at chap. IV, ¶ 45. See also Right to Know 
Principles, supra note 280, at principle 4.  
 
368 Id. at ¶ 45. 
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example, he argued, information classified in the name of national security can be 
legitimately withheld only for the period of time that the threat exists.   
The UN Human Rights Committee also has emphasized the importance of 
narrowly drawn limitations on access to information.  The 2001 report to Uzbekistan 
regarding implementation of article 19 of the Political Covenant chastised the 
government for its overbroad state-secrets legislation.  The report stated that 
“restrictions on the freedom to receive and impart information are too wide to be 
consistent with article 19 of the Covenant. The State party should amend the [state-
secrets law] to define and considerably reduce the types of issues that are defined as 
‘state secrets and other secrets,’ thereby bringing this law into compliance with article 
19 of the Covenant.”369  In the Human Rights Committee’s decision, Gauthier v. 
Canada,370 involving a newspaper publisher who was denied access equal to other 
reporters to attend Canadian parliamentary proceedings, the committee ruled in favor 
of the publisher in part because the rules of the accreditation system were not 
“specific, fair and reasonable” or transparent.371 
                                                 
369 UN HRC Concluding Observations on Uzbekistan, A/56/40 vol. I, ¶ 79 (2001). See also UN HRC 
Concluding Observations on Great Britain and Northern Ireland, A/57/40 vol. I, ¶ 7 (2002) (arguing that the 
government “should ensure that its powers to protect information genuinely related to matters of national 
security are narrowly utilized and limited to instances where it has been shown to be necessary to suppress 
release of the information). 
 
370 See UN HRC Commission no. 633/1995, Gauthier v. Canada, CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995, ¶ 13.6 (May 5, 1999). 
 
371 UN HRC Commission no. 633/1995, Gauthier v. Canada, CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995, ¶ 13.6 (May 5, 1999). See 
also 2000 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 208, at ¶ 44 (Jan. 18, 2000) (arguing that a “refusal to disclose 
information may not be based on the aim to protect Governments from embarrassment or the exposure of 
wrongdoing; a complete list of legitimate aims which may justify nondisclosure should be provided in the law 
and exceptions should be narrowly drawn as to avoid including material which does not harm the legitimate 
interest”);  2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 4 (arguing that the “right of access should be subject to a 
narrow, carefully tailored system of exception”). 
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As stated above, in order to limit disclosure of information, governments also 
must show that the disclosure will cause a substantial harm that is not outweighed by 
the public’s interest in the information.  In assessing whether disclosure of information 
will cause a substantial harm, the OAS special rapporteur asserted in a 2003 report that 
governments must “consider both the short and long term consequences of the 
disclosure.”372  For example, he stated: 
[E]xposing a pattern of bribery in the legislature may have negative 
consequences for the stability of the public body in the short term. However, in 
the long term it will help eliminate corruption and strengthen the legislative 
branch. Thus, the overall effect of disclosure must be substantially harmful in 
order to justify an exception.373 
   
The substantial harm also must be greater than the public’s right to know.  According 
to the OAS special rapporteur’s 2003 report, this “involves an explicit balancing of the 
harm in question with public interest in releasing the information.”374  Exposure of 
bribery in the legislature, he reasoned, may harm legislators’ right to privacy, but it is 
not a harm greater than the public’s interest in having the information.375  
The 2004 joint declaration of the UN and OAS special rapporteurs and the 
OSCE media representative also made this point:  
Exceptions should apply only where there is a risk of substantial harm to the 
protected interest and where that harm is greater than the overall public interest 
in having access to the information. The burden should be on the public 
                                                 
372 See 2003b Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 255, at chap IV ¶ 46. 
 
373 Id. at chap IV, ¶  47. 
 
374 Id. at chap IV, ¶ 48. 
 
375 Id. at ¶ 48. 
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authority seeking to deny access to show that the information falls within the 
scope of the system of exceptions.376   
 
Quoting the Johannesburg Principle, the UN freedom of expression special 
rapporteur’s 1999 report explicitly stated that “the public’s interest in knowing the 
information shall be a primary consideration in all laws and decisions conceding the 
right to obtain information.”377  The Lima Principles give concrete examples of 
information in the public interest: 
The public interest takes precedent over secrecy. Information must be released 
when the public interest outweighs any harm in releasing it. There is a strong 
presumption that information about threats to the environment, health, or 
human rights, and information revealing corruption should be released, given 
the high public interest in such information.378 
 
 
5ational Security Limitations 
  
When limiting the right to information for national security purposes, the same 
procedures and requirements regarding limitations apply.  As stated above, the limitations 
must be established in law; written justifications for denial of information must be provided; 
and a process for appealing the decision must be in place.  Also, the limitations must be 
narrowly drawn and serve a significant public interest that outweighs the public interest in 
receiving the information, and the burden of proof is on the government.  Simply claiming 
that the significant public interest is one of national security is not enough to meet this burden 
of proof.  According the Johannesburg Principles, a “state may not categorically deny access 
                                                 
376 2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 4. See also 2006 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 4 
(arguing that access should be granted unless “disclosure would cause serious harm to a protected interest” and 
“this harm outweighs the public interest in accessing the information”). 
 
377 1999 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 201, at ¶ 22(e). See Johannesburg Principles, supra note 279, at 
principle 13.  
 
378 Lagos Declaration, supra note 304, at principle 7. 
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to all information related to national security, but must designate in law only those specific 
and narrow categories of information that it is necessary to withhold in order to protect a 
legitimate national security interest.”379 
 According to the OAS special rapporteur, the “process of evaluation required to 
adequately justify a denial of access to state-held information takes on particular urgency and 
importance when the legitimate aim in question is that of protecting national security.”380  
This requires that the restrictions be “highly scrutinized in order to determine where they are 
legitimate.”381 
The OAS special rapporteur has expressed concern in country reports regarding 
excessive secrecy and over-classification of information.  In his reports to Haiti and 
Venezuela, the rapporteur suggested that classified material be reviewed by an independent 
mechanism to ensure that national-security interests were appropriately balanced with the 
public interest in the right to know.382  The UN freedom of expression special rapporteur, in a 
1998 report, expressed concern that governments were over-classifying information:  
States in every region and with different structures of government continue to 
classify far more information than could be considered necessary. "Necessary" 
in this context means that serious harm to the State's interest is unavoidable if 
                                                 
379 Johannesburg Principles, supra note 279, at principle 12. See also Lima Principles, supra note 309, at 
principle 8 (stating that “withholding information under a broad and imprecise definition of national security is 
unacceptable”). See also 2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 13 (arguing that “[c]ertain information may 
legitimately be secret on grounds of national security or protection of other overriding interests” but “secrecy 
laws should define national security precisely and indicate clearly the criteria which should be used in 
determining whether or not information can be declared secret, so as to prevent abuse of the label ‘secret’ for 
purposes of preventing disclosure of information which is in the public interest”). 
 
380 2003b Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp., supra note 255, at chap IV ¶ 49. 
 
381 Id. 
 
382 2003 OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Venezuela, supra note 258, at ¶ 483; 2003 OAS Sp. Rapp. Report on Haiti, 
supra note 258, at ¶ 30. 
 
97 
 
the information is made public and that this harm outweighs the harm to the 
rights of opinion, expression and information.383 
 
 
When information is legitimately withheld for national-security purposes, release of 
that confidential or classified information by a pubic authority or journalist should not be 
punished if the information is of public interest or obtained legally.  According to the 2004 
joint declaration of the UN and OAS special rapporteurs and the OSCE media representative, 
journalists and civil servants should not be held accountable for leaked information:  
Public authorities and their staff bear sole responsibility for protecting the 
confidentiality of legitimately secret information under their control. Other 
individuals, including journalists and civil society representatives, should 
never be subject to liability for publishing or further disseminating this 
information, regardless of whether or not it has been leaked to them, unless 
they committed fraud or another crime to obtain the information.384 
 
The 1999 report of the UN freedom of expression special rapporteur noted with concern that 
several governments “have attempted to prosecute civil servants and others who make 
available public information which has been classified.” 385  The Lima Principles more 
conservatively stated that disclosure of classified information should not be punished if “the 
public’s interest in knowing the information outweighs the consequences of disclosure.”386  
 
 
 
                                                 
383 1998 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 201, at ¶ 13.  
 
384 2004 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 11. See also 2006 Joint Declaration, supra note 275, at ¶ 1 
(arguing that it is up to “public authorities to protect the legitimately confidential information they hold” and that 
“journalists should not be held liable for publishing classified or confidential information where they have not 
themselves committed a wrong in obtaining it”). 
 
385 1998 Report of the UN Sp. Rapp., supra note 201, at ¶ 13. 
 
386 Lima Principles, supra note 309 at principle 9. 
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Conclusion 
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization is based on the idea that citizens must 
have access to government information in order to effectively exercise their right to freedom 
of expression.  Within this conceptualization, freedom of expression and information are 
considered as essential to a free, democratic society.  Three central rationales were discovered 
for linking a right to government-held information to the right to freedom of expression: the 
seek-and-receive, self-governance, and good-governance rationales.   
The seek-and-receive rationale is based on the rights to seek and receive information 
that are present in several international human rights instruments such as the Political 
Covenant, the American Convention, and the UN Declaration.   Although the difference 
between the two rights is not always clear, these rights often have been interpreted as 
including a right of access to government information that places an obligation on 
governments to provide information.  At a minimum this obligation seems to include the 
requirement that governments pass freedom-of-information legislation.    
The self-governance rationale is based on the importance of citizens’ informed 
consent in a democracy.  In order for citizens to give their consent to be governed or 
effectively participate in the political process, they must have access to government 
information.  The good-governance rationale is based on the importance of information to 
hold governments accountable for their actions and to prevent government abuse and 
corruption.  The two rationales are not mutually exclusive and are often discussed together in 
human rights documents.   
Within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, government information is 
understood as a public good belonging to the people.  Governments, acting as representatives 
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of the people, hold information on behalf of all citizens.  In this context government does not 
own the information, citizens do; therefore, citizens do not have to show a direct interest in 
the information in order to request access to it.  It is not always clear whether citizenship is 
required to access government information.  At a minimum, information belongs to all 
citizens of a given country, but often it is expressed that the right to information belongs to all 
people regardless of citizenship.  Within this conceptualization, there is recognition that 
marginalized groups and the media have a distinctive need for government information.  This 
understanding does not give greater rights of access to information to the disadvantaged or the 
media, but this understanding acknowledges that information in these contexts fulfills 
important societal needs.  Information is particularly important for the disenfranchised 
because it is seen as empowering the disenfranchised to gain equality within society.  
Information for the media is crucial because media facilitate citizens’ rights to information.   
Because information is owned by the people, the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization requires that there is a presumption of disclosure.  In other words, all 
information within the control of government should be disclosed unless there are legitimate 
and significant justifications to withhold it.  This often is referred to as the principle of 
maximum disclosure.  To help facilitate the democratic process, governments also are 
required to proactively provide information that is of a public interest even when the 
information is not requested.   
Within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the right of information is not 
absolute.  Governments can limit the disclosure of information, but this conceptualization 
requires governments to meet strict standards in order to justify nondisclosure.  Limitations 
must be explicitly established in law.  When information is withheld, governments are 
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required to provide a written justification and to ensure that citizens have access to an appeal 
process.   Limitations on information must be based a significant public interest, must be 
narrowly drawn and interpreted, and must be balanced in favor of the public’s interest in 
receiving the information.    It is up to governments to prove that the restriction on disclosing 
information serves a legitimate interest that outweighs the public’s right to know.  Within this 
conceptualization, it is acknowledged that the protection of national security is a legitimate 
justification to withhold information; nonetheless, any limitation on information based on 
national security must abide by the same requirements as other restrictions.
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE I*FORMATIO*-PRIVACY CO*CEPTUALIZATIO* 
The information-privacy conceptualization of access to information recognizes that 
individuals have a right to access government documents containing information that pertains 
directly to them.  This allows individuals to know the specific information the government has 
gathered about them, to assess the information’s accuracy, and to correct the information if it 
is false or misleading.  The OAS special rapporteur explained that the right of access to 
personal information is important because having control over “personal information is 
essential in many areas of life, since the lack of legal mechanisms for the correction, updating 
or removal of information can have a direct impact on the right to privacy, honor, personal 
identity, property and accountability in information gathering.”387  This right to access 
personal information has become significant with the advent of new technologies that make it 
much easier for the government to store and access personal data.  According to the OAS 
special rapporteur: 
Widespread use of computers and the Internet has meant that the State and 
private sector can gain rapid access to a considerable amount of information 
about people. It is therefore necessary to ensure that there are specific channels 
for rapid access to information that can be used to modify any incorrect or 
outdated information contained in electronic databases.388 
 
                                                 
387 2000 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, chap. 2, supra note 255, at ¶12. The point was reiterated in the special 
rapporteur’s 2001 report, 2001 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, chap. 3, supra note 283, at 28. 
 
388 2000 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, chap. 2, supra note 255, at ¶13. 
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In order to further explore the right-to-privacy conceptualization, it is necessary to 
discuss the different sources of the right of access to personal information.  Unlike the 
freedom-of-expression conceptualization, which is based solely in the right to freedom of 
expression, the right-to-privacy conceptualization finds its roots in three separate rights: the 
right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, and, in one articulation, the right to fair 
treatment while in detention.   The following sections will discuss the bases for the right to 
personal information, the rationales for the right, to whom the right is conferred, the types of 
information guaranteed, and the limitations on the right.  
 
Sources of the Right to Personal Information 
Often the right of access to personal information is based on an individual’s right to 
privacy that is recognized by several human rights treaties.389  In several rulings,390 the 
European Court of Human Right has recognized a right of access to government-held personal 
information based the right to privacy, which is guaranteed by article 8 of the European 
Convention.391  For example, in Rotaru v. Romania, the court stated that “both the storing by 
                                                 
389 Article 8 of the European Convention states: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.” Paragraph two delineates limitations, stating, “There shall be no interference 
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 8. Article 17 of the Political 
Covenant states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation” and  “[e]veryone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 17. 
 
390 See, e.g., Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 49 (July 7, 1989) (ruling that the right to 
private and family life included a positive obligation on the government to release personal files and that failure 
to do so violated Gaskin’s rights); Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 46 (May 4, 2000) 
(ruling that the storing and use of personal data by the Romanian intelligence services and absence of the 
possibility of refuting their accuracy was a violation of article 8).  
 
391 European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 8. 
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a public authority of information relating to an individual’s private life and the use of it and 
the refusal to allow an opportunity for it to be refuted amount to interference with the right to 
respect for private life secured in article 8 [of the European Convention].”392  The court has 
been quite clear that this right is not based on article 10, the freedom-of-expression provision 
of the European Convention, stating that “the right to freedom to receive information 
basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information that 
others wish or may be willing to impart to him” and therefore does not “embody an obligation 
on the Government to impart such information.”393   
The UN Human Rights Committee, which monitors the implementation of and 
compliance with the Political Covenant, stated in a general comment that the right to privacy 
includes the right to access personal information held by the government.  General comments 
are statements made by the committee to clarify to governments their obligations under the 
Political Covenant and to communicate interpretations of the covenant’s articles.394  In 
interpreting article 17,395 the right-to-privacy provision of the Political Covenant, the 
committee stated, “In order to have the most effective protection of his private life, every 
individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, what 
personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for what purposes.”396  Several compliance 
reports from governments to the Human Rights Committee have listed the right of access to 
                                                 
392 Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 46 (May 4, 2000). 
 
393 Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 74 (1987). See also Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 52 (July 7, 1989). 
 
394 ALEX CONTE, ET AL., DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE  (2004). 
 
395 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(2). 
 
396 UN HRC General Comment 16, UN Doc. A/43/40 (1988)181, at ¶10 (1988).  
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personal information and the right to correct inaccurate personal information as an example of 
compliance with article 17 of the Political Covenant.  For example in discussing article 17, 
Macedonia stated in its 2007 report to the Human Rights Committee that federal law ensures 
individuals the right of access to personal information and a means to correct the information, 
if needed.397  However, other such reports from governments have listed a right to personal 
information as complying with article 19, the freedom-of-expression provision of the Political 
Covenant.398   
The right of access to personal information, which often is called habeas data,399 also 
has been based on the right to freedom of expression within the American Convention.400  
                                                 
397 UN H.R. C. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Second Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/MKD/2, ¶ 329 (Feb. 2, 2007). See also UN H.R. C. Argentina Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/ARG/98/3, ¶ 149 (May 7, 1999); UN H.R. C. Austria Fourth Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/AUT/4, ¶ 283 (Nov. 1, 2006); UN H.R. C. Australia Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/AUS/98/3, ¶ 869 (July 2, 1999); UN H.R. C. Belgium Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/Add.3, ¶ 187 (Oct. 15, 1997); UN H.R. C. Canada Fourth Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/103/Add.5, ¶ 185 (Oct. 15, 1997); UN H.R. C. Columbia Fourth Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/103/Add.3, ¶ 255 (Oct. 8, 1996); reiterated in 2002 State Report, UN H.R. C. Columbia Fifth Periodic 
Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/COL/2002/5, ¶ 792 (Sept. 18, 2002); UN HRC Czech Republic Initial Report, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/2000/1, ¶ 325 (May 4, 2000); UN H.R. C. Netherlands Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/NET/99/3, ¶ 136 (Aug. 25, 2000); UN H.R. C. Portugal Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/PRT/2002/3, ¶ 17.3 (June 6, 2002). At least two states have indicated that the right of access to 
personal information under article 19 of the Political Covenant and the right to correct it under article 17 of the 
Political Covenant, See UN H.R. C. Georgia Second Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GEO/2000/2, ¶ 424, 
444 (Feb. 26, 2001); UN H.R. C. Ukraine Fifth Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UKR/99/5, ¶ 434 (Nov. 16, 
2000).  
 
398 See UN H.R. C. Argentina Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ARG/98/3, ¶ 149 (May 7, 1999); UN 
H.R. C. Australia Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/98/3, ¶ 869 (July 2, 1999); UN H.R. C. 
Belgium Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/Add.3, ¶ 187 (Oct. 15, 1997); UN H.R. C. Brazil Initial 
Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.6, ¶ 223 (Mar. 2, 1995); UN H.R. C. Canada Fourth Periodic Report, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/103/Add.5, ¶ 185 (Oct. 15, 1997); UN H.R. C. Netherland Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/NET/99/3, ¶ 136 (Aug. 25, 2000); UN H.R. C. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Second 
Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/2, ¶ 329 (Feb. 2, 2007). 
 
399 According to the Inter-American Commission, habeas data “refers to the right of any individual to have 
access to information referring to him and to modify, remove, or correct such information when necessary.” 
Inter-American Commission Report of the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., OAS Doc.  OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, Doc. 5, rev. 1, ¶87  (Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Report on H.R. 
Defenders]. 
 
400 See American Convention, supra 1, at art. 13. 
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Principle three of the Inter-American Commission’s Declaration on Principles of Freedom of 
Expression401 states, “Every person has the right to access to information about himself or 
herself or his/her assets expeditiously and not onerously, whether it be contained in databases 
or public or private registries, and if necessary to update it correct it and/or amend it.”402  
According to a 1999 OAS special rapporteur report: 
The right to access information held by the government (public information) 
and habeas data both follow from the right to freedom of information. While 
the two are similar in that they have a similar objective, the information to 
which they grant access serves a clearly different function. The information in 
the first case is public in nature, and the right to that information is informed 
by the need to make the democratic system work better and scrutinize 
government. Habeas data, however, provides one the opportunity to request 
[personal] information housed in both government data banks and private data 
banks.403 
 
This exact language regarding the difference between the right to public information 
and personal information also was used by the UN special rapporteur in a 2002 report on 
Argentina’s compliance with article 19 of the Political Covenant.404  Also, on several 
occasions, compliance reports from governments to the Human Rights Committee have listed 
the right of access to personal information and the means to correct it as an example of 
compliance with article 19.405  The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in 
Africa also links the right of access to personal information to the right to freedom of 
                                                 
401 Inter-Am. Comm. Freedom of Expression Declaration, supra note 259. 
 
402 Id. at principle 3.  
 
403 1999 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, supra note 255, at n. 42.  
 
404 UN Sp. Rapp. Report on Mission to Argentina, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/75/Add.1, ¶ 104 (Jan. 17, 2002). 
 
405 UN HRC Czech Republic Initial Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/2000/1, ¶ 325 (May 4, 2000) (stating that a 
“specific sphere of the right to information is represented by citizens’ access to files kept on them before 1989 by 
the former State Security Police.”). See UN HRC Georgia Second Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/GEO/2000/2, ¶ 444 (Feb. 26, 2001); UN HRC Ukraine Fifth Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/UKR/99/5, ¶ 434 (Nov. 16, 2000). 
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expression, stating, “Everyone has the right to access and update or otherwise correct their 
personal information, whether it is held by public or private bodies.”406   
The right to personal information also has been recognized as part of the right to fair 
treatment while in detention.  As noted above, the Human Rights Committee has recognized 
the right of access to personal information based on the right to privacy and the right to 
freedom of expression; yet, in one of its only decisions regarding a right to government-held 
information, the committee held that withholding a prisoner’s medical records violated the 
right to fair treatment while in detention, which is guaranteed by article 10 of the Political 
Covenant.407  The committee ruled that the “consistent and unexplained denial of access to 
medical records” violated the complainant’s rights under article 10.408  
The right of access to personal information has been based on three separate rights, 
which indicates that there can be more one than one source of a right to information within a 
conceptualization.  Even though the right to personal information is based in different sources, 
this does not significantly affect how the right to personal information has been 
conceptualized.   Even when the right is based on freedom of expression, the right to privacy 
                                                 
406 African Declaration, supra note 185, at principle IV(3).  
 
407 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 10 (stating, in part, “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person to be treated with humanity 
and respect while in detention”). 
 
408 UN HRC Communication no. 726/1996, Zheludkov v. Ukraine, CCPR/C/76/D/726/1996, ¶ 8.4 (Dec. 6, 
2002). It is interesting to note that there was a consenting and a dissenting opinion regarding the majority ruling. 
In a dissenting opinion, a committee member wrote, “To conclude that the denial of access to medical records to 
a person deprived of his liberty, assuming such a denial is proved, constitutes ‘inhumane’ treatment and is 
contrary to ‘respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’ goes beyond the scope of the said paragraph 
and runs the risk of undermining a fundamental principle which must be above whimsical interpretations.” 
Zheludkov v. Ukraine, Individual Opinion by Rafael Posada. In a concurring opinion, a member argued that the 
right personal information held by the government should be absolute, stating that “a person’s right to have 
access to his or her medical records form part of the right of all individuals to have access to personal 
information concerning them . . .  regardless of whether or not this refusal may have had consequences for the 
medical treatment.” Zheludkov v. Ukraine, Individual Opinion by Cecilia Medina.  
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often is evoked.  For example, in the OAS special rapporteur’s interpretations of the Inter-
American Freedom of Expression principle, he stated that the first principle that habeas data 
is built upon is “the right [of individuals] to not have their privacy disturbed.” 409  Both the 
UN and OAS special rapporteurs on freedom of expression argued that the right to personal 
information plays two separate roles: as a private right it protects the privacy of individuals, 
and as a political right it helps ensure a healthy democracy. 
It also is important to note that in-depth discussion regarding the specifics of a right of 
access to personal information is limited in these documents, particularly within those of 
NGOs.  This may be because a general right of access to government information often is 
understood to include the right to personal information.  For example, the principle of 
maximum disclosure discussed in Chapter Two presumes that all government information is 
accessible to the public unless there is a legitimate basis for withholding it.410  Under this 
principle, access to personal information would be included; nonetheless, a separate 
information-privacy conceptualization of access to government information does exist as the 
following sections demonstrate.         
    
The Information-Privacy Conceptualization – Rationales of the Right 
 Within the information-privacy conceptualization of access to government 
information, there are two central rationales that justify a right of access to personal 
                                                 
409 2001 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, supra note 283, at ¶12. The Inter-Am. Comm. also reiterated the three 
premises. See Inter-American Commission Report of the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS Doc.  OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, Doc. 5, rev. 1, ¶ 89 (Mar. 7, 2006). 
 
410 See Principle of Maximum Disclosure, infra pp. 81-85 
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information.   These are the knowledge-about-self rationale and the government-
accountability rationale.    
 
Knowledge-about-Self Rationale  
According to Toby Mendel of the NGO Article 19, the ability to gain knowledge about 
oneself is part of basic human dignity.  Access to personal information, Mendel argued, is a 
“social goal as opposed to a political goal (protecting other rights). The right to access one’s 
personal information is part of basic human dignity.”411  This understanding of the right to 
personal information is evident in three European Court cases involving access to birth or 
childhood information.  In all three cases, the court maintained that the personal information 
held in government files was important for the complainants’ understanding of themselves.  
Two of the cases, Gaskin v. the United Kingdom412 and M.G. v. the United Kingdom,413 
involved information about the complainants’ childhoods.  The third case, Odièvre v. 
France,414 pertained to information about the complainant’s birth mother.   
In Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, Graham Gaskin, who was taken into care by social 
services at a very young age, wanted access to confidential case files that had been compiled 
by local authorities and contained reports by all those connected with his care.  He was denied 
access to some of his files because several of the contributors, such as social workers, 
                                                 
411 Toby Mendel, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Study, 4 (2004), 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/file_download.php/fa422efc11c9f9b15f9374a5eac31c7efreedom_info_laws.pdf. 
For an updated version of this study, see Toby Mendel, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Study (2d 
ed. 2008), 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/file_download.php/fa422efc11c9f9b15f9374a5eac31c7efreedom_info_laws.pdf. 
 
412 Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (July 7, 1989). 
 
413 M.G. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39393/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 24, 2002). 
 
414 Odièvre v. France, App. No. 42326/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 13, 2003). 
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withheld permission because some information in their reports had been provided in 
confidence.  Gaskin wanted the files because he believed that he was “ill-treated in care” and 
wanted to “obtain details of where he was kept and by whom and in what conditions in order 
to be able to help him to overcome his problems and learn about his past.”415  
The European Court determined that the government records in question provided 
Gaskin “a substitute record for the memories and experience of the parents. . . .  It no doubt 
contained information concerning highly personal aspects of the applicant’s childhood, 
development and history and thus could constitute his principle source of information about 
his past and formative years.”416  The court went on to state that the “respect for private life 
requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human 
beings and that in principle they should not be obstructed by the authorities from obtaining 
such very basic information without specific justification.”417  The court concluded that 
“persons in the situation of the applicant have a vital interest, protected by the Convention, in 
receiving the information necessary to know and to understand their childhood and early 
development.”418 
The case M.G. v. the United Kingdom involved a similar request for information.  As a 
child, the complainant periodically had been in the care of social services.  He wanted his 
social services records because he believed he was physically abused as a child and needed all 
relevant information about his childhood “in order to come to terms with the emotional and 
                                                 
415 Gaskin v. United Kingdom, at ¶ 11. 
 
416 Id. at ¶ 36. 
 
417 Id. at ¶ 39. 
 
418 Id. at ¶ 49. 
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psychological impact of any such abuse, and to understand his own subsequent behavior.”419  
He had been given limited access to the files, but he argued that he had a right to “unimpeded 
access” to his files.420  The European Court stated that the “social service records, which 
contain the principle source of information regarding significant periods of the applicant’s 
formative years, relate to his private and family life.” 421  Relying heavily on the Gaskin 
decision, the court ruled that the complainant’s interest in obtaining the documents 
outweighed the government’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of social service 
records.422  
The case Odièvre v. France involved Pascale Odièvre, who requested information 
about her birth mother from the French government.  Odièvre had been given up for adoption 
and wanted to obtain identifying information about her natural family.  She argued that the 
government’s refusal to give her the information she sought prevented her from knowing her 
personal history.423  The court said that the case related to the complainant’s private life 
because her “claim to be entitled, in the name of biological truth, to know her personal history 
is based on her inability to gain access to information about her origins and related identifying 
data.”424  Quoting Gaskin, the court emphasized that the vital interest in understanding one’s 
childhood and early development was protected under article 8 of the European 
                                                 
419 M.G. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39393/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26 (Sept. 24, 2002). 
 
420 Id. at ¶ 26. 
 
421 Id. at ¶ 27-32. 
 
422 Id. 
 
423 Odièvre v. France, App. No. 42326/98 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 28 (Feb. 13, 2003). 
 
424 Id. at 29. 
 
111 
 
Convention.425  In discussing whether article 8, the right-to-privacy provision, applied to the 
requested information, the court stated: 
Matters of relevance to personal development include details of a person’s 
identity as a human being and the vital interest protected by the Convention in 
obtaining information necessary to discover the truth concerning important 
aspects of one’s personal identity, such as the identity of one’s parents. Birth, 
and in particular the circumstances in which a child is born, forms part of a 
child’s, and subsequently the adult’s, private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the 
Convention.426  
 
Although the court ruled that the protections in article 8 applied to information about one’s 
birth mother, the court maintained that, in this case, the government’s interest in preserving 
the anonymity of the birth mother outweighed Odièvre’s interest in the information,427 which 
will be discussed below.  
 
Government-Accountability Rationale 
 The government-accountability rationale for the information-privacy 
conceptualization understands the right of access to personal information as a vehicle to 
ensure that governments do not overstep their powers by storing false or misleading 
information about individuals, illegally gathering or using information on individuals, or 
allowing unauthorized individuals to access the information.  According to the OAS special 
rapporteur, “[I]ndividuals have the right to use the habeas data writ as a mechanism to ensure 
accountability.”428  This rationale is implied in the right to correct inaccurate personal 
information, a right often included in the right of access to personal information.   
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For example, in a 2000 report to Korea about its compliance with article 17, the right 
to privacy provision of the Political Covenant, the Human Rights Committee stated that the 
“lack of adequate remedies to correct inaccurate information in databases or to prevent its 
misuse or abuse is also of concern.”429  According to David Banisar of the NGO Privacy 
International, “A right of access and correction to personal files ensures that records on 
individuals are accurate and decisions are not based on out-of-date or irrelevant 
information.”430  The Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of article 17 stated, “If such 
files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed contrary to the 
provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to request rectification or 
elimination.”431   
The European Court on Human Rights addressed this issue in Turek v. Slovakia.432  
This case involved Ivan Turek, who was denied a security clearance he needed in order to 
work for the Slovakian government because it was determined that he had collaborated with 
the security agency of the former communist regime.  Under a Slovakian lustration law, 433 
                                                                                                                                                        
428 2001 Report of the OAS Sp. Rapp, supra note 283, at ¶12. The Inter-Am. Commission also reiterated the 
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429 UN HRC Concluding Observations on Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/55/40 vol. I, ¶ 149 (2000). 
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citizens who collaborated with the former communist regime cannot hold certain government 
positions.434  Lustration is the act of vetting potential public officials for links to the 
communist-era security services.  This was particularly common in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.435  The allegations that Turek had collaborated also 
were made public in the news media and on the Internet.436  Turek refuted the information and 
requested access to the information about him in the government’s files.  He was denied the 
information because the files were classified.  The court ruled that the government had not 
justified its need to withhold the information, stating, “If the party to whom the classified 
materials relate is denied access to all or most of the materials in question, his or her 
possibilities to contradict the security agency’s version of the facts would be severely 
curtailed.”437  
The accountability rationale also is based on ensuring that unauthorized individuals 
have not obtained the personal information of others.   The Human Rights Committee’s 
general comment on article 17 of the Political Covenant438 stated: 
Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that information 
concerning a person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are 
not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for 
purposes incompatible with the Covenant. Thus it is necessary for individuals 
to access their personal information. 439  
                                                 
434 Turek v. Slovankia, at ¶ 11. 
 
435 Kieran Williams et al., Explaining Lustration in Central Europe: a ‘post-communist politics’ approach, 12 
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Often the rationale that the right to personal information is necessary to hold governments 
accountable specifically refers to security and intelligence agencies, which by design collect 
and store personal information.  In this sense, the right is seen as preventing the arbitrary or 
illegitimate use of personal data.440   
In a 2001 report, the OAS special rapporteur emphasized that the right of access to 
personal information can ensure that security and intelligence agencies are held accountable 
for their actions.  The special rapporteur said that “with respect to the accountability aspect of 
the habeas data writ, it should be stressed that in some countries in the hemisphere, this 
procedure is an important mechanism for monitoring the activities of State security or 
intelligence agencies.”441  The special rapporteur further stated: 
The action of habeas data entitles the injured party, or his family members, to 
ascertain the purpose for which the data was collected and, if collected 
illegally, to determine whether the responsible parties are punishable. Public 
disclosure of illegal practices in the collection of personal data can have the 
effect of preventing such practices by these agencies in the future.442 
 
Although the information-privacy conceptualization understands the right to personal 
information held by the government as an individual right, the OAS special rapporteur’s 
statement above implies that the right also could be political in nature in that it could lead to 
public exposure of government wrong-doing.   
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The Information-Privacy Conceptualization – To Whom the Right is Conferred 
Within the information-privacy conceptualization, the right to personal information 
pertains to all individuals who desire personal information about them held by the 
government, regardless of citizenship.443  Individuals do not have to indicate why they are 
requesting the information.  According to the OAS special rapporteur, “The mere existence of 
personal data in public or private records is sufficient reason in itself for the exercise of this 
right.”444  The European Court of Human Rights stated that an individual does not have to 
show that the information is “sensitive” or that the government’s collection and storage of the 
information created a harm. 445 
  According to the Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files 
created by the UN Commission on Human Rights and adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
all that is required to request personal information is proof of identity.446  Sometimes there are 
references to this right also belonging to individuals’ family members.  For example, 
according to the OAS special rapporteur, family members of the individual also have a right 
to request the information from the government.447   
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The Information-Privacy Conceptualization – The Type of Information Guaranteed  
The type of information to which access is guaranteed within the information-privacy 
conceptualization is limited to information that specifically pertains to the requester of the 
information.  Often this is referred to as personal information, personal data, or information 
about one’s private life.   
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the right to private life must be 
interpreted broadly.  According to the court, “[A]ny information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual” held by the government is included.448  The court further stated: 
“[T]he term ‘private life’ must not be interpreted restrictively.  In particular, respect for 
private life comprises the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings” and does not exclude “activities of a professional or business nature.”449  Other types 
of the information that the court has found to be related to private life include information on 
one’s birth450 and childhood,451 social service records,452 and any information collected and 
stored by intelligence agencies.453  
The European Court also has ruled that information once in the public domain can be 
considered private if it is then collected and stored by the government.  In 2000 the court 
stated:  “Public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is systematically 
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collected and stored in files held by public authorities.  That is all the truer where such 
information concerns a person’s distant past.”454  This case involved an individual who sought 
access to personal files created 50 years earlier by the Romanian Intelligence Service.  The 
files included information about the complainant’s academic studies, his political activities, 
and his criminal record.455  In 2006, the court reiterated this point in a case involving 
information gathered by the Swedish Security Police.  The information included radio 
programs and newspaper articles.  According to the court, “[E]ven those parts of the 
information that were public since the information had been systematically collected and 
stored in files held by the authorities” can be considered private.456 
As indicated above, the European Court has stated that an individual does not have to 
show that the information is “sensitive” in order to claim a right of access to information. 457    
Nor does an individual have to allege that the information is incorrect.458  The OAS special 
rapporteur has stated that information regarding one’s property also is included. 459  The OAS 
special rapporteur also has stated that individuals have a right to access information that is 
classified, if “entities of the state or the private sector obtain data improperly and/or 
illegally.”460     
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Within this conceptualization, information held by nongovernment entities sometimes 
is included in the right of access to personal information.  The Human Rights Committee 
included information from nongovernment entities in its general comment on article 17, the 
right-to-privacy provision of the Political Covenant.  The comment stated that the right to 
privacy guaranteed by article 17 included the right to access personal information held by 
both “public authorities and private individuals or bodies.”461  In a 1999 meeting with a 
representative of South Korea, the committee urged the South Korean government to provide 
a right of access to personal information from both public and private databases.462  Several 
countries in their compliance reports to the committee noted in their sections on article 17 that 
their laws or constitutions included a right to data held by private entities.463 
 The OAS special rapporteur also has stated that the right of habeas data includes the 
right to information in “private databases.”464  This was emphasized in reports to Panama and 
Paraguay on the governments’ compliance with the American Convention.465  The Africa 
Declaration also includes a right of access to personal information held by private entities in 
the declaration’s right of access to personal information.466 
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The Information-Privacy Conceptualization – Limitations on the Right 
As noted above, the right to access personal information is based on more than one 
right: a right to privacy, a right to freedom of expression, and a right to fair treatment while in 
detention.  This inconsistency could affect how the limitations on the right of access to 
personal information are conceptualized.  For example, the Political Covenant allows 
restrictions on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under article 19 in order to 
protect reputations, national security, and public health or morals.467  The American 
Convention allows for similar restrictions. 468   At the same time, the Political Covenant 
articulates no restrictions on the right to privacy.  Thus far, neither the Inter-American Court 
nor the Human Rights Committee has weighed in on potential restrictions on the right to 
personal information guaranteed by the American Convention or the Political Covenant.  The 
European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, which understands the right to personal 
information as part of the right to privacy, has addressed in detail the limitations on this right.    
 According to paragraph two of article 8 of the European Convention, which sets out 
the limitations on the right to privacy: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.469  
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According to the European Court’s interpretation of article 8, in order to legitimately 
limit access to personal information, governments must clearly define restrictions within the 
law.  The European Court has ruled that this means that the law denying access to personal 
information must be clear and its consequences must be “foreseeable” to the public.  This also 
means that the law “must be compatible with the rule of law, which means that it must 
provide a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities.”470  
The court explained these requirements in Leander v. Sweden.471   
 The Leander v. Sweden case, discussed earlier, involved Torsten Leander, who had 
temporary employment as a technician at a navel museum in Sweden.  After being denied a 
security clearance from the government, he was fired.  He asked to see the information about 
him that had prompted the government to deny his security clearance and was denied access 
to the information for reasons of national security.  In determining if the denial of information 
was “in accordance with the law,” the court stated that the government’s interference with 
article 8, the right to privacy provision in the European Covenant, must have some basis in 
domestic law.  But, the court asserted, “Compliance with domestic law . . .  does not suffice: 
the law in question must be accessible to the individual concerned and its consequences for 
him must also be foreseeable.”472  The court went on to explain that “foreseeability” means 
that “the law has to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate indication as to 
the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the public authorities are empowered 
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to resort to this kind of secret and potentially dangerous interference with private life.”473  
According to the court, this means that the “law must indicate the scope of any such discretion 
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient 
clarity.”474  Ultimately, in Leander the court ruled that national security concerns justified the 
government’s restriction on information.  Limitations on information based on national 
security will be discussed in more detail below.   
In Rotaru v. Romania, the European Court ruled that a law allowing the government to 
collect and store information on individuals was not “in accordance with the law,” as required 
by article 8, because it contained “no explicit, detailed provision concerning the persons 
authorized to consult the file, the nature of the files, the procedure to be followed or the use 
that may be made of the information thus obtained.”475  The court concluded that the 
“domestic law does not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of 
the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities.”476  The court also noted that 
information gathered by the government based solely on political affiliations would not be 
considered “in accordance with the law.”477 
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A procedure to appeal denials of information must be in place in order to be “in 
accordance with the law.”  In both Gaskin and M.G., the European Court ruled that the 
government was in violation of article 8 because no such procedure was in place.478  
In the context of national security, the court has stated that the requirement of 
foreseeability can be modified.  According to the court in Leander, in the context of national 
security, foreseeability “cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee precisely 
what checks will be made in his regard by the Swedish special police service in its efforts to 
protect national security.”479  The court further stated: 
[W]here the implementation of the law consists of secret measures, not open to 
scrutiny by the individuals concerned or by the public at large, the law itself, as 
opposed to the accompanying administrative practice, must indicate the scope 
of any discretion conferred on the competent authority with sufficient clarity, 
having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the 
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.480 
 
 In order for a limitation on access to personal information to be justified, the limitation 
also must have a legitimate aim that is “necessary in a democratic society.”481  According to 
the court, the “notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing 
social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”482  This 
was addressed in two cases, Leander and Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden,483 both of which 
involved national security.  In both cases the court unceremoniously agreed that the protection 
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of national security was a legitimate governmental aim.484  What was at stake in these cases, 
however, was whether the “interference” with the right to privacy was “proportionate” to that 
legitimate governmental aim.485    
 In Leander the European Court stated that when national security interests are 
involved, governments enjoy a wide “margin of appreciation” 486 when balancing the rights of 
individuals with the need to protect national security.  In other words, the government is given 
a certain degree of latitude in balancing these competing interests.   
Referring to the government interest in withholding information, the court stated: 
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting 
national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the 
competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers 
not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this 
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in 
posts of importance for national security.487 
  
However, the court reasoned, it was still necessary to ensure that proper safeguards against 
government abuse were in place.  According to the court, “[I]n view of the risk that a system 
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of secret surveillance for the protection of national security poses of undermining or even 
destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, the Court must be satisfied that there 
exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”488   
 The government invoked 12 separate safeguards that protected against abuse.  
Ultimately, the court decided that proper provisions to guard against abuse were in place.  The 
court was particularly swayed by the supervision provided for by members of parliament, 
oversight from an independent board, and an ombudsman.489  The court concluded that when 
taking into account the “wide margin of appreciation” conferred on the government, “the 
interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant.”490       
  In Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden,491 the European Court again balanced individuals’ 
rights of access to personal information against the government’s need to protect national 
security.  This case involved five complainants, all of whom had requested information about 
them held by the Swedish Security Police.  The complainants had received some of the 
information held in his government files, but they argued that they had a right to all of the 
information because the government had failed to show that they were connected to terrorism, 
espionage, or any other criminal activity.492  Four of the requests were refused on the grounds 
that making the information available could jeopardize national security.  The other request 
was refused because making the information available could risk effective crime prevention.   
According to the court: 
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[A] refusal of full access to a national secret police register is necessary where 
the State may legitimately fear that the provision of such information may 
jeopardise the efficacy of a secret surveillance system designed to protect 
national security and to combat terrorism. In this case the national 
administrative and judicial authorities involved all held that full access would 
jeopardise the purpose of the system. The Court does not find any ground on 
which it could arrive at a different conclusion.493 
 
The court concluded that given the “wide margin of appreciation” that governments receive in 
national security cases, the government “was entitled to consider that the interests of national 
security and the fight against terrorism prevailed over the interests of the applicants in being 
advised of the full extent to which information was kept about them on the Security Police 
register.”494 
Sometimes the right of access to personal information conflicts with another person’s 
right to privacy.  This was at issue in the Odièvre case,495 which was discussed previously.  
Odièvre wanted access to information about her birth mother, but the government withheld 
the information arguing that disclosure would violate the privacy rights of the mother who 
had voluntarily decided not to have contact with her child.  France had a law that allowed 
anonymous births to ensure that pregnant women who did not want to keep their babies would 
seek the medical care they needed.496  Although the European Court stated that Odièvre had a 
right to her childhood information,497 the court weighed that right against the mother’s right to 
anonymity.  These two rights, the court admitted, “are not easily reconciled.”498  According to 
                                                 
493 Id. at ¶ 102. 
 
494 Id. at ¶ 104. 
 
495 Odièvre v. France, App. No. 42326/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 13, 2003). 
 
496 Id. at ¶ 45.  
 
497 Id. at ¶ 42. 
 
498 Id at ¶ 44. 
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the court, the right to privacy in article 8 of the European Convention is guaranteed to 
“everyone” and thus “applies to both the child and the mother.”499  In the end the court 
deferred to the state’s “margin of appreciation” and stated: 
[T]he Court considers that France has not overstepped the margin of 
appreciation which it must be afforded in view of the complex and sensitive 
nature of the issue of access to information about one’s origins, an issue that 
concerns the right to know one’s personal history, the choices of the natural 
parents, the existing family ties and the adoptive parents.500 
 
The European Court came to a different conclusion in Gaskin501 and M.G.,502 which 
were discussed previously.  In both cases, the complainants were denied access to personal 
records because in the United Kingdom access to personal records was contingent upon 
permission from third-party contributors to the files.503  In both cases, the court did not find 
that this requirement violated article 8, the right-to-privacy provision of the European 
Convention.  However, the court did find a violation of article 8 because there was no appeal 
process for when a third party denied consent or was not available.504      
NGO Article 19’s Model Freedom of Information Law also limits the right of access 
to personal information where granting the right “would involve the unreasonable disclosure 
of personal information about a natural third party.”505  Similar to the decisions of the 
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European Court, the model law makes exceptions to this limitation when the third party is no 
longer available to give consent.506  
 
Conclusion 
The information-privacy conceptualization of access to government information 
understands that individuals have a right to access government documents containing 
information that pertains directly to them.  This conceptualization allows individuals to know 
what information the government has gathered about them, and it allows individuals to assess 
whether the information is accurate and to have the information corrected if it is not.  There 
have been different approaches within the documents regarding the origin of the right to 
personal information.  This conceptualization has been based on a right to privacy, a right to 
freedom of expression, and even the right to be treated with humanity while in detention.  
Nonetheless, basing the right to personal information on separate rights largely has not 
affected the way the right to personal information has been conceptualized. 
Within the information-privacy conceptualization, the right to personal information 
pertains to all individuals wanting access to their personal information held by the 
government, regardless of citizenship.  Individuals requesting access do not have to provide 
reasons for their requests.  Both official government documents and documents held by 
private entities are including in the type of information that is guaranteed within this 
conceptualization.    
The two rationales within this conceptualization are the knowledge-about-self 
rationale and the government-accountability rationale.  The knowledge-about-self rationale 
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understands personal information as essential to understanding aspects about one’s history.  
The right to personal information in this context is understood as a personal right.  The 
government-accountability rationale understands access to personal information as a means to 
ensuring that governments do not abuse their powers by storing inaccurate information, 
illegally gathering or using personal information, or allowing unauthorized individuals to 
access the information.  This is very similar to the good-governance rationale of the freedom-
of-expression conceptualization.  These rationales both understand access to personal 
information as a political right that helps hold governments accountable.     
In order for restrictions on the right of access to personal information to be legitimate, 
they must be clearly stated in legislation.  When matters of national security are involved, 
there must exist proper safeguards against abuse of power; nonetheless, in this context 
governments are given deference in deciding how best to balance competing interests.  The 
right of access also can be limited when others’ privacy interests are at stake, but proper 
appeals procedures must be in place.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE RIGHT-TO-A-HEALTHY-E*VIRO*ME*T CO*CEPTUALIZATIO* 
The right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization of access to information is 
based on the idea that human rights and environmental concerns are related.  A right to 
environmental information in this context is seen as necessary to ensure that human rights, 
such as the right to life or health, are not violated and to facilitate public participation in 
environmental decision-making.  Unlike the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the 
right-to-a-healthy-environment has not been articulated in rich detail by a range of entities.  
For example, the nongovernmental organizations identified in this research rarely discuss 
environmental information specifically.  Often when environmental information is mentioned, 
it is listed as one among many types of government information to which citizens have a 
right.507   
 In order to understand this conceptualization, it is necessary to understand the 
relationship between a healthy environment and human rights, which will be discussed in the 
following section.  Subsequent sections will explicate the right-to-a-healthy-environment 
conceptualization by discussing rationales for a right to environmental information, to whom 
this right is conferred, the type of information involved, and the limitations on the right. 
 
 
                                                 
507 See, e.g., Open Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth, supra note 229, at 29; 
Under Lock and Key: Freedom of Information and the Media in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, supra note 
229, 84. 
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The Right to a Healthy Environment 
The right to a healthy environment has been understood in two ways: first, as a stand-
alone right and, second, as a right linked to the fulfillment of substantive rights.508    The 
Inter-American and African human right regimes specifically have created a right to a healthy 
environment as a separate right.  Article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and 
to have access to basic public services” and that the government “shall promote the 
protection, preservation and improvement of the environment.”509  The African Charter also 
recognizes an environmental human right. According to the charter, “All people have a right 
to a safe and satisfactory environment favorable to their development.”510  In 2002, the 
African Commission ruled in a complaint against Nigeria that the government violated this 
right.  According to the commission, citizens’ right to a clean environment was violated 
because the government directly contaminated the environment and failed to protect the 
community from environmental harms caused by foreign oil companies.  The commission 
asserted that “the right to a healthy environment . . . imposes clear obligations upon a 
                                                 
508 See generally Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights have 
been Recognized?, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 129 (2006). 
 
509 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, art. 11, 28 I.L.M. 156 (Nov. 14, 1988).  Article 11 is not, however, one of the rights in the 
Protocol that is subject to the petition procedure established by the American Convention. See Dinah Shelton, 
Environmental Rights, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 185 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).  The OAS General Assembly has 
recognized the public’s right to live in a healthy environment. OAS GA Resolution, AG/Res 1819 (XXXI-O/01) 
(2001) (calling for OAS institutions to explore the relationship between human rights and the environment); 
OAS GA Resolution, AG/Res 1896 (XXXII-O/02) (2002); OAS GA Resolution, AG/Res 1926 (XXXIII-O/03) 
(2003) (encouraging international cooperation in human rights and the environment). The Inter-American 
Democratic Charter also recognizes a right to a healthy environment: “The exercise of democracy promotes the 
preservation and good stewardship of the environment. It is essential that the states of the Hemisphere implement 
policies and strategies to protect the environment.” Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 247, at art. 
15.  
 
510 African Charter, supra note 53, at art. 24.  
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government.  It requires the state to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution 
and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources.”511  This ruling is discussed in more detail below.   
More commonly, the right to a healthy environment has been understood as linked to 
substantive rights, such as the right to health or the right to life.512  According to Judge 
Christopher Weermantry of the International Court of Justice: 
The protection of the environment is . . . a vital part of contemporary human 
rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the 
right to health and the right to life itself.  It is scarcely necessary to elaborate 
on this, as damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human 
rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights 
instruments.513 
 
As far back as 1972, discussions were taking place about the relationship between 
human rights and the environment.  In 1972, the United Nations organized the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, which culminated in a final declaration, known as 
the Stockholm Declaration.  The first principle of the declaration stated, “Man has the 
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
                                                 
511 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 
Communication No. 155/96, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., ¶ 52 
(May 27, 2002), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/allcases.html.  The commission 
also ruled that the government violated citizens’ rights to non-discrimination, life, property, health, family, and 
protection from foreign exploitation (African Charter, supra note 53, at art.s 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), and 21, id. at ¶ 
70.  The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, ruled that in matters of environmental protections, 
a fair balance should be struck between the economic interest of the country and the conflicting interests of 
persons affected by noise disturbances from Heathrow airport, “but it would not be appropriate for the Court to 
adopt a special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human rights.” Hatton 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 122 (July 8, 2003). 
 
512 For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that the right to a healthy 
environment is one of the “underlying determinants of health” and is an integral element of the right to health as 
laid out in Article 12 (right to health) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, General Comment, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Oct. 29, 
2007).   See also UN Comm. on H.R., Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/L.11/Add., art. 4(l) (Apr. 24, 2003) (stating that “a democratic and equitable international order 
requires, inter alia, the realization of. . . [t]he right of every person and all peoples to a healthy environment”). 
 
513 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) Judgment ICJ, 37 ILM 162, ¶ 92 (1998). 
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quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to 
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”514 
Two decades later, the UN organized another conference on the environment, the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development, held June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro Brazil.  As 
part of the build-up to the conference, a 1990 UN General Assembly reaffirmed the 
Stockholm Declaration, recognizing that “all individuals are entitled to live in an environment 
adequate for their health and well-being,” and “called upon Member States and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations dealing with environmental questions 
to enhance their efforts towards ensuring a better and healthier environment.”515   
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities516 also focused on the topic by creating a temporary special rapporteur on human 
rights and the environment to undertake a study of the environment and its relation to human 
rights (UN environmental special rapporteur).517  This resulted in an extensive report that 
included a draft declaration of principles on human rights and the environment, which stated 
                                                 
514 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm, Switz., Declaration of 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], 11 I.L.M. 
1416, principle 1 (1972). 
 
515 Need to Ensure a Healthy Environment for the Well-Being of Individuals, G.A. Res. 45/94, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/45/94, at ¶ 1-2 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
 
516 The sub-commission was established by the Commission on Human Rights at its first session in 1947 under 
the authority of the Economic and Social Council.  In 1999 the sub-commission changed its name to the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. In 2006, pursuant to Human Rights Council 
resolution 5/1, all mandates, mechanisms, functions, and responsibilities of the sub-commission were assumed 
by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, which is “composed of 18 experts serving in their personal 
capacity, [to] function as a think-tank for the Council and work at its direction” HRC Res. Institution-building of 
the United Nations Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/5/1 ¶ 65 (June 18, 2007). The first session of 
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Doc. A/HRC/AC/1/2 (Nov. 3, 2008). 
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Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/58, 71 (Aug. 31, 1989). 
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in part, “Human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable development and 
peace are interdependent and indivisible.”518 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development culminated in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development,519 which was affirmed by the UN General 
Assembly.520  Principle one of the declaration states that “human beings are at the centre of 
concerns for sustainable development.  They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in 
harmony with nature.”521   
Following the UN conference, the UN Commission on Human Rights decided in 1995 
to appoint a special rapporteur – a toxic products special rapporteur – to study the adverse 
effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on 
the enjoyment of human rights.522  This special rapporteur consistently has referenced human 
rights in his reports on environmental problem.  For example, in a 2006 report, he stated: 
                                                 
518 UN ECOSOC, Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned, 
Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report [hereinafter H.R. and Environ. Final Report], Draft 
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522 The special rapporteur is mandated for three years to investigate and monitor effects of dumping of toxic 
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Resolution 9/1, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/1 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
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A fundamental ingredient of rights-based approaches to toxic chemicals is the 
explicit linkage to human rights. The linkage to human rights brings a legal 
framework to the issue of toxic chemicals which ensures that solving the 
problems relating to such chemicals is more than just a good idea – it is legally 
enforceable. The simple but important linkage of human rights to strategies 
and frameworks aimed at regulating toxic transfers automatically brings into 
play the whole corpus of human rights norms, standards and principles523 
 
The commission’s resolutions on toxic and dangerous wastes also consistently refer to the 
human rights to life, health, and a sound environment for every individual and affirm that 
illicit traffic in and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes are a serious threat 
to these rights.524  
It is within this context of articulating a relationship between human rights and the 
environment that the concept of a right of access to environmental information was born.  For 
example, principle 10 of the Rio Declaration affirms a right to environmental information and 
citizen participation in decision-making.525  In 2001, a new environmental treaty went into 
force that furthered the work of the UN conference and elaborated on principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration.  The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matter (the Aarhus Convention),526 requires 
governments to provide access to environmental information.  Unlike traditional agreements 
that are designed to solve specific goals, the Aarhus Convention is based on the premise that 
                                                 
523 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and 
dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights. ECOSOC, UN Doc.  E/CN.4/2006/42, ¶ 56 
(Feb. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Toxic Products special rapporteur 2006 report]. 
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526 UN Economic Commission on Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
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access to information, public participation in decision-making, and the guarantees of judicial 
recourse will facilitate better environmental outcomes.  Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
and the Aarhus Convention will be discussed in more detail below.   
The following sections will explicate the right to environmental information within the 
right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization.  The next section will discuss the rationales 
of this right. 
  
The Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization – Rationales of the Right 
There are two main rationales for granting a right of access to environmental 
information.  The first rationale understands access to environmental information as helping 
to ensure that human rights are not compromised by an unhealthy environment.  For example, 
in her final report, the environmental rapporteur stated that “the right to information [is] 
highly relevant to human rights and the environment.  Public access to information on request 
and the obligation of public authorities to disclose it irrespective of requests are essential for 
the protection of the environment and the prevention of environmental human rights 
problems.”527  Access to environmental information also is understood as necessary to ensure 
effective public participation in environmental decision-making.  In this context, public input 
is seen as enhancing better environmental decision-making.  The public-participation rationale 
often includes the protecting-rights rationale in its understanding of the right of environmental 
information.  Effective public participation in environmental decision-making is not only seen 
                                                 
527 H.R. and Environ. Final Report, supra note 518, at ¶ 204. See also UN Doc. A/HRC/7/21, ¶ 67 (arguing that 
the Human Rights Council should “recognize explicitly the right to information as a precondition for good 
governance and the realization of all other human rights”) [hereinafter Toxic Products special rapporteur 2008 
report]. 
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as protecting the environment, but also as protecting individuals, communities, and countries 
from human rights abuses due to environmental problems.    
 
Protecting-Rights Rationale  
Two European Court of Human Rights cases link the right to environmental 
information to the right to respect for private and family life, guaranteed under article 8 of the 
European Convention.528  Both cases involved requests for information in order to assess 
environmental risks that might threaten the health of citizens.   
In Guerra v. Italy,529 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Italian 
government’s failure to provide information about risks from a chemical factory violated the 
complainants’ rights under article 8.  The complainants, 40 individuals from the town of 
Manfredonia, Italy, claimed that government had failed to provide information about the toxic 
hazards of a local chemical factory, which had been classified by the Italian government as a 
“high risk” to the community.  According to the court, “[T]he direct effect of the toxic 
emissions on the [complainants’] right to respect for their private and family life means that 
Article 8 is applicable.”530  The court further explained that article 8 creates a positive 
obligation on the government to protect families’ rights. 531  Such an obligation, the court 
asserted, included the duty to provide the environmental information necessary for the 
families to determine the health risks of living near the factory so they could react 
appropriately.  According to the court, the complainants 
                                                 
528 European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 8. 
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waited, right up until the production of fertilizers ceased in 1994, for essential 
information that would have enabled them to assess the risks they and their 
families might run if they continued to live at Manfredonia, a town particularly 
exposed to danger in the event of an accident at the factory.  The government 
did not meet its positive obligation to “secure the [complainants’] right to 
respect for their private and family life.”532 
 
In McGinley v. United Kingdom, the European Court also ruled that the right to 
respect for private and family life, guaranteed under article 8 of the European Convention,533 
created an obligation on the government to provide environmental information.  This case 
involved information about nuclear testing in the 1950s on Christmas Island in the Indian 
Ocean, which was then held by the United Kingdom.  The complainants had witnessed the 
tests during their time in British military service and subsequently experienced ill health.  
They were denied war pensions because there was no evidence to suggest that their health 
problems were caused by their proximity to the testing.  The complainants argued that the 
government had failed to provide the necessary individual health records and nuclear 
monitoring information that would help them show a correlation between their ill health and 
their exposure to the nuclear testing.  The court stated, “Where a government engages in 
hazardous activities . . . which might have hidden adverse consequences on the health of those 
involved in such activities, . . . Article 8 requires an effective and accessible procedure be 
established which enables persons to seek all relevant and appropriate information.”534  
Nonetheless, the court went on to assert that the government had provided proper procedures 
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for obtaining information but the complainants had not utilized them; therefore, the 
government had fulfilled its positive obligation under article 8.535 
 
Public-Participation Rationale  
The link between the right of access to environmental information and effective 
participation in environmental decision-making has been linked as far back as the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration.  Although it does not explicitly reference access to government 
information, the Stockholm Declaration stated that “education in environmental matters” is 
essential to “broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by 
individuals, enterprises and communities in protecting and improving the environment in its 
full human dimension.”536  The declaration also emphasized the importance of the “free flow 
of up-to-date scientific information and transfer of experience” in facilitating “the solution of 
environmental problems”537 
The 1992 Rio Declaration, adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, explicitly links the right of access to environmental information with effective 
environmental participation.  The declaration states: 
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities 
in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available.538  
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In 1997 the Rio Declaration was endorsed by the UN General Assembly, which specifically 
resolved that “[a]ccess to information and broad public participation in decision-making are 
fundamental to sustainable development.”539   
In what is widely accepted as the leading example of the implementation of principle 
10 of the Rio Declaration,540 the Aarhus Convention went into force in 2001.  According to a 
2005 UN Secretary-General report, the Aarhus Convention “continues to represent the most 
advanced example of the link between the environment and human rights”541  The Aarhus 
Convention was born out of a four-conference process called “Environment for Europe,”542 
which was created by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).543  Although it is a 
regional treaty, its global significance is widely recognized544 and it is open to non-ECE 
members to join.   
The Aarhus Convention’s goal is “to contribute to the protection of the right of every 
person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her 
health and well-being.” 545  The convention is unique in that it does not establish specific 
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environmental goals, such as pollution controls, but instead implements a rights-based 
approach that provides citizens with rights to information, to participation in environmental 
decision-making, and to access to judicial recourse.  According to the convention’s preamble, 
[I]n the field of the environment, improved access to information and public 
participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of 
decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the 
public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to 
take due account of such concerns.546 
 
Rights to information, participation in environmental decision-making, and access to 
judicial recourse are articulated within the three “pillars” laid out in the convention.  The first 
pillar, public access to environmental information, creates rules and requirements for 
governments to disclose environmental and other relevant information.547  The second pillar, 
public participation in environmental matters, requires that the public and public interest 
groups be allowed to participate in environmental decision-making.548  The third pillar, access 
to judicial recourse, grants the public and public interest groups the right to seek judicial 
remedies when governments fail to comply with the first two pillars.549 All three pillars 
emphasize enforceable rights of citizens.  
The UN environmental special rapporteur also firmly based the right of access to 
environmental information on the importance of public participation in a democratic society.  
In her 1994 final report, she stated:  
The right to information is frequently presented as an individual and group 
right which constitutes an essential attribute of the democratic processes and 
the principle of popular participation. Indeed, the concept of democratic 
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government as stated in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights becomes meaningless unless individuals and groups have access to 
relevant information on which to base the exercise of the vote or otherwise 
express the will of the people.550 
 
The draft principles on human rights and the environment included in the final report also link 
the right of access to environmental information to “effective public participation in 
environmental decision-making.”551 
 The UN toxic products special rapporteur also has linked the right to environmental 
information to citizen participation in environmental decision-making.  The special 
rapporteur’s 2008 annual report included a section highlighting the importance of the right to 
information and participation.  This section borrowed heavily from the ideas presented in the 
final report of the UN environmental special rapporteur.  In the 2008 report, the UN toxic 
products special rapporteur asserted that “the right to information and participation are both 
rights in themselves and essential tools for the exercise of other rights, such as the right to life, 
the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to adequate housing and 
others.”552  In the report’s concluding statements, the special rapporteur declared that these 
rights place obligations on governments, stating, “Public access to information when 
requested and the obligation of public authorities to disclose and inform, irrespective of 
requests, are imperative for the prevention of environmental human rights problems and the 
protection of the environment.”553 
                                                 
550 H.R. and Environ. Final Report, supra note 518, at ¶ 209. This was also reiterated Toxic Products special 
rapporteur 2008 report, supra note 527, at ¶ 66.  
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Both the Inter-American Commission and the African Commission have linked the 
right of access to environmental information and participation in environmental decision-
making.  As noted previously, the African Commission ruled that the government of Nigeria 
violated citizens’ right to a healthy environment by not protecting them from the harmful 
effects of oil production.  The complaint was filed against the Nigerian government, which 
was involved in oil production in a consortium with the Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation.  The complaint alleged that the oil operations produced contamination that 
caused environmental degradation and health problems; that the consortium disposed of toxic 
wastes in violation of international environmental standards and caused numerous avoidable 
spills near villages, which poisoned much of the region’s soil and water; that the government 
aided these violations by placing the state’s legal and military powers at the disposal of the oil 
companies; and that the government’s security forces killed innocent civilians and destroyed 
villages.  The complaint also alleged that the government failed to monitor the activities of the 
oil companies, to provide information to local communities, and to conduct environmental 
impact studies.554  Referring to governments’ obligations regarding their citizens’ rights to a 
healthy environment and to good health guaranteed in the African Charter, the commission 
asserted: 
[G]overnment compliance . . . must also include ordering or at least permitting 
independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and 
publicizing environmental and social impact studies prior to any major 
industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing 
information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and 
activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard 
and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.555 
 
                                                 
554 SERC v. Nigeria, ¶s 1-9. 
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143 
 
The Nigerian government had failed to uphold these obligations, the commission 
concluded, by not providing information or allowing the affected communities to participate 
in decision-making about oil production nearby.556  The commission listed among the several 
specific obligations on the Nigerian government the duty to provide “information on health 
and environmental risks and meaningful access to regulatory and decision-making bodies to 
communities likely to be affected by oil operations.”557   
In a 1997 study of the state of human rights protections in Ecuador, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights devoted particular attention to the environmental 
rights of Ecuador’s indigenous peoples.558  The commission noted that it had been examining 
the human rights situation in the area of Oriente, Ecuador, for several years, in response to 
claims that oil production activities were contaminating the water, air, and soil, causing the 
people of the region to become sick and to have a greatly increased risk of serious illness.   
The commission found that both the Ecuadoran government and residents of Oriente 
agreed that the environment was contaminated; the residents were exposed to the toxic 
byproducts of oil production in their drinking and bathing water, in the air, and in the soil. 
The Oriente residents stated that oil operations, especially the disposal of toxic wastes, 
jeopardized their lives and health.  Many suffered skin diseases, rashes, chronic infections, 
and gastrointestinal problems. In addition, many claimed that the pollution of local waters 
contaminated fish and drove away wildlife, threatening food supplies.559  
                                                 
556 Id. at ¶ 55. 
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In its analysis of these human rights violations, the Inter-American Commission stated 
that “the absence of regulation, inappropriate regulation, or a lack of supervision in the 
application of extant norms may create serious problems with respect to the environment 
which translate into violations of human rights protected by the American Convention.”560  
The commission further declared that the government is required to take positive measures to 
safeguard against human rights abuses such as denials of access to information.  In its 
analysis, the commission argued that access to information is required in order for citizens to 
effectively participate in decision-making. The commission called on the government of 
Ecuador to implement legislation to strengthen environmental protections and in particular 
recommended that the government improve its systems for disseminating information about 
environmental issues, and enhance the transparency and opportunities for public input into 
environmental decision-making.561  The commission elaborated that the right of access to 
environmental information is based in part on the right to seek, receive, and impart 
information, which is protected by article 13 of the American Convention.562  The right to 
public participation is guaranteed under article 23 of the American Convention, which 
provides that every citizen shall enjoy the right “to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.”563  The Inter-American Commission 
concluded: 
In the context of the situation under study, protection of the right to life and 
physical integrity may best be advanced through measures to support and 
enhance the ability of individuals to safeguard and vindicate those rights. The 
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quest to guard against environmental conditions which threaten human health 
requires that individuals have access to: information, participation in relevant 
decision-making processes, and judicial recourse.564  
 
It also is important to note that the Inter-American Court decision in Reyes v. Chile involved 
access to environmental information.  As discussed previously, at issue was a deforestation 
project that “caused considerable public debate owing to its potential environmental 
impact.”565  The right of access to government information that the court conferred was based 
in part on the importance of furthering public debate and participation on environmental 
issues.566 
The importance of environmental information specifically to ensure the participation 
of vulnerable populations, such as the poor and elderly, also has been addressed.  According 
to a 2006 report of the UN toxic products special rapporteur: 
Rights-based approaches promote the participation of all relevant actors – in 
particular the most vulnerable – in programming, implementation and 
monitoring. In this way, rights-based approaches promote “bottom-up” 
approaches to the issue of toxic chemicals, not “top-down.”  They seek 
dialogue with people affected by toxic and dangerous products and wastes such 
as workers, farmers, local communities, civil society, people living in minority 
groups, indigenous peoples, women and others. In this regard, access to full 
information on chemicals is central to the meaningful participation of 
vulnerable groups.567 
 
The Stockholm declaration also emphasized the importance of the right to environmental 
information and citizen participation in environmental decision-making for vulnerable 
populations.  It states that environmental information “for the younger generation as well as 
adults, giving due consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in order to broaden the 
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basis for an enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and 
communities in protecting and improving the environment in its full human dimension.”568 
 
The Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization – To Whom the Right is 
Conferred 
 
There has not been much elaboration regarding who specifically should receive the 
right of access to environment information.  Often there is reference to individuals, 
communities, as well as countries.  It is clear that at the very least the right belongs to those 
who might be affected by environmental harms.  
  The Aarhus Convention has explicitly stated that individuals do not have to show an 
interest in the environmental information they request.569  Without elaboration, the UN toxic 
products special rapporteur stated in a 2003 report on the right of access to environmental 
information that “information held by the State should be considered to be held in trust for the 
public, not as belonging to the Government.” 570  Mostly, though, the right of access to 
environmental information has been discussed in relationship to those who are or could be 
harmed by environmental pollution. 
The UN toxic products special rapporteur has referred to the right of access to 
environmental information as belonging to individuals, communities, and neighboring 
countries that are potentially affected by hazardous materials and conditions.571  In SERAC v. 
5igeria, the African Commission ruled that the government had an obligation to provide 
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environmental information to “communities likely to be affected.”572  Also, both of the 
European Court decisions, Guerra v. Italy573 and McGinley v. United Kingdom 574 discussed 
above are predicated on the fact that the complainants had a direct interest in the information 
because they were potential victims of environmental harms.  In Guerra v. Italy, the court 
stated that article 8 of the European Convention was applicable precisely because of “the 
direct effect of the toxic emissions on the [complainants’] right to respect for their private and 
family life.”575  The positive obligations on the government that ensued included providing 
the information necessary to assess health risks.576  The court in McGinley v. United Kingdom 
also indicated that the government’s positive obligation to provide information is to those 
potentially affected by hazardous activities.577 
Sometimes reference is made to a right of access to environmental information for 
specific vulnerable populations.  For example, the OAS report on Ecuador stated:  
[W]hile environmental action requires the participation of all social sections, 
some, such as women, young people, minorities and the indigenous peoples, 
have not been able to directly participate in such processes for diverse 
historical reasons.  Affected individuals should be able to be informed about 
and have input into the decisions which affect them.578  
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The 1972 Stockholm Declaration also referenced vulnerable populations, stating, “Education 
in environmental matters, for the younger generation as well as adults, giving due 
consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in order to broaden the basis for an 
enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in 
protecting and improving the environment in its full human dimension.”579 
Often it is made clear that citizenship is not a requirement in order to request and 
receive information.  According to the Aarhus Convention, the right to environmental 
information is for all people “without discrimination as to citizenship, nationality or 
domicile.”580  The final report of the UN environmental special rapporteur stated that the right 
to environmental information means that information should be available across state 
boundaries.581   
The right of access to environmental information also has been understood as 
belonging to countries; for example, the UN environmental special rapporteur refers to the 
right to environmental information as belonging to individuals, communities, and neighboring 
countries that could be affected by environmental problems.582  According to the special 
rapporteur’s final report:    
The right to information not only protects individuals and groups, but also 
Governments themselves. In this light, the Special Rapporteur is aware that in 
the context of human rights and the environment, the right to information may 
also be considered a right of States vis-à-vis other States or of States vis-à-vis 
transnational corporations. In this context a State’s access to information 
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would enable it to transmit the information to its residents and to otherwise 
protect the human rights of those residents. 583  
 
This right of countries to information clearly stems from the right of individuals to have 
access to information.  The special rapporteur’s report further noted:  
[M]any conflicts have arisen between Governments because Governments of 
developed countries, transnational enterprises operating from the developed 
countries or international development banks do not provide full disclosure of 
potential dangers to human beings or to the environment for contemplated 
activities. Under these circumstances, individuals and groups have limited 
recourses because their own Governments may not have the relevant 
information.584 
 
The Rio Declaration also provides for a right of access for countries.  It states that 
governments must “immediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other 
emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those 
States.”585  States also are obligated to provide relevant environmental information regarding 
“activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect.”586 
 
The Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization – The Type of Information 
Guaranteed 
 
Only the Aarhus Convention has been explicit about the types of environmental 
information included within this right of access.  Mostly, the particulars of what comprises 
environmental information have not been articulated.  Often environmental information is 
referred to generally, for example the Rio Declaration refers to “access to information 
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concerning the environment.”587  Information about potential environmental harms also is 
mentioned.  For example, in SERAC v. 5igeria, the African Commission required the 
Nigerian government to provide information not only on environmental harms but also on 
potential health and environmental risks.588  Similar to the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization, the healthy-environment conceptualization requires governments to 
proactively disseminate information, even if a request has not been made.   Also, similar to 
both the freedom-of-expression and information-privacy conceptualizations, information from 
private entities often is included.    
 The Aarhus Convention defines environmental information quite specifically.  
According to the convention, environmental information is “any information in written, 
visual, aural, electronic or any other material form” that concerns the “state of the elements of 
the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites, 
biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the 
interaction among these elements.”589  This includes “factors affecting or likely to affect the 
elements of the environment,” such as “substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities 
or measures, including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, 
legislation, plans and programmes, . . . and cost-benefiting and other economic analyses and 
assumptions used in environmental decision-making.”590   Environmental information also 
includes information on the “state of human health and safety, conditions of human life, 
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Agenda 21, UN Doc. UN Res. A/Res/S-19/2, ¶ 108 (Sept. 19, 1997). 
 
588 SERAC v. Nigeria, at ¶ 71. 
 
589 Aarhus Convention, supra note 526, at art. 2(3)(a). 
 
590 Id. at art. 2(3)(b). 
 
151 
 
cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the 
elements of the environment” or factors affecting or likely to affect the elements.591  The 
Aarhus definition is all-encompassing in that it includes general information about the health 
of the environment as well as information about potential harms that could result from 
environmental problems.  
There also has been concern that information needs to be presented in a timely and 
comprehensible manner.  According to the final report of the UN environmental special 
rapporteur, “[T]he right to information relating to the environmental requires that information 
be relevant and comprehensible.”592  In addressing problems that NGOs have reported when 
they have attempted to access information about the environment, the UN toxic products 
special rapporteur expressed concerns regarding the “difficulty of timely access to pertinent, 
full and usable information” and stated that often information is disclosed in “dribs and drabs 
or in such a way as to be unusable.” 593  The Aarhus Convention also requires that information 
be easily accessible and comprehensible.594 
 
Proactive Requirement 
Within the healthy-environmental conceptualization, governments are also required to 
proactively provide information to the public even when information is not requested.  The 
UN environmental special rapporteur declared that a right to environmental information 
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“imposed a duty on governments.”595  This duty includes providing information “without a 
specific request, of any matter having a negative or potentially negative impact on the 
environment” and collecting and disseminating environmental information as well as 
providing “due notice of significant environmental hazards.” 596 
According to the UN toxic products special rapporteur, “Public access to information 
when requested and the obligation of public authorities to disclose and inform, irrespective of 
requests, are imperative for the prevention of environmental human rights problems and the 
protection of the environment.”597  The UN toxic products special rapporteur also made this 
point in a report on a visit to the Ukraine, noting that even through Ukraine had legislation 
providing access to information, some local authorities “were not sufficiently proactive in 
providing information to members of the public.”598  This included information about 
potentially hazardous materials, even if harms had not yet been proven.  The special 
rapporteur concluded that in the Ukraine, “[a]ccess to information regarding environmental 
issues and their potential consequences for human rights thus appears to require some 
improvement.”599  In SERAC v. 5igeria, the African Commission asserted that compliance 
with the right to health and a healthy environment guaranteed in the African Charter600 meant 
that the government must publicize “environmental and social impact studies prior to any 
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major industrial development.” 601  The government’s obligation included “undertaking 
appropriate monitoring and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous 
material and activities.”602  
The Aarhus Convention also required that governments proactively provide 
information about the environment.  The convention contains a very detailed section on the 
collection and dissemination of information and requires governments to proactively provide 
information.  According to the convention, governments must ensure that systems are 
“established so that there is an adequate flow of information to public authorities about 
proposed and existing activities which may significantly affect the environment.”603  The 
convention further details the types of information that must be provided, which include 
reports on the state of the environment;604 policies, plans, and programs relating to the 
environment;605 and information on proposed environmental policies.606  This obligation 
requires that governments not only provide information that is already available but also 
create documents specifically for the purpose of dissemination.607  The convention also 
provides that in the event of an environment emergency, regardless of the cause, “all 
information which could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm 
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arising from the threat and is held by a public authority” must be “disseminated immediately 
and without delay to members of the public who may be affected.”608 
 
Private Sector Information 
Within this conceptualization, a right of access to environmental information from 
private entities, not just governments, also has been discussed.  Although a right to 
information from private entities has not been explicitly stated, it is clear that there is concern 
about the lack of information from corporations in particular.   
In explaining how the right of access to environmental information can be violated, 
the UN environmental special rapporteur gave an example of development projects that 
involved both private and public entities.  “Relevant information may be in many locations 
and with many entities, making access by the public difficult.  International funding sources 
or transnational corporations may not allow private access to information under their 
control.”609 
According to the UN toxic products special rapporteur:  
[T]here are many cases . . . of disputes between citizens and Governments in 
developing countries and between developing countries and transnational 
corporations over the movement of toxic and dangerous products and wastes. 
Disputes often arise owing to a lack of information or the failure of the State or 
of corporations to ensure full disclosure of the potential dangers of activities 
carried out by those corporations to individuals, communities and the 
environment.610 
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Because of this, he argued, “often governments claim not to have access to the necessary 
information on the potential dangers to human beings and the environment.”611 
In SERC v. 5igeria, the African Commission articulated obligations on the 
government to protect citizens from harm by corporations.  The decision asserted: 
Governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through appropriate 
legislation and effective enforcement, but also by protecting them from 
damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties. . . . This calls for 
positive action on the part of governments in fulfilling their obligation under 
human right instruments.612 
 
Although the commission did not specifically link this obligation to a right to information 
from non-governmental entities, the decision is significant because it does articulate duties on 
African governments to monitor and control the activities of corporations. 
 
The Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization – Limitations on the Right 
Similar to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, any limitation on the right of 
access to environmental information must be provided by law,613 reasons for nondisclosure 
must be stated in writing,614 and the government decision must be reviewable.615  Limitations 
on the right to environmental information have not been detailed within the documents, with 
the exception of the Aarhus Convention.   
                                                 
611 Id. See also Toxic Products special rapporteur 2003 report, supra note 293, at ¶ 85(arguing that some 
transnational corporations, often in collusion with governments, are violating human rights including the right to 
information) . 
 
612 SERC v. Nigeria, at ¶ 57.  
 
613 Aarhus Convention, supra note 526, at art. 9; H.R. and Environ. Principles, supra note 518, at principle 26. 
 
614 Aarhus Convention, supra note 526, at art. 4. 
 
615 H.R. and Environ. Final Report, supra note 518, at ¶ 213 (stating that decisions to withhold information 
“must be reviewable to ensure that the public’s right to information is not unduly restricted”); Aarhus 
Convention, supra note 526, at art. 9. 
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Without elaboration, the Principles on Human Rights and the Environment stated that 
any limitations on access must be “necessary to protect public order, health and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”616  The Aarhus Convention, on the other hand, 
articulates limitations in detail.  According to the convention, information can be withheld if 
disclosure would adversely affect the confidentiality of proceedings; international relations, 
national defense, or public security; justice, fair trials, or inquiries; commercial 
confidentiality; intellectual property; personal information; voluntarily provided information 
from third parties; and environmentally sensitive information.617  Aarhus Convention requires 
that limitations on information must be “interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account 
the public interest served by disclosure and taking into account whether the information 
requested related to emissions into the environment.”618  The UN toxic products special 
rapporteur also made this point.  In a 2003 report on the United Kingdom, the special 
rapporteur noted with approval that “many of the exemptions [of the UK’s FOI law] involve a 
public interest test, an important safeguard which may require disclosure even where an 
exemption has technically been triggered.”619  
Both the UN environmental and toxic products special rapporteurs have expressed 
concern about restrictions on public access to environmental information based on national 
security and commercial secrecy grounds.  The UN toxic products special rapporteur’s 2006 
report focused on the human rights impact of the widespread exposure of individuals and 
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communities to toxic chemicals in everyday household goods and food.  In a section on the 
rights to information and participation, the special rapporteur expressed concern that 
“information about the effects and exact nature of toxic chemicals is often labeled as being 
confidential commercial information, and access is impeded by laws and regulations 
exempting such information from public scrutiny.”620     
In explaining how the right of access to environmental information can be violated, 
the UN environmental special rapporteur stated in a 2008 report that invoking national 
security to withhold information is of particular concern and must be in conformity with 
“limitations clauses in international human rights instruments.”621  The special rapporteur 
further explained that even if a national security argument is legitimate, “there are 
circumstances where it is not acceptable.”  For example, information must be disclosed 
“wherever there is a danger of large-scale industrial accidents like Chernobyl and Bhopal”;622 
when proposed development projects could “increase pollution, loss of land base, dislocation 
and other impacts”; or when the requested information involves “pollutants and wastes 
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associated with industrial and agricultural processes.”  In these circumstances, according to 
the special rapporteur, “there is a clear duty to disclose.”623 
The UN toxic products special rapporteur also noted that “widespread political 
instability in many developing countries means that vital information that is necessary to the 
health, environment and well-being of the population is often withheld from the public, 
apparently on the grounds that it is necessary to uphold national security, and prevent civil 
unrest.”624  According to the special rapporteur, although the government can invoke national 
security or defense rationales for limiting information, “this responsibility should not be 
abused by States or used to derogate from their duty to protect and promote the rights of their 
citizens in relation to the adverse effects of toxic and dangerous products and wastes.” 625   
 
Conclusion 
The right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization is not as well articulated as the 
freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  Most of the discussion stems from the UN toxic 
products and environmental special rapporteurs and the Aarhus Convention.  Although the 
European Court, the Inter-American Commission, and the African Commission address the 
right to environmental information sparingly, they do contribute to the articulation of the 
conceptualization.  The NGOs, on the other hand, rarely address access to environmental 
information as separate from government information in general.  Most likely this is because 
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environmental information held by the government would be included within the broad scope 
of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.    
The right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization is based on the idea that human 
rights and environmental concerns are closely related.  This has been envisaged in two distinct 
ways.  The right to a healthy environment has been understood as substantive right and, more 
commonly, as a procedural right.  As a substantive right, it exists as a right in and of itself.  
As a procedural right, it is seen as necessary to ensure the protection of other human rights.   
Access to environmental information as a procedural right is articulated within the 
protecting-rights rationale, which confers a right of access to environmental information in 
order to ensure the protection of other human rights.  Individuals and communities need 
information about the environment in order to be protected from ill-health or from loss of life 
or home, for example.  The two European Court decisions based on the right to respect for 
private and family life are illustrative of this rationale.  The Inter-American Commission 
report on Ecuador and the African Commission decision on Nigeria also reflect this position 
on the role of access to environmental information in protecting human rights. 
Access to environmental information also is understood as facilitating effective public 
participation in environmental decision-making, the public-participation rationale.  This 
rationale is based on the idea that public input into the decision-making process will produce 
better outcomes that reflect the needs of the people.  The right to environmental information, 
participation, and judicial recourse are often intertwined, as reflected in the Aarhus 
Convention.  Individuals have a right to participate in environmental decision-making, and, in 
order to effectively act on this right, they must have information.  Access to judicial recourse 
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is then necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the rights of access to information 
and participation. 
Often the public-participation rationale includes the protecting-rights rationale.  In a 
sense, the public-participation rationale can be seen as taking the protecting-rights rationale 
one step further.  Using environmental information to enhance decision-making and having 
opinions heard helps ensure that human rights will not be violated.   
Similar to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the right-to-a-healthy-
environment conceptualization confers the right to environmental information to all 
individuals regardless of citizenship or showing of interest.  Governments also have an 
obligation to proactively provide information to the public even when the information is not 
requested.  Because environmental issues often are not contained within countries’ 
boundaries, governments also have a right of access to information held by the governments 
of other nations.  This is especially true when large-scale environmental disasters occur.   
The type of information included in this conceptualization generally is not defined.  
Although the Aarhus Convention is quite precise in most respects, it is vague about what 
specifically constitutes environmental information.  Environmental information has been 
referred to as information about environmental harms as well as information on potential 
environmental harms.  Sometimes there is a reference to information from the private sector.  
The activities of private entities such as corporations often affect or potentially affect the 
environment.  Although a right to private information is not explicitly stated, concerns often 
were expressed about the lack of access to this type of information.       
Regarding limitations of the right to environmental information, again, only the 
Aarhus Convention has been explicit in articulating limitations, but reference to the 
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importance of balancing the public interest against any limitations on information has been 
made by the toxic products special rapporteur as well.  In discussions about limitations, 
information from private entities such as corporation again were noted, this time in reference 
to governments’ overuse of limitations on government disclosure of commercial information.  
Concern also was expressed by both UN special rapporteurs about the overuse of national 
security arguments in denying access to information about the environment.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE RIGHT-TO-TRUTH CO*CEPTUALIZATIO* 
 The right-to-truth conceptualization recognizes a right of access to government 
information about serious human rights violations.  It is based on the right to truth found in 
human rights law.  The right to truth creates obligations on governments to investigate serious 
human rights violations, bring the perpetrators to justice, and provide information to the 
victims, their families, and sometimes society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding 
the violations.  It is this last obligation upon which the right-to-truth conceptualization of 
access to information is based.  The right-to-truth conceptualization has been recognized by a 
range of human rights entities including the Inter-American and European UN Commission 
on Human Rights, Inter-American court and commission, and the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Noticeably absent, with a few exceptions, are articulations from NGOs.   
In order to understand this conceptualization, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
right to truth, which will be discussed in the following section.  This discussion is not meant 
to encompass the myriad views regarding the right to truth but merely to provide a brief 
history of the right to truth and its place within international human rights law.  Subsequent 
sections will explicate the right-to-truth conceptualization by discussing rationales for the 
right of access to information about human rights abuses, to whom this right is conferred, the 
type of information involved, and the limitations on the right. 
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Defining the Right to Truth 
In human rights law, the right to truth, also referred to as the “right to the truth” and 
“the right to know the truth,” refers to the obligation on governments to investigate serious 
human rights violations, bring perpetrators to justice, and to provide information to the 
victims, their families, or society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding 
violations.626   According to a 2005 report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR):   
The right to the truth is often invoked in the context of gross violations of 
human rights and grave breaches of humanitarian law. Victims of summary 
executions, enforced disappearance, missing persons, abducted children, 
torture, claim to know what happened to them or their relatives. The right to 
the truth implies knowing the full and complete truth as to the events that 
transpired, their specific circumstances, and who participated in them, 
including knowing the circumstances in which the violations took place, as 
well as the reasons for them.627 
 
According to a UN Secretary-General report, the right to truth is “both an independent right 
and the means for the realization of other rights: information, to identity, to mourning and, 
especially, the right to justice.”628 
                                                 
626 See also UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/66, Comm. H.R. Res. 2005/66, UN doc. 
E/CN.4/Res/2005/66, ¶ 1 (Apr. 20, 2005) (acknowledging that “that the right to the truth may be characterized 
differently in some legal systems as the right to know or the right to be informed or freedom of information”). 
This was reiterated in a Human Rights Council resolution, HRC Res. 9/11, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/9/11, preamble 
(Sept. 24, 2008). 
 
627 Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Study on the Right to 
Truth, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91, ¶ 3 (Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth].  
This study was conducted pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/66, which 
“[r]ecognize[d] the importance of respecting and ensuring the right to the truth so as to contribute to ending 
impunity and to promote and protect human rights.”  The resolution further requested the OHCHR “to prepare a 
study on the right to the truth, including information on the basis, scope, and content of the right under 
international law, as well as best practices and recommendations for effective implementation of this right, in 
particular, legislative, administrative or any other measures that may be adopted in this respect, taking into 
account the views of States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, for 
consideration at its sixty-second session.”Id. ¶ 6. 
 
628 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, UN Doc. A/61/384, ¶16 
(Sept. 12, 2006). 
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As a legal concept, the right to truth has emerged in various ways depending upon the 
jurisdiction.629  Historically, the right to truth was first articulated within the context of armed 
conflicts and international humanitarian law,630 which places obligations on parties of armed 
conflicts to search for missing persons and gives families the right to know the fates of their 
relatives involved in the conflict.631  In the 1970s and early 1980s, the widespread practice of 
“enforced disappearances”632 prompted several international and regional human rights 
bodied to further examine the right to truth.633  According to the UN special rapporteur on the 
independence of judges and lawyers, during this time “there emerged dictatorial regimes 
                                                 
629 See 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 4-25. See also Yasmin Naqvi, The 
Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 245, 248 (2006).  
 
630 International humanitarian law (IHL), which is separate from human rights law, incorporates the rules of 
international law especially designed for the protection of the individual in time of war or armed conflict.  IHL 
was codified in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention (II) 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
75 UNTS 85 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 
135 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 
UNTS 287 (Aug. 12, 1949), and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Conventions: Additional Protocol (No. I) 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (June 8, 1977) [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions]; Additional Protocol (No. II) Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609 (June 8, 1977). Each of these instruments 
contains a list of grave breaches of human rights that can be committed in both international and non-
international armed conflicts. For a detailed description of the historical development of international 
humanitarian law, seeMARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR: CASES, 
DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Apr. 1999). See generally DIETER FLECK, THE 
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (2000). 
 
631 Id. at article 32 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. 
 
632 According to the UN International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance,  an enforced disappearance “is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form 
of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups acting with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of 
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” 
GA Resolution 61/177, UN  Doc. A/RES/61/177, Annex at article 2 (Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Convention on 
Disappearances].  The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on Disappearances in January 2007, id. at 
¶ 2.  The convention was opened for signatory on Feb. 6, 2007.  As of December 2008, 80 states have signed it 
and seven have ratified it. The convention will come into force when it is ratified by 20 state parties, Convention 
on Disappearances, id. at article 39.  
 
633 2006 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 8. 
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which used this practice in an institutionalized, systematic and widespread manner, with the 
aim of eliminating all forms of opposition.” 634 Latin America, according to the special 
rapporteur, “was among the main regions in which this sinister tool of repression was utilized. 
However, this practice has now been documented in 90 countries.”635 
In 1980 the UN Commission on Human Rights created a working group on enforced 
or involuntary disappearances,636 which established in its first report that disappearances not 
only violated the rights of missing persons but also the rights of family members.  Citing the 
Geneva Conventions,637 the report stated that international law recognizes the rights of 
families to be “informed of the whereabouts and the fate of” their relatives. 638   
  In the 1980s the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights both recognized that governments had an obligation to investigate allegations 
of enforced disappearances and that disappearances also violated the rights of relatives.  In a 
case having to do with the fate of a political prisoner in Honduras, the Inter-American Court 
ruled that the government had an obligation to investigate the fate of prisoners, calling for an 
“effective search for the truth.”639  This obligation included using “the means at its disposal to 
inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they have been killed, the location of 
                                                 
634 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, supra note 628, at ¶17. 
2006). 
 
635 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, supra note 628, at ¶17. 
See also 1985-1986 Report of the Inter-American Commission, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, Doc. 8 rev. 1, Chapter 5 
(Sept. 26, 1986), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/85.86eng/chap.5.htm ; 1980 Report of the Working Group 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1435, ¶s 175-83 (Jan. 26, 1981) (referring also to 
problems of enforced disappearances in South Africa and Namibia). 
 
636 UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 20 (XXXVI) (Feb. 29, 1980). 
 
637 Id. 
 
638 1980 Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, supra note 635, at ¶ 187. 
 
639 Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 4, ¶ 177 (July 29, 1988). 
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their remains,” an obligation that continues as long as there is uncertainty about the fate of the 
person who has disappeared.640   
In 1988, the UN Human Rights Committee faced similar facts.  An Uruguayan mother 
wanted to know the fate of her daughter who had been arrested years earlier.  The committee 
found that a mother had endured substantial anguish and stress due to the disappearance of her 
daughter and the continuing uncertainty about her fate and whereabouts.  In this context of her 
acute suffering, which itself was held to be a form of torture, the committee ruled that the 
mother had a basic “right to know” what had happened to her daughter.641   
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its 1985 report also recognized 
that relatives had a right to know but went a step further and stated that this right also 
belonged to society.  According to the commission: “Every society has the inalienable right to 
know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant 
crimes came to be committed, in order to prevent repetition of such acts in the future. 
Moreover, the family members of the victims are entitled to information as to what happened 
to their relatives.”642 
By 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted that Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances,643 which also established a right to truth, requiring 
that all legitimate allegations of disappearances be investigated or, absent a formal complaint, 
                                                 
640 Id. at ¶ 181.  
 
641 Quinteros v. Uruguay, H.R.C. Comm. No. 107/1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981, ¶ 14 (July 21, 1983). 
During this time period, the UN General Assembly also recognized that governments had an obligation to 
investigate disappearances and that victims’ relatives had a right to know what had happened.  GA Res. 34/179, 
UN Doc. A/RES/34/179, ¶ 7 (1979); A/RES/35/188, ¶ 7 (Dec. 15, 1980); A/RES/ 40/45, ¶ 6(b) (1985). 
 
642 1985-1986 Report of the Inter-American Commission, supra note 635.  
 
643 GA Resolution 77/133, UN DOC. A/RES/47/133, preamble (Dec. 18, 1992) (proclaiming the Declaration “as 
a body of principles for all States”) [hereinafter Declaration on Enforced Disappearances]. 
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when there were reasonable grounds to believe a disappearance had occurred.644  According 
to the declaration, all findings of investigations must be made available to all “persons 
concerned” unless doing so would jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation.645   
Following the declaration, after years of negotiation, the legally-binding International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances opened for 
countries to sign in 2007.646  The convention similarly establishes a right to truth obligating 
governments to investigate disappearances and inform families.  Broadly defining a victim as 
a “disappeared person and any individual who has suffered harm as a direct result of an 
enforced disappearance,”647 the convention states that each “victim has the right to know the 
truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of 
the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person.”648   
                                                 
644 UN GA Res 47/133, UN Doc. A/RES/47/133, article 13 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
 
645 Id. 
 
646 Convention on Disappearances, supra note 632.  The OAS had negotiated a similar treaty more than ten years 
earlier. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons art. III, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1529, available at http:// www.oas.org/juridico/English/Treaties/a-60.html . 
 
647 Id. at article 24(1). 
 
648 Id. at article 24(2).  It is interesting to note that the United States, which has not signed the convention, 
publicly objected to the right-to-truth provisions stating that “the United States is committed to advancing the 
cause of families dealing with the problem of missing persons; however, we do not acknowledge any new 
international right or obligation in this regard.  For the United States, which is not a party to the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and has no obligations vis-à-vis any ‘right to truth’ under Article 32 of that 
instrument, families are informed of the fate of their missing family members based on the longstanding policy 
of the United States and not because of Article 32.” The statement further explained that regarding the 
convention, “Article 24 on the right to the truth and reparation contains text that is vague and at the same time 
overly specific, employs an overbroad definition of a ‘victim,’ and may not be consistent with a common law 
system for granting remedies and compensation.” U.S. Mission to the United State in Geneva, Press Release, 
U.S. Statement on the Draft Convention on Enforced Disappearances (June 27, 2006) available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/0627U.S.StatementonForcedDisappearances.html (last visited Dec. 28, 
2008). See also Digest of United States Practice, chapter 6, U.S. statement concerning draft International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87244.htm. 
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Although initially established within the context of missing persons and enforced 
disappearances, the right to truth gradually has been extended to other areas of human rights 
law, such as combating impunity, which refers to the failure to bring perpetrators to 
justice,649conferring remedies and reparations for serious human rights abuses,650 and creating 
obligations to investigate extrajudicial executions, and torture.651  For example, in a case 
involving the  1989  assassination of Jesuit priests by Salvadorian military agents, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights established that the lack of investigation and official 
information violated family members’ and society’s right to truth.652   
According to the special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the 
right to truth, which was first established in humanitarian law, has developed “more recently 
in the field of international human rights law, where this independent right appears in 
                                                 
649 See Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat 
Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Updated Set of Principles]. According to 
the Updated Set of Principles, impunity is “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of 
violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not 
subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to 
appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims.” Id. at Definitions (A). The first draft of the Set 
of Principles can be found in Annex II of UN Special Rapporteur on Impunity Louis Joinet’s final report, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev. 1, annex II (Oct. 2, 1997) [hereinafter Final Report on Updating the Set of 
Principles]. The updated principles were created “to reflect recent developments in international law and 
practice, including international jurisprudence and State practice” and are “not legal standards in the strict sense, 
but guiding principles.” Report of the independent expert to update the Set of Principles to combat impunity, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102, ¶ 11 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
 
650 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law , UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/147, Annex (March 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines]. 
 
651 2006 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 8. 
 
652 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, case 10.488, Report no. 136/99, ¶ 221 (Dec. 22, 1999); 1999 Report of 
the Inter-American Commission, OEA, Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 6 rev. (Apr. 13, 1999).  
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association with other fundamental human rights, such as the right of access to information . . 
. and especially the right to justice.”653   
As indicated in the statement above by the special rapporteur on the independence of 
judges and lawyers, the right to truth often is connected to the right of access to information.  
According to an OAS General Assembly resolution, the “right to truth may be characterized 
differently in some legal systems as the right to know or the right to be informed or as 
freedom of information.”654  A report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted, 
“One of the most decisive ways of ensuring the right to the truth is still the right to 
information.” 655  This also was expressed by the Inter-American Commission, which stated 
that “access to state-held information is necessary in part to uphold the ‘right to know the 
truth.’”656  
The Inter-American Commission, referring to the right of access to personal 
information held by the government discussed in chapter 3, noted:  
[H]abeas data has become an essential tool for the investigation of human 
rights violations committed during past military dictatorships in the Americas.  
Relatives of the disappeared have brought actions of habeas data to obtain 
information about the government’s behavior, to ascertain the whereabouts of 
                                                 
653 2005 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/2, 
¶ 15 (Jan. 23, 2006). He further argued that the right to truth recognized in both humanitarian and human rights 
law “have been complementary and in no way opposed to each other.” Id. at ¶ 16. 
 
654 OAS G.A. Res. Right to the Truth, AG/Res. 2267 (XXXVII-O/07), preamble (June 5, 2007). See also OAS 
G.A. Res. Right to the Truth, AG/Res. 2175 (XXXVI-O/06), preamble (June 6, 2006) (stating the same 
proposition).   This language also was used in a UN Commission on Human Rights resolution, Comm. H.R. Res. 
On Right to the Truth, Comm. H.R. Res. 2005/66, UN doc. E/CN.4/Res/2005/66, preamble (Apr. 20, 2005) 
(stating that “the right to the truth may be characterized differently in some legal systems as the right to know or 
the right to be informed or freedom of information”). 
 
655 Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Truth, UN Doc. A/HRC/5/7 
(June 7, 2007), pursuant to H.R.C. Decision, A/HRC/Dec/ 2/105, ¶ 39 (Nov. 27, 2006) (requesting the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to create a follow-up to the 2006 High Commission report on the right to truth) 
[hereinafter 2007 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth].  
 
656 Inter-America Comm. 2003 Report, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, Doc. 5 rev. 2, chap. 4,  ¶ 14 (Dec. 29, 2003) 
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the disappeared, and to determine responsibilities. Such actions ultimately 
constitute an important means of ensuring the ‘right to truth.’657 
 
   The right to truth also has been linked more broadly to principles of government 
transparency.  For example, a UN High Commission of Human Rights report stated that 
although the right to truth is “closely linked to the State’s duty to protect and guarantee 
human rights and to the State’s obligation to conduct effective investigations into gross 
human rights violations . . . and to guarantee effective remedies and reparation.” 658   The 
obligation to investigate human rights abuses also “is closely linked to the rule of law and the 
principles of transparency, accountability and good governance in a democratic society.”659 
The following sections will explicate the right-to-truth conceptualization by examining 
the rationales for the right of access to information about human rights abuses, to whom this 
right is conferred, the type of information involved, and the limitations on the right.  As 
previously discussed, the right to truth includes the obligation on governments to investigate 
human rights violations and bring perpetrators to justice.  The right to truth also includes the 
right to information about the circumstances surrounding the violation.  This last obligation is 
the basis for the right-to-truth conceptualization.  Although the obligation on government to 
investigate human rights abuses is part of the right to truth, the following sections will focus 
primarily on the right of access to information conferred within the right to truth.  The 
obligation on governments to investigate human rights violations and bring perpetrators to 
justice will be addressed only in the context of subsequent obligations to disclose that 
information.   
                                                 
657 OAS Report on H.R. Defenders, supra note 399, at ¶ 89. 
 
658 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 56. 
 
659 Id. at ¶ 46. 
 
171 
 
The Right-to-Truth Conceptualization – Rationales of the Right 
There are three main rationales for conferring a right of access to information about 
human rights violations within the context of the right to truth.  These rationales are not 
mutually exclusive and often are found with the same court rulings or documents.  The first 
rationale, the human-rights-violations-through-nondisclosure rationale, recognizes that 
nondisclosure of information about the fate of next of kin who may have been victims of 
human violations contributes to the violations of relatives’ rights not to be treated inhumanely 
or tortured.  In other words, by not providing information on human rights violations such as 
extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearance, governments can violate the rights of 
victims’ family members, as well.  The second rationale is the information-as-reparation-for-
human-rights-violations rationale, which has both an individual and a societal dimension.  
The individual dimension recognizes access to information as a form of reparation for the 
family members of victims.  Providing information is a way to compensate family members 
for harms they have suffered.  The societal dimension of this rationale recognizes access to 
information as providing redress to society for the harms that were done.  Often this redress 
involves ensuring that similar violations do not occur in the future.  That is the third rationale 
for this conceptualization, the prevention-of-human-rights-violations rationale.  This rationale 
is based on the idea that informing society of the details of its history of human rights abuse 
will act as a deterrent to future abuses. 
 
Human-Rights-Violations-through-5ondisclosure Rationale  
 The nondisclosure rationale for a right of access to information recognizes that the 
anguish that individuals experience as a result of uncertainty about the fate of close relatives 
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who are direct victims of enforced disappearances or other serious violations of human rights 
in itself constitutes a violation of human rights.  It has been recognized, particularly by the 
Human Rights Committee and the European Court, that a government’s failure to provide 
information concerning victims of enforced disappearance can amount to a form of inhumane 
treatment or even torture.  It follows that government authorities must investigate what 
happened to the victims and inform their relatives of their fate.  This often includes a right to 
be kept apprised of official investigations.  
Often the right of access to information about human rights is recognized within the 
context of enforced disappearances.  As stated above, the UN Convention on Enforced 
Disappearances defines victims not only as those who “disappeared,” but also their family 
members.660  The convention requires: “Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding 
the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation 
and the fate of the disappeared person.  Each State Party shall take appropriate measures in 
this regard.”661  Both the UN convention and the Inter-American convention on enforced 
disappearances define an enforced disappearance in part as an absence of information from 
the government about the missing person’s fate.662  This lack of information is seen as 
violating the rights of the victims and of their family members.   
In several cases, the lack of information about relatives or loved ones has been 
determined to constitute a form inhumane treatment or torture.  The UN Human Rights 
Committee has recognized on numerous occasions that the pain and suffering of relatives not 
                                                 
660 UN Convention on Enforced Disappearance, supra note 632, at art. 24(1). 
 
661 Id. at 24(2). 
 
662 UN Convention on Enforced Disappearance, supra note 632, at art. 2; Inter-American Convention on 
Enforced Disappearances, supra note 646, at art. 2. 
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knowing the fate of their loved ones constitutes a violation of article 7 of the Political 
Covenant,663 which prohibits torture.  The committee first made this determination as far back 
as 1981.  In Quintero v. Uruguay, discussed previously, the committee ruled that a mother’s 
anguish and suffering caused by not knowing what happened to her daughter after being 
arrested was a form of torture.664  The authorities had arrested her daughter and provided no 
official information as to the daughter’s whereabouts.  According to the committee: 
The Committee understands the anguish and stress caused to the mother by the 
disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning 
her fate and whereabouts. The author has the right to know what has happened 
to her daughter. In these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of the 
Covenant suffered by her daughter in particular, of article 7.665 
 
In this case, the committee found that the mother had endured substantial anguish and 
stress due to the disappearance of her daughter and the continuing uncertainty of her fate and 
whereabouts.  In this context of acute suffering, which itself was held to be a form of cruel 
and inhumane treatment, the committee ruled that the mother had a basic “right to know” 
what had happened to her daughter.666  Toward this end, the committee concluded that the 
government needed to take immediate and effective measures to establish the facts, secure the 
                                                 
663 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 7 (stating: “No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation.”). 
 
664 Quinteros v. Uruguay, H.R.C. Comm. No. 107/1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981, ¶ 14 (July 21, 1983). 
 
665 Id. See also Amnesty International and Others v Sudan, African Comm. H.R., Communication No. 48/90, 
AHG/222 (XXXVI) Add., Annex 5, ¶ 54 (2000) (stating that “holding an individual without permitting him or 
her to have any contact with his or her family, and refusing to inform the family if and where the individual is 
being held, is inhuman treatment of both the detainee and the family concerned”), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/activity_reports/activity13_en.pdf. 
 
666 Id.  
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daughter’s release, bring to justice those found responsible, and ensure that similar violations 
did not occur in the future.667 
 The committee also has found a violation of article 7, the right against inhumane 
treatment or torture provision of the Political Covenant, when relatives of executed prisoners 
could not get information about why the execution occurred or the location of the grave site.  
According to the committee in Lyashkevich v. Belarus, “The secrecy surrounding the date of 
the execution, and the place of burial have the effect of intimidating or punishing families by 
intentionally leaving them in a state of uncertainty and mental distress.”668 
 On several occasions the European Court of Human Rights also has ruled that the lack 
of information about the whereabouts of missing relatives constitutes a violation of article 3 
of the European Convention, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment.669  
In 1998, in Kurt v. Turkey, the court ruled that the Turkish government violated article 3 by 
not releasing information to the mother of a Kurdish man who had been taken into custody, 
where he subsequently disappeared.  The mother’s repeated requests for information were to 
no avail.  The court ruled that the government breached article 3 because the mother had been 
left “with the anguish of knowing that her son had been detained” and because there was “a 
                                                 
667 Id. at ¶ 16. See also H.R.C. Concluding Observations on Algeria, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.95, ¶ 10 (Aug. 
18, 1998) (stating that disappearances violated article 7 with regard to relatives of the disappeared). The Special 
Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment also has 
made this conclusion. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, UN Doc. A/56/156, ¶ 13 (July 3, 2001). 
 
668 Lyashkevich v. Belarus, H.R.C. Comm. No. 887/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999, ¶ 9.2 (Apr. 24, 
2003).  See also Khalilova v. Tajikistan, H.R.C. Comm. No. 973/2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/973/2001, ¶ 7.7 
(Apr. 13, 2005);  Khalilova v. Aliboeva, H.R.C. Comm. No. 985/2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/985/2001, ¶ 6.7 
(Nov. 16, 2005); Concluding Observations on Uzbekistan (2005); Concluding Observations on Tajikistan 
(2005). 
 
669 See European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 3 (stating that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment”).  
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complete absence of official information as to his subsequent fate” over a prolonged period of 
time.670 
In a subsequent case, Cakici v. Turkey, involving the brother of a disappeared person, 
the court emphasized that the Kurt ruling did not “establish any general principle that a family 
member of a ‘disappeared person’ is thereby a victim of treatment contrary to Article 3.”671  
In order for there to be a violation of article 3, the court explained, several elements need to 
be considered.  These included the “proximity of the family tie, with a particular weight to the 
parent-child bond;” the “involvement of the family member in the attempts to obtain 
information; and the “way in which the authorities responded to those inquiries.”672  The court 
further explained: 
The essence of such a violation does not so much lie in the fact of the 
“disappearance” of the family member but rather concerns the authorities’ 
reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention.  It is 
especially in respect of the latter that a relative may claim directly to be a 
victim of the authorities’ conduct.673  
 
In other words, the court put particular emphasis on how the government responded to 
requests for information.  In the Cakici case, the court found that article 3 had not been 
violated because the Cakici was the brother of the disappeared person and not a parent, he did 
                                                 
670 Kurt v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 24276/94, ¶ 133-34 (May 25, 1998). See also Tas v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. 
H.R.,  App No. 24396/94,  ¶ 79 (Nov. 14, 2000) (ruling that the Turkish government violated article 3 when it 
neglected to provide information to the father of a son who had been detained by authorities and then went 
missing). 
 
671 Cakici v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 23657/94, ¶ 98 (July 8, 1999). 
 
672 Id. 
 
673 Id. 
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not “bear the brunt” of attempts to obtain information (the father had), and no proof was 
presented that the authorities’ response to inquiries was indifferent.674 
In 2001, the European Court ruled in Cyprus v. Turkey that a violation of article 3 
occurred even though relatives of disappeared persons did not witness the disappearance.  The 
court emphasized the government’s responsibility to provide information.  The case 
concerned the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus, which resulted in the 
disappearance of more than 1,000 persons.  According to the court: 
The fact that a very substantial number of Greek Cypriots had to seek refuge in 
the south [of Cyrus] coupled with the continuing division of Cyprus must be 
considered to constitute very serious obstacles to their quest for information. 
The provision of such information is the responsibility of the authorities of the 
respondent State. This responsibility has not been discharged. For the Court, 
the silence of the authorities of the respondent State in the face of the real 
concerns of the relatives of the missing persons attains a level of severity 
which can only be categorized as inhumane treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3.675 
 
The Inter-American Court also has ruled that suffering and anguish of family members 
of disappeared persons amounts to “cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.”676  The case, 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala,677 dealt with the disappearance at the hands of the 
Guatemalan Army of Efraín Bámaca Velásquez, a leader of a guerrilla group in Guatemala.  
His disappearance became internationally known due to his wife, Jennifer Harbury, who also 
was a U.S. lawyer and writer.  She led a prolonged campaign, which included hunger strikes, 
                                                 
674 Id. at ¶ 99. 
 
675 Cyprus v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 25781/94, ¶ 157 (May 10, 2001). 
 
676 See American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5 (stating: “1. Every person has the right to have his physical, 
mental, and moral integrity respected” and “2. No one should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person”). 
 
677 Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000). 
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to discover his fate.678  The court ruled that the Guatemalan government’s “official refusal to 
provide relevant information . . . clearly constitute[d] cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment.”679  
The Inter-American Court came to the same conclusion in Pueblo Bello Massacre v. 
Columbia, which dealt with a 1990 abduction and subsequent murder of 43 villagers by a 
Columbian paramilitary group.  Family members’ attempts to find out what had happened to 
their loved ones had been continually frustrated by government authorities.  According to the 
court: 
[T]he next of kin of the victims of human rights violations may also be victims. 
In this regard, the Court has considered that the right to mental and moral 
integrity of the next of kin of the victims has been violated owing to their 
suffering as a result of the specific circumstances of the violations perpetrated 
against their loved ones and the subsequent acts or omissions of the State 
authorities with regard to the events.680 
 
The court further declared that: 
 
[T]he next of kin have not been able to honor their deceased loved ones 
appropriately. In cases involving forced disappearance, the Court has stated 
that the violation of the right to mental and moral integrity of the next of kin of 
a victim is a direct consequence of this phenomenon; they suffer greatly as a 
result of the act itself, and their suffering is increased by not knowing the truth 
about the facts, which has the effect of ensuring partial impunity.681 
 
                                                 
678 Id. at ¶ 18. 
 
679 Id. at ¶ 165. The court also has ruled that “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” suffered by the next-of-
kin of disappeared persons is due to the hardships resulting from the person being gone and the subsequent 
searches for the person. 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 211 (July 5, 2004). 
 
680 Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 154 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
 
681 Id. at 161. 
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According to the court, the suffering of the relatives amounted to a violation of article 5 of the 
American Convention, which guarantees the right to humane treatment.682 
The UN special rapporteur on questions of torture and other cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading treatment or punishment also has stated that disappearances constitute a form of 
torture for the family members of the disappeared person.  The government’s “refusal to 
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the 
deprivation of their liberty,” according to the special rapporteur, “is an intentional act directly 
affecting close family members.  Being fully aware they are hurling family members into a 
turmoil of uncertainty, fear and anguish regarding the fate of their loved one(s), public 
officials are said to maliciously lie to the family, with a view to punishing or intimidating 
them and others.”683  
 
Information-as-Reparation-for-Human-Rights-Violations Rationale 
As noted above, the right to truth places obligations on governments to investigate 
human rights abuses, bring perpetrators to justice, and inform the families about the 
circumstances surrounding the abuse.  Often this last obligation is understood as a form of 
reparation to the families for the suffering they endured.  For example, according to the Inter-
American Commission report on Galdamez v. El Salvador, reparations include knowing the 
“full, complete, and public truth as to the events that transpired, their specific circumstances, 
                                                 
682 See American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5. Specifically, the court ruled that article 5(1) was violated.  
Article 5(1) states, “Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.” Id. 
 
683 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, UN Doc. A/56/156, ¶ 12 (July 3, 2001).  
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and who participated in them.”684  It is not enough to investigate the abuses, bring perpetrators 
to justice, and provide monetary compensation to the families.  Reparations also include 
providing the families with specific information about what occurred and why.   
This was addressed in the UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity. 685  Principle 34, which addresses 
reparations, stated, “[T]he family of the direct victim has an imprescriptible right to be 
informed of the fate and/or whereabouts of the disappeared person . . . regardless of whether 
the perpetrators have been identified or prosecuted.”686   The UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparations states that as part of reparations, victims 
of human rights violations “should be entitled to seek and obtain information on the causes 
leading to their victimization and conditions”  pertaining to the violations in order “to learn 
the truth.”687 
The UN independent expert on the Updated Set of Principles stated that the right of 
families to know the truth about the fate of their relatives has both a substantive and a 
remedial dimension.  The substantive dimension, which was discussed previously, reflects 
jurisprudence that governments’ failure to inform victims’ families about what happened 
“may itself entail a breach of human rights.”688  The remedial dimension of the right to know 
“recognize[s] the reparative effect of knowledge of the circumstances” regarding serious 
                                                 
684 Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Galdámez v. El Salvador, Case no. 11.481, Report No. 37/00, ¶ 147-8 
(Apr. 13, 2000). 
 
685 Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649.   
 
686 Id. at principle 34. 
 
687 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 650, at art. 10.  
 
688 Final Report on the Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at ¶ 63. 
 
180 
 
human rights abuses.689  According to the independent expert, one of the main goals of 
reparations is to “provide recognition to victims (not just in their status as victims, but also in 
their status as citizens and bearers of equal human rights).”690   
Both the Inter-American Court and Inter-American Commission have understood 
access to information about human rights abuses as a form of reparation.  Often this has both 
an individual and collective dimension.  For example, in 1990 anthropologist Myrna Mack 
Chang, who was doing research in a Mayan village, was murdered by a member of the 
Guatemalan armed forces, which subsequently covered up the killing and obstructed the 
administration of justice.691  According to the court: 
[E]very person, including the next of kin of the victims of grave violations of 
human rights, has the right to the truth. Therefore, the next of kin of the 
victims and society as a whole must be informed of everything that has 
happened in connection with said violations. This right to the truth has been 
developed by International Human Rights Law; recognized and exercised in a 
concrete situation, it constitutes an important means of reparation. Therefore, 
in this case it gives rise to an expectation that the State must satisfy for the next 
of kin of the victim and Guatemalan society as a whole.692 
 
The court has used that same language in numerous cases.693  Often, as part of 
reparations, the court has ordered governments to publish in newspapers all or specific parts 
                                                 
689 Id. 
 
690 Id. at ¶ (59(e). 
 
691 Myrna Mack Chang  v. Guatemala (ser. C) no. 1010 ¶  4 (Nov. 23, 2003). 
 
692 Id. at ¶ 274.  
 
693 See, e.g., Carpio-Nicolle, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 128 (Nov. 22, 2004); Oroza v. Bolivia (Reparations),  
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92, ¶ 114 (Feb. 27, 2002); Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia,  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 122,  ¶ 297 (Sept. 15, 2005); Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
120, ¶ 62 (Mar. 1, 2005); 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 259, 261 (July 5, 
2004). 
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of the court’s decision,694  publish the results of national criminal proceedings,695 and/or 
provide public apologies that detail the circumstances of the abuse.696 
It is important to note, though, that the Inter-American Court has acknowledged a 
societal right to know only within the context of reparations for human rights abuses.  Unlike 
the Inter-American Commission, the court has not recognized that there is a societal right to 
know based on the rights guaranteed by the American Convention.  The right to know within 
the context of reparations, according to the court, is based on the idea that society benefits 
from the right to know, not that society has a right to know as guaranteed by the convention.  
For example, as part of reparations often the court will require that governments issue public 
statements in order to inform society about what happened.  The societal right to know will be 
discussed further in the next section on who receives the right to information. 
The Inter-American Commission also has stated in numerous reports that the right to 
know is a form of reparation for both individuals and society as a whole.  For example, in 
                                                 
694 See, e.g., Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 404(h) (July 1, 2006) 
(ordering the government to publish all of the Inter-American Court judgment); Huilca-Tecse v. Peru, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121, ¶ 107 (Mar. 3, 2005) (ordering Peru to publicize results of an extrajudicial execution 
trial so that “Peruvian society may know the truth”); Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 258 
(Sept. 7, 2004) (ordering that the “results of this process [the required investigation into the abuse] must be made 
know to the public, for Ecuadorian and French society to know the truth”).  
 
695
 See, e.g., Luis Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶157 (Sept. 26, 2006) 
(ordering Chile to make public the results of the investigation “so that the Chilean society may know the truth” 
about the case); Ituango Massacres v. Colombia (ordering that the results of criminal proceedings be published 
by the state “so that Colombian society may know the truth”); 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 236 (July 5, 2004) (ordering the results of the investigation be made public so “Columbian 
society may know the truth about what happen”); Myrna Mack Chang  v. Guatemala, ¶  275 (ordering that the 
outcome of the required investigation be made public in order “for Guatamalan society to know the truth”) 
 
696 See, e.g., Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, ¶ 404(d) (requiring that the state acknowledge publicly in the 
presence of “senior authorities” its “international responsibilities” for the massacres ); Huilca-Tecse v. Peru, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121, ¶ 111 (Mar. 3, 2005) (ordering Peru to provide a public apology); 19 
Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 274 (July 5, 2004) (ordering Columbia to provide 
a public apology); Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 261 (Sept. 07, 2004) (ordering a 
“written statement of acknowledgement of international responsibility” (for the facts addressed in the instant 
ruling) and an “apology to the victims”). 
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Chile v. Oracyle, which addressed enforced disappearances, the commission stated: “[T]he 
duty to repair the consequences of the violation is not satisfied merely by offering an amount 
of money.  The first step toward offering reparation to the families of the victims consists of 
putting to an end the state of uncertainty and ignorance in which they are.  That can only be 
achieved by completely and openly revealing the truth.”697  The commission further 
commented, “Apart from the families of the victims, which are directly affected by the 
violation of human rights, society as a whole is also entitled to be informed. . . . Every society 
has a right to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and circumstance in 
which aberrant crimes came to be committed.”698  Often in these cases, the commission 
argued that not only is the right to know a form of reparation, it also is a way “to prevent 
repetition of such acts in the future.”699  The role of access to information in preventing future 
abuse is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
Prevention-of-Human-Rights-Violations Rationale  
Often the right of access to information about human rights abuses is understood as 
helping to ensure that human rights abuses do not happen again.  The Inter-American 
Commission first articulated this idea in a 1985 report, stating, “Every society has the 
inalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and circumstances 
in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order to prevent repetition of such acts in 
                                                 
697 Chile v. Oracyle et al., Report No. 25/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 93 (Apr. 13, 1998).  
 
698 Id. at 94. See also Lucio Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador et al., Case no. 10.480, Report No. 1/99, ¶ 155 (Jan. 
27, 1999); Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Galdámez v. El Salvador, Case no. 11.481, Report No. 37/00, ¶ 
144  (Apr. 13, 2000). 
 
699 Chile v. Oracyl at ¶ 93.  
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the future.”700  This language has been quoted numerous times in commission decisions 
regarding the right to the truth.701  According to the commission in Ellacuría v. El Salvador, 
“Society’s right to know the truth about its past must be seen not only as a means of ensuring 
compensation and clarification of the facts, but also as a means of preventing future 
violations.”702 
In numerous decisions, the Inter-American Court also has referred to the benefit of 
information to prevent reoccurrences of abuse.  Often this is within the context of issuing non-
monetary reparations.  For example, in Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, the court stated that 
not only must governments investigate human rights abuses and inform the victims’ families 
of the outcome, governments also must “publicly divulge” the result of the investigation 
because “[s]ociety has the right to know the truth regarding such crimes, so as to be capable 
of preventing them in the future.” 703  The OAS General Assembly also has articulated the 
connection between the right of access to information and the prevention of human rights 
                                                 
700 1985-1986 Report of the Inter-American Commission, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, Doc. 8 rev. 1, Chapter 5, 193 
(Sept. 26, 1986), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/85.86eng/chap.5.htm.  
 
701 See, e.g., Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, report no. 136/99; Chile v. Oracyle et al., Report No. 25/98, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev.,  ¶  92 (Apr. 13, 1998); Lucio Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador et al., Case no. 
10.480, Report No. 1/99,  ¶ 153 (Jan. 27, 1999); Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Galdámez v. El Salvador, 
case no. 11.481, report No. 37/00, ¶ 146 (Apr. 13, 2000). 
 
702 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, report no. 136/99 (Dec. 22, 1999); Annual Report of the 
IACHR 1999, OEA, Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 6 rev., ¶  228 (Apr. 13, 1999). See also Galdamez v. El Salvador, 
Report No. 37/00, ¶ 148 (Apr. 13, 2000), available at  
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/ElSalvador11.481.htm. (stating that the “right that all persons and 
society have to know the full, complete, and public truth as to the events transpired, their specific circumstances, 
and who participated in them is part of the right to reparation for human rights violations, . . . but is also aimed at 
preventing future violations”); Lucio Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador et al., Case no. 10.480, Report No. 1/99, ¶ 
155 (Jan. 27, 1999). 
 
703 Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 91, ¶ 77-8 (Feb. 22, 
2002). See also 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶259 (July 5, 2004) (stating that 
“knowing the truth about such crimes . . . can prevent them in the future”); Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101,  ¶ 259 (Nov. 25, 2003); Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 155, ¶ 81 (Sept. 26, 2006) (stating that “the imperious need to avoid repetition can only be satisfied by 
fighting impunity and by respecting the right of victims and society as a whole to know the truth ”). 
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violations.  A 2006 resolution on the right to the truth encouraged governments to take 
“appropriate measures to establish mechanisms or institutions for disclosing information on 
human rights violations, and to ensure that citizens have appropriate access to said 
information, in order to further the exercise of the right to the truth, prevent future human 
rights violations, and establish accountability in this area.”704    
The idea that information about past human rights abuses will prevent recidivism also 
has been propagated in the context of governments trying to achieve peace, democracy, and 
national reconciliation in the aftermath of an abusive regime.  In a 2006 case, Pueblo Bello 
Massacre v. Colombia, the Inter-American Court acknowledged that the government had been 
struggling “to achieve peace,” but the court still held the government responsible for 
investigating human rights abuses of previous governments.  According to the court, not 
investigating and not releasing investigative findings to the public “reproduces the conditions 
of impunity for this type of acts to be repeated.” 705   
The Inter-American Commission also emphasized the role of information is 
preventing future abuse in Galdámez et al. v. El Salvador.  Quoting former Inter-American 
Court Judge Pedro Nikken, the commission stated: 
First, it is useful for society to learn, objectively, what happened in its midst, 
which translates into a sort of collective catharsis.  And second, it contributes 
to creating a collective conscience as to the need to impede the repetition of 
similar acts and shows those who are capable of doing so that even if they may 
escape the action of justice, they are not immune from being publicly 
recognized as the persons responsible for very grave attacks against other 
human rights.  In this regard, even though these do not constitute punitive 
                                                 
704 OAS G.A. Res. Right to the Truth, AG/Res. 2175 (XXXVI-O/06), ¶ 7 (June 6, 2006).  
 
705 Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 146 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
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mechanisms, they may perform a preventive function that is highly useful in a 
process of building peace and the transition to democracy. 706 
 
The Lima Principles also emphasize the importance of a right of access to information 
during times of transition from one government to another.  According to the principles, 
“transparency of information reduces the possibility of abuse of power.  Freedom of 
information in the context of democratic transition can contribute to guaranteeing truth, 
justice and reconciliation. Lack of information adds to the difficulty of transition and reduces 
its credibility.”707  This also was emphasized in the 2007 report of the UN High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, which stated, “The right to the truth is viewed as an 
indispensable element in any process of restoring democracy, since it plays an essential role in 
the historical reconstruction of the causes and consequences of human rights violations.”708 
The UN original and updated Set of Principles on Impunity, which have been very 
influential particularly within the Inter-American human rights regime,709 stressed the 
importance of the right to know the truth for ensuring that gross human rights violations do 
not occur in the future.  According to principle 1: 
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events 
concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and 
                                                 
706 Galdámez et al. v. El Salvador, Case no. 11.481, Report No. 37/00, ¶ 149 (Apr. 13, 2000), citing former Inter-
American Court judge Pedro Nikken, El manejo del pasado y la cuestión de la impunidad en la solución de los 
conflictos armados de El Salvador y Guatemala, in Liber Amicorum - Héctor Fix-Zamudio, Vol. I, Secretariat of 
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1/99, ¶ 154 (Jan. 27, 1999); Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Galdámez v. El Salvador, Case no. 11.481, 
Report No. 37/0, ¶ 147 (Apr. 13, 2000). 
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reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration 
of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth provides a 
vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations710 
 
 The Updated Set of Principles also refers to the importance of ensuring that 
information about past human rights abuses is not lost because remembering the events of the 
past helps guarantee that abuses do not occur in the future.  This places an obligation on 
government to preserve information.  According to the principles: 
A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage 
and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfillment of the 
State’s duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those 
violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory 
from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of 
revisionist and negationist arguments.711 
 
Similarly, the final report on the first Set of Principles referred to the right to know about past 
human rights abuses as a “corollary to a ‘duty to remember,’”712  
 
The Right-to-Truth Conceptualization – To Whom the Right is Conferred 
 Generally, the right to information about human rights abuses is conferred on the 
relatives of those whom are victims of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and 
torture, as well as the victims.  Society as a whole also has been understood as having a right 
to information about past human rights abuses.  The following sections will discuss the 
individual dimension and the societal dimension of the right to information about human 
rights abuses.  
                                                 
710 Updated Set of Principles, id. at principle 2. 
 
711 Id. at principle 2. 
 
712 Final Report on Updating the Set of Principle, supra note 649, at ¶ 17. 
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The Individual Dimension  
 The individual dimension of the right to information includes both the victims of 
human rights violations and their relatives.  For example, according to the Inter-American 
Court, “The victim of the human rights violation and their next of kin, when applicable, have 
the right to know the truth.”  713  The UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances defines 
victim in broad terms, stating that victims include “any individual who suffered harm as the 
direct result of an enforced disappearance,” although this is an exception and generally the 
status of victim is confined to the victim of abuse and close relatives of victim.  
  The relatives’ right to truth is based on the idea that relatives of victims of serious 
human rights violations also are victims.  As stated above, the UN Convention on Enforced 
Disappearances and the Updated Set of Principle define victims not only as those who were 
victims of enforced disappearances but also their family members.714  As was discussed 
previously, authorities’ refusal to provide information to relatives of victims contributes to the 
victimization of the relatives.715  It is not always clear who is a relative with the right to the 
                                                 
713 Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 257 (Sept. 07, 2004) . 
 
714 UN Convention on Enforced Disappearance, supra note 632, at art. 24(1); Updated Set of Principles, supra 
note 632, at art. 4. 
 
715 See infra pp. 171-78. 
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information about human rights abuses.  Often the terms “family,”716 relatives,”717 and “next-
of-kin”718 are used interchangeably to describe who has a right to the truth.  
Only the European Court of Human Rights has articulated parameters for relatives’ 
rights to information.  In Cakciki v. Turkey, discussed earlier, the European Court established 
that in order to find a violation relatives’ rights, the court must consider the “proximity of the 
family tie” to the victim, with particular weight placed on the parent-child bond.719  In 
Cakciki, the court ruled that the brother of a man who disappeared was not a victim in part 
because his family tie to the victim was not close enough.  It is important to note that the 
closeness of the family tie is only one of several elements the court considers and, as 
discussed above, in one case the court found that a large group of relatives with varying ties to 
the victims also were victims of human rights abuse.720     
 
The Societal Dimension 
Often it has been asserted that society in general has a right to information about 
human rights abuses.  The societal dimension of the right to know the truth has been 
                                                 
716 See e.g. Lyashkevich v. Belarus, H.R.C. Comm. No. 887/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999, ¶ 9.2 (Apr. 
24, 2003).  See also Khalilova v. Tajikistan, H.R.C. Comm. No. 973/2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/973/2001, ¶ 
7.7; Chile v. Oracyle et al., Report No. 25/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 93 (Apr. 13, 1998); Galdamez, ¶ 
147-48; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, UN Doc. A/56/156, ¶ 12 (July 3, 2001).  
 
717 See, e.g., Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador  at ¶ 224.  
  
718
See, e.g., Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 154 (Jan. 31, 2006); 19 
Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 261 (July 5, 2004); Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 257 (Sept. 07, 2004);  Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
no. 70, ¶ 160 (Nov. 25, 2000). 
 
719 Cakciki v. Turkey at ¶ 99. 
 
720 Cyprus v. Turkey at ¶ 157. 
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articulated as a right of “every people,”721 “society as a whole,”722 and, more specifically, 
“Chilean society”723 or “Peruvian society,”724 for example.  The societal right also has been 
referred to as a “collective”725 right.  
Often the societal dimension of the right to truth is recognized in connection with the 
prevention of future abuse.  For example, the 2006 UN High Commissioner study on the right 
to truth stated, “The right to the truth also has a societal dimension: society has the right to 
know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes, as well as the 
circumstances and the reasons for which aberrant crimes came to be committed, so that such 
events do not reoccur in the future.” 726 
The Updated Set of Principles stated, “Every people has the inalienable right to know 
the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and the 
circumstances and reasons that led” to them.727  The principles also referred to the importance 
of preserving a “people’s knowledge of history of its oppression” and the “collective 
memory.”728  This idea of collective memory has been referred to as a “duty to remember,” 
                                                 
721 See, e.g., Updated Set of Principles, id. at principle 2. 
 
722 See, e.g., Myrna Mack Chang  v. Guatemala at  ¶ 274. 
 
723 See, e.g., Luis Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶157 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
 
724 See, e.g., Huilca-Tecse v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121, ¶ 107 (Mar. 3, 2005). 
 
725 Galdámez et al. v. El Salvador, Case no. 11.481, Report No. 37/00, ¶ 149 (Apr. 13, 2000). 
 
726 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 58. 
 
727 Updated Set of Principle, supra note 649, at principle 2 
 
728 Id. at principle 3 
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which places obligations on governments to collect and disseminate information about human 
rights abuses “in order to guard against the perversions of history.”729  
The Inter-American Commission has repeatedly argued that the American Convention 
guarantees a right to information about human rights violations for society as a whole as well 
as individuals.  According to the commission, “Pursuant to the American Convention, the 
State has the duty to ensure the right of the victims’ families and of society as a whole, to 
know the truth of the facts connected with the serious violations to human rights which 
occurred in Chile, as well as the identity of those who committed them.” 730  The 
commission’s report concerned a group of cases involving complaints about Chile’s 1978 
amnesty law,731 which was promulgated under the regime of General Augusto Pinochet.  The 
amnesty law, according to the complaints, obstructed justice for the victims and prevented 
victims’ next of kin from knowing what had happened to the victims.  Without providing 
legal reasoning, the commission stated: 
The right to truth constitutes both a right of a collective nature which allows 
society as a whole to have access to essential information on the development 
of the democratic system, and an individual right which allows the families of 
the victims to have access to some kind of reparation in those cases in which 
amnesty laws are in force.  The American Convention protects the rights to 
access and receive information in the case of disappearances.732  
 
In Ellacuría the Inter-American Commission was more specific, stating that the right to truth 
is based on article 13, the freedom of expression provision within the American 
                                                 
729 Final Report on Updating the Set of Principles, supra note 649, at ¶ 17. 
 
730 Chile v. Oracyle et al., Report No. 25/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 85 (Apr. 13, 1998).  
 
731 Amnesty laws retroactively exempt a select group of people, often military leaders or government leaders, 
from criminal liability for crimes usually involving human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. 
 
732 Chile v. Oracyle et al., Report No. 25/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 88 (Apr. 13, 1998). 
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Convention.733  According to the commission, “The right to know the truth is a collective 
right that ensures society access to information that is essential for the workings of democratic 
systems. . . . Article 13 of the American Convention protects the right of access to 
information.”734   
The Inter-American Court has been reluctant to find a societal right to information 
about human rights abuses with the American Convention.  In several cases, the court has 
emphasized that the right to information about human rights abuses is conferred on the 
victims and their next of kin.  According to the court, this right is based on article 8 of the 
American Convention, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, and article 25, which 
guarantees the right to judicial protection.735  Although the Inter-American Court has not 
specifically denied a societal right of access to information based on article 13, the freedom-
of-expression provision, it thus far has not agreed with the commission on this point.   
Although the Inter-American Court does not recognize  a societal right to know about 
human rights violations based in the American Convention, it does seem clear that the court 
views access to information about human rights abuses as a substantial benefit to society.  The 
court often has referred to a societal right to know within the context of reparations and non-
recidivism, as discussed previously.  For example, the court has stated that the obligation on 
governments to investigate human rights abuses and inform the families of the results also 
“benefits . . . society as a whole, because, by knowing the truth about such crimes, it can 
                                                 
733 American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13. 
 
734 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, report no. 136/99, ¶ 24 (Dec. 22, 1999); Annual Report of 
the IACHR 1999, OEA, Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 6 rev. (Apr. 13, 1999). 
 
735 American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8 and 25. 
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prevent them in the future.”736   In another ruling, the court differentiated between rights 
guaranteed by the convention that were violated and a societal right to know.   The court 
stated that the Suriname government’s failure to investigate an extrajudicial execution, punish 
the perpetrators, and inform the victim’s family, breached “its duty to ensure the rights 
recognized in the Convention and [emphasis added] prevents the society as a whole from 
learning the truth regarding the facts.”737  In the court’s ruling on the reparations owed to the 
victims, the court’s language was less cautious: 
[A]ll persons, including the family members of victims of serious human rights 
violations, have the right to the truth. In consequence, the family members of 
victims and society as a whole must be informed regarding the circumstances 
of such violations. This right to the truth, once recognized, constitutes an 
important means of reparation. Therefore, in the instant case, the right to the 
truth creates an expectation that the State must fulfill to the benefit of the 
victims.738 
 
The court went on to order the government to effectively and swiftly investigate the killing, 
punish those responsible, provide compensation, and “publicly disseminate” the findings “so 
that Surinamese society may know the truth regarding the facts.”739 
 
 
The Right-to-Truth Conceptualization – The Type of Information Guaranteed 
 
 The type of information included within the right-to-truth conceptualization of the 
right of access to information has been articulated in a variety of ways.  The type of 
information has been described  as information about “serious” or “grave” human rights 
                                                 
736 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 259 (July 5, 2004) 
 
737 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, In-Am Ct H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 153 (July 15, 2005).  
 
738 Id. at 204. 
 
739 Id. at 205. 
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violations,740 “aberrant crimes,”741 and “gross violations” of human rights.742  Most often 
governments must provide all information about such crimes, including who participated in 
the crimes and the specific circumstances in which the crimes took place.   
Most often the type of information about the human rights violations includes the 
circumstances surrounding enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions.  This 
includes obligations on governments to provide all information about the violations that 
occurred, their specific circumstances, who participated in the violations, and the 
circumstances in which the violations took place.   
 According to the 2006 UN High Commissioner report on the right to the truth: 
Given that historically the right to the truth was initially linked to the missing 
and disappeared, the content was focused on knowing the fate and whereabouts 
of disappeared persons. However, as international law on the right to the truth 
has evolved to apply in all situations of serious violations of human rights, the 
material scope of the right to the truth has also expanded to include other 
elements. These may be summarized as the entitlement to seek and obtain 
information on: the causes leading to the person’s victimization; the causes and 
                                                 
740 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Report N° 136/99, ¶ 221 (Dec. 22, 1999). The term 
“serious” has not been defined within the context of the right to truth and human rights violations, but within 
international humanitarian law, the term has referred to violations of the Geneva Conventions.  According to the 
Updated Set of Principles, “serious violations of international law . . . encompasses grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Additional Protocol I thereto of 1977 and other violations of international 
humanitarian law that are crimes under international law, genocide, crimes against humanity, and other 
violations of internationally protected human rights that are crimes under international law and/or which 
international law requires States to penalize, such as torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial execution, and 
slavery” Updated Set of Principle, supra note 649, at definition B.  
 
741 1985-1986 Report of the Inter-American Commission, supra note 635, at 205; Chile v. Oracyle et al., Report 
No. 25/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 92 (Apr. 13, 1998); Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 
10.488, Report N° 136/99, ¶ 226 (Dec. 22, 1999); Lucio Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador et al., Case no. 10.480, 
Report No. 1/99, ¶ 153 (Jan. 27, 1999); Galdámez v. El Salvador, Case no. 11.481, Report No. 37/00, ¶ 146  
(Apr. 13, 2000). 
 
742 The use of the term “gross” when referring to human rights violations has not been defined within these 
documents, but according to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, gross violations of human rights law  
include at least the following: genocide; slavery, and slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary execution; 
torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance; arbitrary and 
prolonged detention; deportation or forcible transfer of population; and systematic discrimination, in particular 
based on race or gender. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,  sec. 702 
(American Law Institute 1987). 
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conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law; the progress and 
results of the investigation; the circumstances and reasons for the perpetration 
of crimes under international law and gross human rights violations; the 
circumstances in which violations took place; in the event of death,  missing or 
enforced disappearance, the fate and whereabouts of the victims; and the 
identity of perpetrators.743 
 
As stated above, the right to the truth obligates governments to investigate human 
rights abuses, bring the perpetrators to justice, provide information to the victims’ next of kin, 
and, in some articulations, provide information to society as a whole about the investigations’ 
outcomes.  This means that governments not only have to provide information that is in their 
possession, governments also must investigate the circumstances surrounding the human 
rights violations in order to create new information.  According to Toby Mendel of the NGO 
Article 19: “It is not enough for individuals simply to have access to whatever information the 
State already holds. The State must also ensure that information about past human rights 
violations is readily available, including by collecting, collating, preserving and disseminating 
it, where necessary.”744 
According to the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances, governments must 
provide the name of the person who ordered the “deprivation of liberty” and that person’s 
supervisor; the date, time, and place of the deprivation and the release of the person; the 
health of the deprived person; and, in the event of death, the circumstances and cause of the 
death and the location of the remains.745   
                                                 
743 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 38. 
 
744 See Mendel, supra  note 95, at 16.  
 
745 UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 632, at art. 18(1). See, e.g., Lyashkevich v. Belarus, 
H.R.C. Comm. No. 887/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999, ¶ 9.2 (Apr. 24, 2003); Khalilova v. Tajikistan , 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/973/2001, ¶ 11 (Mar. 30, 2005); Valichon Aliboev v. Tajikistan, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/985/2001 (Nov. 16, 2005). 
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The right of access to information about human rights abuses also can include a right 
of access to the government’s investigatory procedures.  In several cases, the European Court 
of Human Rights has ruled that the government has an obligation to conduct “a thorough and 
effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible,” as well as providing “effective access for the relatives to the investigatory 
procedure.”746  As stated previously, often this requires that the final outcomes of 
investigations into human rights violations be publicly disseminated, requiring governments 
to publish the outcomes of judicial proceedings and to issue detailed public apologies.   
The right of access to information about human rights violations also often includes an 
obligation on governments to create and maintain archives.  According to the 2007 UN 
OHCHR Study on the right to truth: 
Archives have an intrinsic value directly related to the exercise of victims’ 
rights, the work of the courts and non-judicial mechanisms for establishing the 
facts, the preservation of memory and history. The question of archives is 
closely bound up with the right to information, the fundamental right of each 
individual to have access to information on the public record relating to 
himself or herself.747    
 
 
A Human Rights Council resolution on the right to truth stated, “States should preserve 
archives and other evidence concerning gross violations of human rights and serious 
violations of international law to facilitate knowledge of such violations, to investigate 
allegations and to provide victims with access to an effective remedy.”748 
                                                 
746 Kurt v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. no. 24276/94, ¶ 140 (May 25, 1998). See also Kaya v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. App. No. 22535/93, ¶ 106-7 (Mar. 28, 2000); Tas v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 24396/94, ¶ 91 (Nov. 
14, 2000).   
 
747 2007 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 58. 
 
748 Human Rights Council resolution 9/11, supra note 626, at preamble.  
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The UN Updated Set of Principles provides a section on the preservation of and access 
to archives.  According to principle 14, “The right to know implies that archives must be 
preserved.  Technical measures and penalties should be applied to prevent any removal, 
destruction, concealment or falsification of archives, especially for the purposes of ensuring 
the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights and/or humanitarian law.”749  
According to the final report on updating the Set of Principle, these obligations require that 
specific measures be taken, including “preserving paper, video, audio and other documents 
and the use of microfilm. Such measures must be taken on an urgent basis in some situations, 
as when an outgoing regime attempts to destroy records of its human rights violations. When 
possible and appropriate, copies of archives should be made and stored in diverse 
locations.”750 
The Updated Set of Principles also addresses individuals’ rights to information about 
themselves that is stored in archives.  Similar to the information-privacy conceptualization of 
the right of access to information, the principles provide that “all persons” are entitled to 
information about them in government archives and can challenge that information if it is 
inaccurate.751 
 
The Right-to-Truth Conceptualization – Limitations on the Right 
 The discussion of limitations on the right of access to information about human rights 
violations is limited and is often difficult to separate from discussions of the right to truth – 
                                                 
749 Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at principle 14. 
 
750 Final Report on the Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at ¶ 32. 
 
751 Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at principle 17(b). 
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obligations on government to investigate, punish perpetrators, and provide information.  Often 
these discussions have more to do with what governments cannot do to impede access to 
information than what restrictions on access they legitimately can employ.  Nonetheless, 
limitations on the right of access to private information, information that could jeopardize 
personal safety, and information that could threaten national security have been addressed.  In 
some quarters, the right to truth is understood as having no limitations, but whether or not the 
right to information also would be understood as having no limitations remains unclear.  It 
also has been argued that implementation of amnesty laws violates the right to know about 
human right violations.  This section discusses the limitations on the right of access to 
information, the idea that there may not be limitations, and amnesty laws. 
 The UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances provides that information be 
accessible unless it is “personal information.”  According to the convention, “The collection, 
processing, use and storage of personal information, including medical and genetic data, shall 
not infringe or have the effect of infringing the human rights, fundamental freedoms or human 
dignity of an individual.”752 
The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparations 
states that all information must be disclosed unless it will cause further harm.  According to 
the principles, governments must ensure “full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent 
that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and interests of the 
victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or 
prevent the occurrence of further violations.”753 
                                                 
752 UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 632, at art. 19(b). 
 
753 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 650, at ¶ 22(b). 
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Regarding national security, principle 16 of the UN Updated Set of Principles states, 
“Access may not be denied on grounds of national security unless, in exceptional 
circumstances, the restriction has been prescribed by law; the Government has demonstrated 
that the restriction is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national security 
interest; and the denial is subject to independent judicial review.”754  According to the final 
report on the Updated Set of Principles, the term “legitimate national security interest” was 
added to the principles in light of “recent developments in international law and State 
practice.”  The report then cited the Johannesburg Principles.755  According to the report, a 
“‘legitimate national security’ interest should be understood to exclude restrictions whose 
actual purpose or effect is to protect a government from embarrassment or to prevent 
exposure of wrongdoing.”756 
 A 1998 Inter-American Commission report states that obstacles created by restrictions 
based on national security must be removed in order to ensure a right to know about human 
rights violations.  This includes declassifying information.  According to the commission: 
The administration of swift and effective justice, especially in exposing, 
sanctioning, and providing remedy for atrocities or grave violations of human 
rights by agents of the state, often requires reference to documents that have 
been classified as secret or inaccessible for reasons of national security. 
Maintaining State secrecy in such cases perpetuates impunity and erodes State 
authority, inwardly and outwardly. Such legal and administrative obstacles 
must be removed, and the way cleared for the Commission to establish state 
and individual responsibility for such reprehensible conduct, with all of the 
                                                 
754 Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at principle 16. 
 
755 Final Report on the Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at ¶ 34. The report cited principle 2(b) of the 
Johannesburg Principles, which stated: “In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of 
national security is not legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable effect is to protect  interests unrelated to 
national security, including, for example, to protect a government from embarrassment or exposure of 
wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to entrench a particular 
ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest.” Johannesburg Principles, supra note 279, at principle 2(b). 
 
756 Final Report on the Updated Set of Principles. Id. 
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legal and moral consequences it entails, by opening the archives and 
declassifying documents requested by appropriate national as well as 
international authorities. 757 
 
It also has been argued that the very nature of the right to truth means that there can be 
no limitations on the right.  This is because the right is understood as so fundamental to 
human dignity that there can be are no legitimate restrictions on it.758  For example, 
prohibitions against torture often are understood in this light.  It is not clear, though, whether 
the right to information would also be understood as having no limitations, as is discussed 
below.      
According to the 2005 UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights report 
on the right to truth: 
The right to the truth as a stand-alone right is a fundamental right of the 
individual and therefore should not be subject to limitations. Giv[en] its 
inalienable nature and its close relationship with other non-derogable rights, 
such as the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, the right to the 
truth should be treated as a non-derogable right. 759 
 
 This sentiment is echoed by the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges 
and lawyers: 
A particular feature of the right to the truth, which is based on treaty and 
customary law, is that it is both an independent right and the means for the 
realization of other rights: to information, to identity, to mourning and, 
especially, the right to justice.  Because of the significance of the matters in 
question and the fundamental nature of the rights affected — to life, to 
                                                 
757 1998 Inter-American Comm. Annual Report, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev., chap. 7, ¶ 20(2) (Apr. 16, 
1999).  
 
758 The arguments are based on the concept of jus cogens in international law. According to the Vienna 
Convention,  jus cogens is a norm of general international law “accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention, supra 
note 58, at art. 53 
 
759 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 60. 
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physical or moral integrity, to a fair trial, etc. — the right to the truth is 
inalienable, non-derogable and imprescriptible.760 
 
Nonetheless, concern has been expressed about whether the right-to-know component 
of the right to truth can be limited.  According to the 2005 UN OHCHR report on the right to 
truth, “During the expert workshop on the right to the truth . . . participants concluded that the 
right to seek information may be an instrumental right to realize the right to the truth, but both 
constitute different and separate rights. As the right to freedom of information can be 
restricted for certain reasons under international law, there is the question of whether the right 
to the truth could be restricted under any circumstances.”761 
 The UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers also expressed 
concern that although “the right to the truth is often referred to as the ‘right to know’ or the 
right ‘to be informed,’  . . . there is still a need to spell out its different components.”762  The 
right to truth is often “ensured through freedom of opinion, expression and information laws, 
which can be subjected to certain restrictions, even in ordinary situations.”763  He maintained 
that this is problematic and that there needs to be a distinction between the right to truth and 
the right to know.  He stated: 
It would be illogical to accept that for public order reasons a State may 
suspend rights and guarantees – including the right to the truth – thereby 
jeopardizing untouchable rights such as the right to life or to the physical and 
moral integrity of persons. The differences between these two undoubtedly 
widen as we enter situations in which the nature of the crimes and the rights 
affected renders the right to the truth untouchable and confers on the obligation 
the character of jus cogens.764 
                                                 
760 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, supra note 628, at ¶16. 
 
761 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 43. 
 
762 2005 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, supra note 627, at ¶ 23. 
 
763 Id.  
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Amnesty laws, which protect human rights violators from prosecution, often are 
understood as violating the right to truth and the right of access to information about human 
rights violations.  According to the 2005 UN OHCHR report on the right to truth, “Amnesties 
or similar measures and restrictions to the right to seek information must never be used to 
limit, deny or impair the right to the truth. The right to the truth is intimately linked with the 
States’ obligation to fight and eradicate impunity.”765   
The Inter-American Commission also has maintained that amnesty laws violate the 
right of access to information about human rights violations.  For example, in Ellacuría v. El 
Salvador, the commission ruled that an El Salvadorian amnesty law violated article 13, the 
freedom of expression provision of the American Convention.  The commission stated: “The 
right to know the truth is a collective right that ensures society access to information that is 
essential for the workings of democratic systems, and it is also a private right for relatives of 
the victims, which affords a form of compensation, in particular, in cases where amnesty laws 
are adopted.  Article 13 of the American Convention protects the right of access to 
information.”766 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
765 2005 UN OHCHR Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 627, at ¶ 60. 
 
766 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Report No. 136/99, ¶ 224 (Dec. 22, 1999).  See also Chile 
v. Oracyle, ¶ 89; Cea v. El Salvador, ¶ 151-2. The Inter-American Court also has ruled that amnesty laws violate 
the American Convention, but the court has not specifically linked those violations to a right to information. See 
19 Merchants v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 262; Myrna Mack Chang  v. Guatemala (ser. 
C) no. 1010 ¶ 276. 
 
202 
 
The commission also argued that amnesty laws violated article 25 of the American 
Convention, which protects the “right to simple and prompt recourse for the protection of the 
rights enshrined therein.” 767  According to the commission: 
The existence of obstacles, de facto or de jure (such as the amnesty law) to 
access to information relating to the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
violation of a fundamental right constitutes an open violation of the right 
established in that article [25] and negates remedies available under domestic 
jurisdiction for the judicial protection of the fundamental rights established in 
the Convention, the Constitution and domestic laws.768 
 
This right to information, according to the commission, “applies not only to the relatives of 
the victims directly affected by a human rights violation, but also to society in general.”769 
 
Conclusion 
The right-to-truth conceptualization of access to information is based on the right to 
truth that is found in international human rights law.  The right to truth obligates governments 
to investigate human rights violations; bring perpetrators to justice; and inform victims, next 
of kin, and society of the circumstances surrounding the violations.  The obligation within the 
right to truth to provide information about human rights abuses is the basis of the right-to-
truth conceptualization.   
The right-to-truth conceptualization includes three rationales, which often overlap.  
The human-rights-violations-through-nondisclosure rationale recognizes that that the failure 
to provide relatives information about the fate of next of kin can contribute to the violation of 
the relative human rights.  Often this is within the context of enforced disappearances or 
                                                 
767 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Report No. 136/99, ¶ 225 (Dec. 22, 1999). See American 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25. 
 
768 Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Report No. 136/99, ¶ 225 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 
769 Id. at ¶ 226. 
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extrajudicial executions.  The European Court and Inter-American Court both have found that 
denial of information to family members about what happened to their loved ones constitutes 
inhumane treatment or torture.  When determining if denial of information constitute human 
right abuse, the European Court considers the relationship of the individual requesting the 
information to the victim, and places a particular emphasis on the parent-child bond.  The 
court also considers the officials’ response to the information request.  Particularly unhelpful 
or callous responses contribute to the court’s finding of a violation.      
The information-as-reparations-for-human-rights-violations rationale recognizes that 
information can serve as a form of compensation and redress for family members who are 
victims of not knowing what happened to their loved ones.  Information is understood as a 
form of reparation to help provide closure for the victims’ families.  The public dissemination 
of information also serves to publicly acknowledge the suffering of both the family members 
and their next of kin.  Often public dissemination includes requiring governments to publish 
the results of official investigations into human rights violations, publish human rights court 
rulings, and to issue detailed public apologies.  The public dissemination of information is 
recognized as benefiting society as well as the victims of human rights abuses.  
The third rationale for the right to information recognizes that information can help 
prevent future human rights abuses.  The prevention rationale recognizes that access to 
information can act as a preventative measure against future abuses.  This recognition of 
preventative role of information is particularly apparent within the Inter-American human 
rights system.  Articulations of how access to information will prevent future human rights 
abuses are limited, but discussions suggest that information will publicly shame those 
responsible for the abuses and provide an accurate history. 
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 The right of access to information about human rights abuses within the right-to-truth 
conceptualization has been recognized as having both an individual and a societal dimension.    
The individual dimension of the right to information is granted to the victims of human rights 
abuses and their relatives.  Usually this is within the context of enforced disappearances, 
extrajudicial executions, and torture.  The relatives’ rights to information are based on the 
idea that the suffering endured by not knowing what happened to their next of kin constitutes 
a form of abuse.  The societal dimension of the right to information usually is recognized 
within the context of preventing future abuse.  By informing society about what happened, 
future human rights abuse will be less likely to occur.  For example, the Inter-American Court 
often requires that governments publicly disseminate information about the past human rights 
abuses.   
The type of information included within the right-to-truth conceptualization includes 
information about serious human rights abuses, although what constitutes serious human 
rights violations is not always made clear.  Often the information includes facts about the 
circumstances of the abuses, the perpetrators of the abuse, and the progress and results of 
government investigations into the abuse.  The location of victims’ remains also often is 
included.  The right-to-truth conceptualization also recognizes that the right to information 
creates positive obligations on governments to create and maintain archives.   
Articulations on limitations on the right of access to information within the right-to-
truth conceptualization are limited.  Some restrictions are noted such as restrictions on access 
to personal information and information that may harm individuals’ safety, but they are not 
discussed in any detail.  Some sources suggest that the right to truth is so essential to human 
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dignity, that it cannot be limited, but whether the right to information would be considered to 
be unlimited is unclear.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
EVALUATI*G A*D COMPARI*G THE CO*CEPTUALIZATIO*S 
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and analyze the various 
conceptualizations being used to promote access to government-held information as a human 
right.  This was accomplished in the preceding chapters, which identified and analyzed four 
separate conceptualizations.  This dissertation also set out to assess the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each conceptualization and determine which conceptualization or set of 
conceptualizations holds the greatest promise for ensuring the broadest right of access to 
information.  The last two objectives will be realized in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
First, it is important to review the findings thus far.  The next section will review the findings 
of the four identified conceptualizations.  Following these summaries will be an assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualization and an evaluation of which 
conceptualization holds the greatest promise for ensuring the broadest right of access to 
information.  The final section will provide suggestions for further research related to this 
topic. 
 
Four Conceptualizations of Access to Information as a Human Right 
 Four conceptualizations were identified through legal analysis of human rights 
treaties, documents, and reports from international and regional human rights entities; 
decisions of regional human rights courts; and materials from nongovernmental organizations 
that promote access to information as a human right (see Appendix I).  The documents were 
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evaluated for explicit and implicit references to access to government-held information as a 
human right.  From this analysis four conceptualizations were identified: the freedom-of-
expression, information-privacy, right-to-a-healthy-environment, and right-to-truth 
conceptualizations.  This research explicated each conceptualization by asking the following 
subset of questions: What is the rationale behind the right of access?  Who has the right to 
information?  To what type of information does the right apply? and What are the limitations 
of the right?  The following sections will review the explications of each conceptualization. 
 
The Freedom-of-Expression Conceptualization 
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization is by far the most pervasive and well 
articulated conceptualization of the four.  This conceptualization has been articulated by 
nearly all of the human rights law sources examined for this project including the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, and NGOs.  Only the 
European Court of Human Rights has not recognized a right to information based on the right 
to freedom of expression.  Of all of the conceptualizations, the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization clearly is the most recognized by NGOs.  The other conceptualizations, 
although sometimes hinted at, rarely are discussed in detail in NGO documents and 
declarations.  Most likely this is because of the expansive nature of this conceptualization, 
which recognizes the right to information as belonging to all citizens and including almost all 
government information; thus, information to which access is guaranteed within the other 
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conceptualizations – personal, environmental, or human rights information – would be 
included within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.       
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization is based on the idea that the right to 
freedom of expression also includes the right to government information.  According to this 
conceptualization, citizens and media need information in order to fully exercise their rights 
of freedom of expression.  Without access to information, the ability to express and receive 
information is limited.   
There exist three main rationales for providing a right to information based on the 
right to freedom of expression: the seek-and-receive, self-governance, and good-governance 
rationales.  The latter two rationales are based on the importance placed on healthy 
governance practices such as public participation and government transparency.  The seek-
and-receive rationale, on the other hand, stems from efforts to link a right of access to 
information to a right to freedom of expression.  This is achieved by arguing that the right to 
seek and receive information that is guaranteed in freedom of expression provisions of several 
human rights instruments includes a right of access to government information.  Thus, the 
seek-and-receive rationale is not mutually exclusive of the other two; instead it operates as the 
foundation on which to base a right to information within the right to freedom of expression.  
The difference between the right to seek information and the right to receive 
information was not clearly articulated, but evidence suggests that a right of access to 
information is more likely linked to the right to seek information.  This is evidenced by the 
Inter-American Court decision, Reyes v. Chile.  In explaining why the right to seek and 
receive information, which is guaranteed by the American Convention,770 guarantees a right 
                                                 
770 American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13(2). 
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of access to government information, the court stated that the right of access to information is 
based on the right of individuals to receive information and the positive obligation on the 
government to provide it.771  This suggests the court understands the right to seek information 
as conferring a positive obligation on governments to supply it.   
It also is worth noting that the African Commission passed a resolution to ensure a 
right to seek information, which is not in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 
specifically to guarantee a right of access to government information.  Also, the European 
Court has yet to find a right of access to government information based on article 10 of the 
European Convention, the freedom of expression provision, which provides a right to receive 
information but not a right to seek it.  In fact, Giorgio Malinverni, a European Court judge, 
suggested that the drafters of article 10 of the European Convention specifically left out the 
term “to seek” due to concern that it would place a positive obligation on governments to 
provide information.772   
The self-governance and good-governance rationales both are based on the need to 
ensure healthy governments.  The self-governance rationale recognizes government 
information as essential to public participation.  Without access to information, citizens 
potentially are deprived of information that is vital to making informed decisions about their 
government.  The good-governance rationale is linked to the self-governance rationale in that 
information is recognized as being vital for a healthy government, but the good-governance 
rationale recognizes access to information as a means to hold governments accountable for 
their actions and to prevent government abuse and corruption.  The two rationales are not 
mutually exclusive and are often discussed together in human rights documents.   
                                                 
771 Reyes v. Chile, at ¶ 77. 
 
772 See Malinverni, supra note 112, at 233. 
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Within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, all citizens, and sometimes all 
individuals regardless of citizenship, have a right to government information.  This is because 
the freedom-of-expression conceptualization recognizes that government information is a 
public good that belongs to the people.  The government’s role as representatives of the 
people is to hold information on behalf of all citizens; therefore, government is the caretaker, 
not the owner, of information. Because citizens are the owners of information, they do not 
have to show a direct interest in the information when requesting access to it.  At a minimum, 
information belongs to all citizens of a given country, but often it is expressed that the right to 
information belongs to all people regardless of citizenship. 
Within this conceptualization, each citizen (or each individual) has the same right to 
information as the next citizen; nonetheless, there is recognition that information fulfills 
important societal needs for marginalized groups and the media.  For the disenfranchised, 
information is recognized as empowering citizens to gain equality within society.  For the 
media, information is recognized as helping media to fulfill their role of informing citizens.   
Within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, there is a presumption that the 
government will disclose information.  Because information is recognized as being owned by 
the people, the freedom-of-expression conceptualization requires that all information be 
disclosed unless there are legitimate justifications to withhold it.  Often this is referred to as 
the principle of maximum disclosure.  Governments also are required to proactively provide 
information that is of a public interest even when the information is not requested, although 
what constitutes information that is of a public interest is unclear.  This requirement to 
proactively provide information is to help facilitate the democratic process.  NGOs, in 
particular, have recognized that private entities such as corporations also have an obligation to 
211 
 
release information if important public interests are at stake.  However, why private entities 
have this obligation and the parameters of the obligation have not been articulated as a matter 
of law.  The idea that private entities have an obligation to disclose information has at least 
some level of recognition within all of the conceptualizations, as will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization does recognize that there are legitimate 
reasons for withholding information, but governments are required to meet strict standards in 
order to justify nondisclosure.  Any limitation must be explicitly established in national law, 
and, when a limitation is applied, the government must provide a written justification.  
Procedures to appeal nondisclosure decisions also must be in place.  Restrictions on 
information must be narrowly tailored and interpreted, and based a significant public interest.  
The balancing of the public interest in receiving the information against the government 
interest in nondisclosure must be weighted in favor of public’s interest in obtaining the 
information.  Government bears the burden of proof in showing that the legitimate 
government interest outweighs the public interest.  Within this conceptualization, it is 
acknowledged that the protection of national security is a legitimate justification for 
withholding information; nonetheless, any limitation on access to information based on 
national security must meet the same requirements as other limitations on access.  Restrictions 
on national security must be justified and not used indiscriminately.  It also is recognized that 
individuals receiving unauthorized confidential or classified materials should not be punished.    
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The Information-Privacy Conceptualization 
The information-privacy conceptualization of access to information recognizes that 
individuals have a right to access government documents that contain information directly 
pertaining to them.  Individuals have the right to know what information the government has 
gathered and stored about them, to know whether the information is accurate, and, if it is not 
accurate, to have the information corrected.  Articulations of the information-privacy 
conceptualization, unlike the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, are not detailed and 
comprehensive.  Unlike the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, which is based solely 
on the right to freedom of expression, the information-privacy conceptualization is based on 
several different rights: the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, and, in one 
articulation, the right to fair treatment while in detention.  Basing the right to personal 
information on separate rights largely has not affected the way the right to personal 
information has been conceptualized, but it is an interesting finding.  Both the OAS and UN 
special rapporteurs on freedom of expression have stated that the right of access to 
information is based on the right of freedom of expression.  In making this assessment, they 
referred to information held by the government as “public information” and differentiated 
between public uses and private uses of the information.  The right to personal information in 
this context is subsumed within the right of citizens to have access to all government 
information, as articulated in the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  The Human 
Rights Committee in its reports on countries’ compliance with the Political Covenant has 
expressed at different times that a right to personal information is part of the right to privacy 
and the right to freedom of expression.  The committee had the opportunity to clarify its views 
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on personal information in Zheludkov v. Ukraine,773 but instead based a right to personal 
information on the right to humane treatment while in prison. 
Much of the material comprising the elements of the conceptualization comes from the 
European Court.  Interestingly, of all the sources of human rights law, the European Court 
was the only source not to recognize a right of access to information based on the right to 
freedom of expression, and, in some of its rulings granting a right of access to personal 
information, the court emphasized that the access right is not based on the right to freedom of 
expression. 
The information-privacy conceptualization includes two rationales: the knowledge-
about-self rationale and the government-accountability rationale.  One rationale recognizes 
access to personal information purely as a personal right, and the other recognizes it as a 
political right.  The knowledge-about-self rationale recognizes that personal information is 
vital to understanding aspects about one’s own history.  In this context, the right to personal 
information is recognized as a personal right.  This rationale largely is based on three 
European Court decisions that involve access to information about one’s childhood or birth.  
In all three cases, the court recognized that access to personal information fell under the right 
to privacy provision of the European Convention.      
The government-accountability rationale does not recognize a right to personal 
information as a purely personal right.   This rationale understands access to personal 
information as a means of ensuring government accountability.  In order to hold governments 
accountable for responsibly holding personal information, citizens must be able to check to 
see if the information is accurate, legally obtained and used, and only available to authorized 
                                                 
773 UN HRC Communication no. 726/1996, Zheludkov v. Ukraine, CCPR/C/76/D/726/1996, ¶ 8.4 (Dec. 6, 
2002). 
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individuals.  This rationale is similar to the good-governance rationale of the freedom-of-
expression conceptualization in that both recognize access to personal information as a 
political right that helps hold governments accountable.     
The information-privacy conceptualization recognizes that all individuals have a right 
to their personal information held by the government, regardless of citizenship, and they do 
not need to provide reasons for their requests or allege that the information is inaccurate.  The 
type of information to which access is guaranteed within this conceptualization is limited to 
one’s personal information.  The European Court has stated that personal information does 
not include information of a professional or business nature.  This conceptualization also 
recognizes a right of access to personal information held by private entities, although the 
parameters of this right are not articulated.    
Only the European Court, which recognizes the right of access to personal information 
as based on the right to privacy, has addressed in detail limitations on the right.  Sources that 
discuss a right to personal information based on the right to freedom of expression have not 
articulated limitations; therefore, it is unclear if limitations based on the right to freedom of 
expression would be conceptualized differently than limitations based on the right to privacy. 
According to the European Court, in order for limitations on the right of access to 
personal information to be legitimate, they must be clearly stated in legislation.  This 
legislation must be accessible, meaning that individuals have access to it, and it must be 
foreseeable, meaning that individuals are able to clearly understand the circumstances when 
limitations are legitimate.  Legitimate limitations can include withholding information to 
protect the privacy of third parties and national security.  When limitations based on national 
security are evoked, proper safeguards against abuse of power must exist.  The court has made 
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clear, though, that governments are given deference in deciding how best to balance the 
competing interests of privacy and national security.   
 
Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization  
Similar to the information-privacy conceptualization, the right-to-a-healthy-
environment conceptualization is not as well articulated as the freedom-of expression 
conceptualization.  Much of the discussion of the elements of the conceptualization comes 
from two UN special rapporteurs who deal with the environment and toxic products and from 
the Aarhaus Convention.  The European Court, the Inter-American Commission, and the 
African Commission do address the right to environmental information, but their discussions 
are limited.  NGOs contribute little to the understanding of a right of access to environmental 
information, which was also the case with the information-privacy conceptualization.  As 
stated above in discussing the information-privacy conceptualization, this most likely is 
because all information held by the government including environmental information would 
be included within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, which the NGOs strongly 
support.   
The right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization is premised on the concept that 
human rights and environmental concerns are linked, which has been recognized in two 
different ways.  The relationship between human rights and the environment has been 
recognized as a substantive right, meaning the right to a healthy environment is a stand-alone 
right.  More commonly, it has been recognized as a procedural right, which understands that a 
healthy environment is needed in order to protect other human rights such as the right to life.  
Both frameworks – the right to a healthy environment as a substantive right and as a 
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procedural right – recognize the right of access to environmental information as essential for 
protecting the environment and ensuring that human rights are not violated by environmental 
harms. 
There are two rationales for recognizing a right of access to environmental 
information within the healthy-environment conceptualization.   The protecting-rights 
rationale recognizes that a right of access to environmental information is necessary in order 
to ensure the protection of other human rights.  Individuals and communities need information 
about the environment in order to be protected from human rights violations such as ill-health 
or loss of life or home.  This rationale is evident in two European Court decisions, which are 
based on the right to respect for private and family life guaranteed in the European 
Convention.  The second rationale, the public-participation rationale, also recognizes the 
importance of information in protecting the environment and preventing environmental 
harms, but the public-participation rationale emphasizes the role of information in 
contributing to effective public participation in environmental decision-making. 
The public-participation rationale is based on the idea that access to environmental 
information, public input into the environmental decision-making process, and access to 
judicial recourse when information is withheld will produce outcomes that address the needs 
of the people.  Similar to the self-governance rationale of the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization, the public-participation rationale recognizes that citizens need access to 
information in order to effectively participate in decision-making.  Access to judicial recourse 
is then necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the rights of access to information 
and participation.  This rationale is reflected in the three pillars of the Aarhaus Convention – 
the right to information, the right to participation, and the right to judicial recourse.  
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There is not much elaboration on who receives the right to environmental information.  
The right to environmental information has been understood as belonging to individuals and 
communities.  Because environmental problems often are not contained within countries’ 
boundaries, the right also has been recognized as belonging to governments of other nations.  
This is especially true when large-scale environmental disasters occur.  
At the very least, the right belongs to those whom may be affected by specific 
environmental harms, but this articulation is usually very vague.  For example, in the African 
Commission report, SERAC v. 5igeria, the right to environmental information was recognized 
as belonging to “communities likely to be affected.”774  The Aarhaus Convention is more 
expansive in its understanding of who has a right of access to environmental information and 
recognizes that the right belongs to all individuals regardless of citizenship or whether the 
individual has a direct interest in the information.  The European Court, on the other hand, 
requires that individuals have a direct interest in the information – that they are victims or 
potential victims of environmental harms.  
As with the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, there has been recognition that 
efforts should be made to ensure that vulnerable populations have access to information.  Also 
similar to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the healthy-environment 
conceptualization recognizes that governments have an obligation to proactively provide 
information to the public even when the information is not requested.   
The type of information included within the right-to-a-healthy-environment 
conceptualization is not well defined.  Sometimes environmental information is referred to as 
information about environmental harms and sometimes as information on potential 
environmental harms.  There is a reference to information from the private sector.  Although a 
                                                 
774 SERC v. Nigeria, ¶ 71. 
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right of access to private information is not explicitly stated, concerns often were expressed 
about the lack of access to this type of information.       
Only the Aarhus Convention has explicitly articulated limitations on the right of 
access to environmental information.  The limitations include restrictions based on national 
security, privacy, and corporate confidentiality.   Several sources have expressed concern 
about the overuse of limitations based on the confidentiality of commercial information.   
Both UN special rapporteurs also expressed concern about the overuse of national security 
arguments to deny access to information about the environment.  Similar to the freedom-of-
expression conceptualization, limitations on access to environmental information require that 
the restrictions are clearly stated in law, that reasons for nondisclosure are stated in writing, 
and that nondisclosure decisions are reviewable.   
 
Right-to-Truth Conceptualization  
The right-to-truth conceptualization of access to information is based on the right to 
truth that is found in international human rights law.  The right to truth usually is guaranteed 
within the context of serious human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, 
extrajudicial executions, and torture.  The right to truth obligates governments to investigate 
human rights abuses; bring perpetrators to justice; and inform victims, next of kin, and society 
of the circumstances surrounding the abuses.  The right-to-truth conceptualization stems from 
the obligation on governments to provide information to victims, their next of kin, and society 
about the abuses that occurred.  The right to truth has been articulated in a variety of ways by 
the various human rights entities; therefore the specific parameters of the right of access to 
information within the right to truth are not always clear.  Nonetheless, components of a right-
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to-truth conceptualization of access to information were identified from the range of ideas 
within the documents. 
The right-to-truth conceptualization comprises three rationales, which often overlap.  
All three right-to-truth rationales are predicated on the fact that serious human rights 
violations have occurred either at the hands of government officials or with their explicit or 
tacit approval. The human-rights-violations-through- nondisclosure rationale recognizes that 
nondisclosure by the government of information about the fate of next of kin can contribute to 
the violation of human rights, often within the context of enforced disappearances.  Both the 
European Court and Inter-American Court have found that denying information to family 
members about what happened to their loved ones constitutes inhumane treatment or torture.  
The European Court has been very explicit about when the nondisclosure of information 
amounts to inhumane treatment.  The court considers the relationship of the individual 
requesting the information to the next of kin, with particular emphasis on the parent-child 
bond and the authority’s response to the information request.     
The information-as-reparations-for-human-rights-violations rationale recognizes that 
information can serve as a form of compensation and redress for family members who are 
victims of not knowing what happened to their loved ones.  The obligation to disclose 
information to families and society about what happened is a form of reparation to help 
provide closure for the victims.  The public dissemination of information also serves to 
publicly acknowledge the plights of both the family members and their loved ones.  Often this 
acknowledgment is achieved by requiring governments to publish the outcomes of official 
investigations and human rights court rulings, and to issue detailed public apologies.  This 
dissemination of information is recognized as benefiting society as well as the victims of 
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human rights abuses.   It has been suggested that public dissemination can act as a “collective 
catharsis” for society. 
The third rationale for the right to of access information about human rights abuses 
recognizes that information can help prevent future human rights abuses.  Within the 
prevention rationale, access to information is recognized as a preventative measure against 
future abuses.  This understanding of preventative role of information is particularly evident 
within the Inter-American human rights system.  As noted above, often it is understood as a 
form of reparation for individuals and society in general.  Nonetheless, the articulation of this 
benefit of access to information is pronounced enough to warrant a separate rationale.  
Articulations of how access to information will prevent future human rights abuses are 
limited.  The discussions suggest that information will publicly shame those responsible for 
the abuses and ensure an accurate history, which can demonstrate how to prevent such abuses 
in the future.  
 The right of access to information about human rights abuses within the right-to-truth 
conceptualization has been recognized as belonging to individuals and society as a whole.  
The individual aspect of the right to information is conferred on the victims of human rights 
abuses and their relatives.  Often this is within the context of enforced disappearances, 
extrajudicial executions, and torture.  Relatives’ rights to information are based on the idea 
that not knowing what happened to their next of kin constitutes a form of abuse.  The societal 
aspect of the right of access to information often is recognized with the context of preventing 
abuse.  By informing society about what happened, future human rights abuse will be less 
likely to occur.  Toward this end, the Inter-American Court, for example, often requires that 
governments publicly disseminate information about the abuses.   
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The type of information included within the right-to-truth conceptualization includes 
information about serious human rights abuses.  This includes information surrounding the 
circumstances of the abuses, who participated in the abuses, the progress and results of 
government investigations into the abuse, and, when applicable, the location of the victims or 
their remains.  The right of access to information about human rights abuses creates a positive 
obligation on government to investigate the abuses, thereby creating new information.  The 
right to information also can include an obligation on government to create and maintain 
archives.   
Discussions of the limitations on the right of access to information within the right-to-
truth conceptualization are limited.  Restrictions on access to personal information and 
information that may harm individuals’ safety are discussed, but not in detail.  What is 
interesting about the discussions on limitations on the right of access to information is that 
much of it is focused on what cannot be limited.  This is because of the nature of the 
information that is at stake – information about serious human rights violations.  It is 
understood that limitations on information about the violation of human rights by government 
officials are dangerous to the very notion of civilized society.  
As with the other conceptualizations, national security is discussed; but within this 
conceptualization, a national security exemption is only justified in “exceptional 
circumstances.”775  Some sources even suggested that information may need to be declassified 
to satisfy the obligation on government to disclose information.  There also have been 
suggestions that the right to truth cannot be limited, although it is unclear whether that means 
the right of access to information also would be unlimited.     
 
                                                 
775 Updated Set of Principles, supra note 649, at principle 16. 
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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Four Conceptualizations 
Two criteria are used to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each 
conceptualization.  First, each conceptualization is evaluated to assess the level of support 
within the human rights community for recognizing access to information as a human right.  
In other words, how limited or widespread is the support for the conceptualization?  Second, 
each conceptualization is evaluated to determine the strength of the right to information.  This 
is achieved by assessing the identified elements of each conceptualization – the rationales, to 
whom the information granted, the type of information granted, and the limitations on the 
right – to evaluate the breadth of access to information guaranteed and the clarity of the right.  
The broader the right of access to information and the clearer the articulations of the right, the 
stronger the conceptualization.           
 
 Freedom-of-Expression Conceptualization: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Evaluation of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization indicates that the 
conceptualization is quite strong.  The level of support of the conceptualization in the human 
rights community is very broad and the right to information guaranteed is extensive and 
clearly articulated.    
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization of access to information is the most 
widely recognized by all the sources that were examined with the exception of the European 
Court of Human Rights.  As stated previously, much of this recognition is based on the 
interpretation of the right to seek and receive information that is part of the right to freedom of 
expression guaranteed by several human rights instruments. 776     
                                                 
776 See, e.g., Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19; UN Declaration, supra note 46, at art. 19; American 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13. 
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It is important to note as well that many government reports to the Human Rights 
Committee about compliance with article 19, the freedom of expression provision of the 
International Civil and Political Covenant,777 list freedom-of-information legislation as 
evidence of compliance.  This indicates that many governments also recognize that the right 
to seek and receive information includes a right of access to information.  
A weakness of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization is that the European Court 
has not recognized a right of access to information based on the right to freedom of 
expression provision of the European Convention, which only provides a right to receive 
information and not a right to seek it.778  Nonetheless, the European Court’s rulings denying a 
right of access to information have been limited by the phrase “in circumstances such as those 
of the present case,” suggesting that a right to information could exist in some 
circumstances.779  In a 2006 decision determining the admissibility of a complaint, the 
European Court ruled that article 10,780 the freedom of expression provision of the European 
Convention, was applicable in a case involving government documents about the design and 
construction of a nuclear reactor.781  The decision was based on the fact that the complainants 
were a party to an administrative hearing reviewing the impact of the reactor.  Ultimately, the 
court ruled that the government had properly justified its nondisclosure.  Nonetheless, what is 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
777 Article 19 states in part: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in 
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of choice.” See Political Covenant, supra note 
46, at art. 19(2). 
 
778 Article 10 of the European Convention states in part: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 10. 
 
779 Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 74 (Mar. 26, 1987). 
 
780 European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 10. 
 
781 Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. no. 19101/03 (July 10, 2006). 
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significant here is that this case suggests that the European Court could change course in its 
interpretation of article 10 of the European Convention to include a right of access to 
information.    
The widespread support of this conceptualization by the major NGOs that promote a 
right of access to information also is significant.  Although NGOs do not make human rights 
law, they can be very influential on governments and human rights entities.  Numerous NGO 
reports, declarations, and principles support the proposition that the right to freedom of 
expression includes a right to information.  Several of these principles and declarations have 
been very influential.  For example, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, 
Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information have been cited by the Human Rights 
Committee, the Inter-American Commission, and both the UN and OAS special rapporteurs 
on freedom of expression.   
This widespread support for a right to information based on the right to freedom of 
expression adds strength to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  It shows that there 
is a growing consensus among the human rights community that the right to freedom of 
expression also includes a right to information.   
The strengths and weakness of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization also were 
evaluated by assessing the elements of the conceptualization – the rationales, to whom the 
right is granted, the type of information, and the limitations on the right.  The seek-and-
receive rationale provides a strong foundation for the right to information based on the right to 
freedom of expression.  The recognition of information as a public good and the presumption 
of openness that are based in the self-governance and good-governance rationales provide a 
broad right of access to information.  
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The rationales of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization add to the 
conceptualization’s strength.  As previously discussed, the right to information often is based 
on the rights to seek and receive information, which have been identified as a rationale for the 
freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  The seek-and-receive rationale acts as a foundation 
upon with to base a right of information.  The widespread recognition of a right to information 
based on the rights to seek and receive information, as noted above, adds to the strength of 
this foundation.  The other two rationales – self-governance and good-governance – also add 
to the strength of the conceptualization.  Both address the role of information in society.  The 
former recognizes the importance of information in ensuring an informed and politically-
active citizenry.  The latter understands information as essential for holding government 
accountable for its actions and preventing government abuse.   
Both rationales recognize that governments exist to represent the people and address 
their needs; therefore, citizens have the right to information in order to participate in their own 
governance and to ensure that government acts for the benefit of the people.  Based on these 
assumptions, government information is recognized as a public good that belongs to the 
people.  These core assumptions about democratic governance within the self-governance and 
good-governance rationales directly contribute to the broad right to information guaranteed 
within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  The recognition of information as a 
public good is a key strength of the conceptualization.  Information as a public good means 
that all citizens have a right to access all government information.     
Because information is owned by the public, citizens do not have to show a direct 
interest in obtaining it.  The understanding that information is a public good also means that 
there is a presumption that all information should be disclosed, except for limited, legitimate 
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exemptions.  This has been referred to as the principle of maximum disclosure.  The 
understanding that information is a public good includes an obligation on governments to 
proactively provide information of public concern even if the information is not requested.   
A weakness of the conceptualization is that it is unclear whether the right to 
information extends to all individuals regardless of citizenship.  Within the freedom-of-
information conceptualization, it often is understood that all individuals have a right of access 
to information; however, the justification that information is a public good implies that the 
right to information belongs only to citizens.  
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization is the only conceptualization that 
acknowledges the media’s right to information, which is a strength.  Although it does not 
confer any greater rights for the media to access to information than for individuals, it does 
recognize that the media play a vital role in ensuring that the public receives government 
information.   
Of course, this broad right to information is not absolute and can be limited.  The 
conceptualization does not articulate how specific limitations on information would be 
understood, which is a weakness of the conceptualization.  The right to information within the 
freedom-of-expression conceptualization is based on the right to freedom of expression 
guaranteed in several human rights instruments, most of which contain limitations on the 
right.  The American and European Conventions, and the Political Covenant all are designed 
to protect the reputations of others, public safety, public morals, and national security.782  
Although there were some discussions of national security limitations, in general, there was 
very little to no articulation of how the other limitations would apply to access to information.  
                                                 
782 See American Convention, supra note1, at art. 13(2); European Convention, supra note 55, at art. 10(2); 
Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 19(3). 
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For example, would limitations on the right to information based on the right to freedom of 
expression be different than limitations on the right to freedom of expression?       
Although the freedom-of-information conceptualization is weak in articulating 
specific limitations on the right to information, a strength of the conceptualization is that it 
recognizes that specific procedures must be in place in order to limit information.  
Restrictions must be designated in law, satisfy a significant public interest, be narrowly-
drawn, and balanced with the public’s interest in the information.  To this end, the 
governments carry the burden of proof.  Simply claiming that the information will harm 
national security is not sufficient to prove a significant public interest.        
  
Information-Privacy Conceptualization: Strengths and Weaknesses 
 The information-privacy conceptualization is relatively weak.  Although there is broad 
support for the conceptualization, few of the entities that recognize the conceptualization have 
articulated its parameters in depth.  There also are several inconsistencies regarding the source 
of the right to personal information.  The conceptualization also has narrow definitions 
regarding who has the right to information and to what type of information.        
The information-privacy conceptualization has broad support.  It is recognized by the 
European Court, the Human Rights Committee, and the Inter-American, UN Commission on 
Human Rights, and the African Commission; nonetheless, there are several weaknesses 
regarding the strength of the support.  This is because, of those entities that recognize the right 
to personal information, very few have articulated the parameters of the right.  For example, 
much of the understanding of the information-privacy conceptualization stems from the 
decisions of the European Court. 
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Another weakness regarding the strength of the support is that when the right to 
personal information is recognized, often there are inconsistencies regarding the source of that 
right.  The right to personal information has been recognized as part of the right to privacy 
and also as part of the right freedom of expression, sometimes by the same entity.  For 
example, the Human Rights Committee in its reports on governments’ compliance with the 
Political Covenant has recognized the right to personal information as part of the right to 
privacy783 and as part of the right to freedom of expression;784 yet, in its only ruling on a 
complaint regarding access to personal information, the Human Rights Committee recognized 
a right to personal information based on the right to humane treatment while in detention.785  
The fact that the right to personal information is based in several different rights makes it 
difficult to identify the parameters of the right.  For example, would the parameters of a right 
to personal information based on the right to freedom of expression be different than a right to 
personal information based on the right to privacy?  
 This inconsistency is due in part to the two different rationales for guaranteeing the 
right to personal information.  The knowledge-about-self rationale recognizes the right to 
personal information as purely a personal right; the government-accountability rationale 
recognizes that the right of access to personal information has benefits to society because the 
right helps citizens hold their government accountable.  The latter rationale is similar to good-
governance rationale of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  Both recognize 
                                                 
783 See, e.g., UN H.R. C. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Second Periodic Report, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/MKD/2, ¶ 329 (Feb. 2, 2007). 
 
784 See, e.g., UN H.R. C. Argentina Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ARG/98/3, ¶ 149 (May 7, 1999); 
UN H.R. C. Australia Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/98/3, ¶ 869 (July 2, 1999); UN H.R. C. 
Belgium Third Periodic Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/Add.3, ¶ 187 (Oct. 15, 1997). 
 
785 UN HRC Communication no. 726/1996, Zheludkov v. Ukraine, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/726/1996, ¶ 8.4 
(Dec. 6, 2002). 
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information as helping to hold governments accountable, which benefits all citizens.  The 
knowledge-about-self rationale is much narrower and thus much weaker.  The right to 
information is understood as benefiting only the individual.  Although having the information 
necessary to understand oneself clearly is important, as a basis for a right of access to 
information, it is extremely narrow.                    
Another weakness of the conceptualization is the narrow definitions of who has a right 
to information and the type of information to which the right of access applies.  Because of 
these narrow definitions, the information-privacy conceptualization is the narrowest of all the 
conceptualizations.  Although the right to personal information may benefit society by 
holding governments accountable, the right is conferred only to an individual with a direct 
interest in the information, and the information that is available is limited to information 
pertaining to that individual.  That said, a strength of this conceptualization is the recognition 
from some sources that the right to personal information includes a right to information from 
private databases.  This understanding is broader than that of the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization, which only expresses concerns about the lack of access to private 
information and does not articulate an explicit right.        
As with the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, articulation of the restrictions 
on access to personal information is limited, and this is a weakness of this conceptualization.   
Only the European Court has addressed restrictions on the right and then mostly within the 
context of procedural obligations.  For example, similar to the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization, the restrictions must be based in law.  The European Court briefly 
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referenced restrictions based on national security, stating that governments should receive 
deference when national security interests are concerned.786   
As stated above, there are inconsistencies regarding the source in human rights law of 
a right to personal information.  This inconsistency could affect how restrictions on the right 
to personal information are conceptualized.  For example, the right to privacy and the right to 
freedom of expression have different restrictions.  Would restrictions on the right to personal 
information based on the right to freedom of expression be different from restrictions on the 
right to personal information based on the right to privacy?        
 
Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment Conceptualization: Strengths and Weaknesses 
The right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization has a broad level of support.  It 
has been recognized by the Aarhaus Convention on the Environment, the European Court on 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission, and the African Commission, as well as the 
UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights.  Nonetheless, support, while brad, is weak because there are 
inconsistencies as to where the source of the right to information is found in human rights 
law.  This weakness was also found with the strength of the support of the information-
privacy conceptualization.     
The European Court has recognized the right to environmental information as part of 
the right to respect for private and family life that is guaranteed in the European Convention.  
The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court based the right to 
environmental information in part on the right to freedom of expression.  The African 
Commission based the right to environmental information on a right to a healthy environment 
                                                 
786 See Leander v. Sweden, at ¶ 49; Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, at ¶ 87. 
231 
 
found in the African Charter, and the Aarhaus Convention created a stand-alone right to 
environmental information.  These inconsistencies are a weakness of the conceptualization 
because the parameters of a right to environmental information could change based on the 
sources of law in which that the right is based.  For example, the Aarhaus Convention clearly 
creates a strong right of access to environmental information.  Its obligations on governments 
to provide information to all individuals are unambiguous and detailed. Yet, the right to 
environmental information based on the European Convention’s right to respect for private 
and family life is quite limited.  In the two cases dealing with a right to environmental 
information, the European Court made clear the right to environmental information pertained 
only to those with a direct interest.787  
 A strength of the conceptualization is the public-participation rationale.  Similar to the 
self-governance rationale of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the public-
participation rationale recognizes the importance of information to the democratic process.  
Both the public-participation and the self-governance rationales recognize that citizens have a 
right to participate in government decision making.  In order to effectively exercise this right, 
citizens must have access to information.  The protecting-rights rationale of the right-to-a-
healthy environment conceptualization, on the other hand, is much weaker because it 
recognizes the right to environmental information only in the context of ensuring that rights 
are not violated due to environmental harms.  The protecting-rights rationale only recognizes 
information as helping individuals who are likely to be affected by an environmental harm.            
There has not been much elaboration on who is guaranteed the right of access to 
environmental information.  The Aarhus Convention recognizes that the right belongs to all 
individuals regardless of citizenship, which is very strong.  The European Court only 
                                                 
787 Guerra and Others v. Italy, at ¶ 57; McGinley v. United Kingdom, at ¶ 101. 
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recognizes a right to information for those with a direct interest in the information, which is 
much weaker.  Other sources are not as clear regarding who has the right to environmental 
information.  At a minimum, the right belongs to those who may be affected by environmental 
harms, but how this is determined remains unclear.          
What constitutes environmental information also is not always clear, and this is a 
weakness of this conceptualization. Often references to environmental information are vague 
references to information about the environment or information about potential environmental 
harms.  The Aarhus Convention is the only source that explicitly defines environmental 
information.  The Aarhus Convention’s definition is all-encompassing in that it includes 
general information about the health of the environment as well as information about potential 
harms that could result from environmental problems.  Nonetheless, the narrow nature of the 
information involved makes this conceptualization much weaker than the freedom-of-
expression conceptualization.  
Two strengths of the conceptualization are its obligation on government to proactively 
provide information and its potential obligation on the private sector to provide information.  
Similar to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, the right-to-a-healthy environment 
conceptualization includes an obligation on government to proactively provide important 
information even if the information is not requested.  The right-to-a-healthy environment 
conceptualization also takes into account the importance of private sector information.  
Although a right to information from the private sector is not explicitly recognized, it is clear 
that there is concern about the lack of environmental information from corporations in 
particular.  
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Only the Aarhus Convention has articulated limitations in detail, which are far more 
extensive than the limitations recognized by the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  A 
strength regarding the limitations of the right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization lies 
in the understanding that the use of the national security exemption must be limited.  
Governments are not to be given deference automatically when national security exemptions 
are evoked.  Even when the national security exemption is legitimately applied, in some 
circumstances such as wide-scale environmental disasters, information still must be disclosed.  
Another strength is that the right-to-a-healthy environment conceptualization requires that 
limitations on the right to information must be provided by law.         
                
Right-to-Truth Conceptualization: Strengths and Weaknesses  
The right-to-truth conceptualization of access to information has a strong level of 
support in that it has been widely recognized by the human rights community.  This includes 
recognition by the Inter-American Court, the European Court, the Human Right Committee, 
the African and the Inter-American commissions, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and the UN General 
Assembly. 
Although, the conceptualization has been widely recognized, similar to the 
information-privacy and right-to-a-healthy environment conceptualizations, the right-to-truth 
conceptualization stems from different sources in human rights law, which is a weakness of 
the conceptualization.  Both the European Court and Human Rights Committee have 
recognized a right of access to information about human rights abuses in the right to be 
treated humanely and not be tortured.  The Inter-American Court has recognized a right of 
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access to information based on the rights to a fair trial and judicial recourse, and the Inter-
American Commission has recognized a right to information on human rights abuses based in 
part on the right to freedom of expression.  A right to information on human rights abuses also 
is recognized as part of the UN and Inter-American conventions on enforced disappearances.  
As stated above, inconsistencies regarding the source of the right can weaken the 
conceptualization because how the right is exercised can change depending on the source.  
This unpredictability weakens the conceptualization because the parameters of the right to 
information are unclear.  
Of the three rationales for the conceptualization, the human-rights-violations-through-
nondisclosure is the narrowest in that it recognizes that the failure to disclose information 
about what happened to one’s next of kin constitutes abuse.  This rationale only recognizes 
the right to information for relatives of disappeared persons or victims of extra-judicial 
executions.  The information-as-reparations-for-human-rights-violations rationale and the 
prevention-of-human-right-violations rationale are much stronger in that both recognize to 
some degree that society as a whole benefits from the information.  The reparations rationale 
recognizes information as a form of healing whereas the prevention-of-human-right-violations 
rationale recognizes information as tool to prevent future abuse.  In this sense, the latter 
rationale is similar to the freedom-of-expression conceptualization rationale.  Both are based 
on the societal benefits of information in holding government accountable to its citizens. 
All of the sources recognized that relatives of victims of human rights abuses have a 
right of access to information about the abuse of their next of kin, although it is not always 
clear who constitutes a relative.  This is a very narrow understanding of the right to 
information and a weakness of the conceptualization.  Several of the sources also recognize 
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that the right belongs to society as well, which is a strength because a societal right to know 
would ensure a right to information on a broader scale.  It is unclear, though, how this right 
would be exercised.  Does a societal right to know mean that any individual within society 
can demand information from the government?  It seems unlikely that is the case.  More 
likely, a societal right to know requires that governments proactively provide information to 
the public about human rights abuses.     
The Inter-American Commission has argued that this societal right to know is based 
the freedom of expression provision within the American Convention.  The Inter-American 
Court, on the other hand, has not acknowledged that the American Convention provides a 
society a right of access to information about human rights abuses; instead, the court has 
referred to a societal right to know only within the context of providing reparations.  It is 
interesting to note that in Reyes v. Chile, the Inter-American Court did refer to a societal right 
to know.  The Reyes decision conferred a right to government information based on the right 
to freedom of expression.  In the body of the decision, the court stated that the right of the 
individual to government information also allows the information to be circulated within 
society.  The court stated, “In this way, the right to freedom of thought and expression 
includes the protection of the right of access to State-held information, which also clearly 
includes the two dimensions, individual and social, of the right to freedom of thought and 
expression that must be guaranteed simultaneously by the State.”788   The court did not 
elaborate on the contours of a societal right to know based on freedom of expression.      
All of the sources also recognize that information regarding enforced disappearances 
and extrajudicial executions is included in the right to information.  Some sources refer to the 
                                                 
788 Reyes v. Chile, at ¶ 77. 
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right of access to information about other serious human rights violations, but it is uncertain 
to which type of human rights they refer.   It is clear that the right-to-truth conceptualization 
only involves the most egregious human rights violations, and thus the conceptualization is 
quite limited.  For example, information about other human rights abuses such as violations of 
the right to freedom of expression or the right to privacy would not be included.   
Another weakness of the conceptualization is that limitations on the right of access to 
information about human rights abuses also are not well delineated.  Some sources stated that 
the right to the truth cannot be limited at all, but did not differentiate between the right to truth 
and the right to information.  In fact, the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges 
and lawyers acknowledged that this is an unresolved issue regarding the right to truth – 
unresolved because of the multiple sources of the right to truth.789  Some sources find a right 
to truth and subsequent right of access to information in the right to freedom of expression.  
The special rapporteur argued that restrictions on the right of freedom of expression and 
information found in human rights law should not be applied to the right to truth, which 
should have few or no limitations.            
         
Which Conceptualization Has the Broadest Reach? 
The final research question of this study asks, “Which conceptualization (or set of 
conceptualizations) holds the greatest promise for ensuring the broadest right of access to 
information?”  It is evident that the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, of all the 
conceptualizations, provides the broadest right of access to government information.  This is 
because it is the most broadly recognized by the human right community, it is the most clearly 
articulated, and it encompasses many of the strengths of the other conceptualizations.  
                                                 
789 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, supra note 628, at ¶16. 
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The freedom-of-expression conceptualization is the most broadly recognized 
conceptualization of the human rights community.  Although other conceptualizations also 
were broadly recognized, they were not acknowledged with the same level of breadth.  Not 
only is the freedom-of-expression conceptualization recognized by numerous human rights 
entities, generally, it was articulated in detail, compared to the other conceptualizations.  It 
also is the most consistently articulated in that there are few ambiguities regarding the source 
of the right to information.  Unlike the information-privacy, right-to-a-healthy-environment, 
and right-to-truth conceptualizations, which recognize the right to information as stemming 
from several different rights, the freedom-of-expression conceptualization understands that 
the right to information is based solely on the right to freedom of expression.  Most often the 
right to information is recognized as stemming from the rights to seek and receive information 
that are part of the right to freedom of expression in many human rights instruments.  This is 
important because it offers clarity and consistency upon which a right to information can 
build.    
Because the right to freedom of expression is so pervasive and well-accepted, basing a 
right to information on the right to freedom of expression gives the right to information a very 
broad reach.  It is present in most human rights instruments as well as several federal 
constitutions.  Recognizing a right to information based on the right to freedom of expression 
or the right to seek and receive information therefore influences numerous jurisdictions and 
protects large numbers of people. It also is important to note that both the information-privacy 
and right-to-truth conceptualizations have included the right to freedom of expression as a 
source of the right to personal information and information about human rights abuses, 
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respectively.  This attests to the versatility of a right to information based on the right to 
freedom of expression.     
The elements of the right to information within the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization – the rationales, to whom the right is conferred, the type of information, and 
the limitations – also allow for a broad right of access to information compared to the other 
conceptualizations.  And as will be discussed, often the strengths of the other 
conceptualizations are included within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization. 
The three rationales of the freedom-of-expression conceptualization combine to give 
the conceptualization a solid foundation and a broad reach.  The seek-and-receive rationale 
anchors the right to information within the right to freedom of expression, and the self-
governance and good-governance rationales provide a strong association between democratic 
governance and access to information.  It is important to recognize that all of the other three 
conceptualizations include rationales that are similar to the self-governance and good-
governance rationales.  The information-privacy and right-to-truth conceptualizations include 
rationales that emphasize the importance of holding governments accountable to their citizens 
and preventing government corruption and abuse. The right-to-a-healthy-environment 
conceptualization includes the public-participation rationale, which is similar to the self-
governance rationale.  Both recognize that government information is essential to public 
participation in decision-making.  A right of access to information allows citizens to more 
effectively participate in governmental decision-making.  The inclusion of these similar 
rationales within all the conceptualizations attests to the broad recognition of the essential role 
of information for healthy governance.  The fact that the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization incorporates rationales similar to rationales found in the other three 
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conceptualizations indicates the conceptualization’s broad reach.  In other words, the 
freedom-of-expression conceptualization encompasses the strong rationales of the other 
conceptualizations.      
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization’s emphasis on democratic governance is 
reflected in its understanding of information as a public good.  Because information is 
recognized as a public good, the right belongs to all citizens and includes all government 
information; however, it is not always clear whether citizenship is required to obtain 
information.  This is unlike the right-to-a-healthy environment conceptualization, which 
confers the right to information on all individuals.  In some articulations the right-to-truth 
conceptualization also might grant a right to information to all individuals, but the parameters 
of a societal right to information remain unclear.  The information-privacy conceptualization, 
on the other hand, has a much narrower understanding of who receives a right to information 
and requires that individuals have a direct interest in the information being sought. 
Within the freedom-of expression conceptualization, because information is a public 
good, citizens have the right to all information.  The type of information granted within this 
conceptualization is far more extensive than within the other conceptualizations.  The type of 
information granted with the information-privacy conceptualization is the narrowest of all the 
conceptualizations and only includes individuals’ personal information.  The other two 
conceptualizations, although broader, only include specific categories of information – 
information relating to the environment and information about human rights abuses.  The type 
of information granted within the freedom-of-expression conceptualization, on the other hand, 
is broad enough to encompass all the types of information granted within the other 
conceptualizations and much more. 
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   None of the conceptualizations provided detailed and consistent explanations of 
limitations on the right to information; nonetheless, the freedom-of expression 
conceptualization did provide detailed obligations on governments regarding how they could 
implement limitations.  Restrictions must be provided for in law, written justifications must 
be provided when information is withheld, and there must be an independent process for 
appealing nondisclosure decisions.  Other conceptualizations articulated some of these 
obligations, but did not include all of them.  Because the freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization includes a presumption of disclosure, all information must be released 
unless there are legitimate reasons for nondisclosure.  The freedom-of-expression 
conceptualization requires the public’s right to know be weighed against the substantial harm 
that could come from disclosure.  Some articulations of the right-to-truth conceptualization 
recognize that there are no limitations on access, but this understanding is unclear.   
The freedom-of-expression conceptualization holds the greatest promise for ensuring 
the broadest right of access to information.  Basing the right to information on the right to 
freedom of expression gives the right to information a broad reach.  Of all of the 
conceptualizations, it is the most clearly defined; the specific parameters of the right to 
information are clearer than with the other conceptualizations.  Because the freedom-of-
expression conceptualization is grounded in rationales that place importance on the role of 
information in democracies, the conceptualization offers a broad right of access to all types of 
information.  In fact, all of the different types of information guaranteed within the other 
conceptualizations are included with the freedom-of-expression conceptualization.  Although 
limitations on the right to information need to be better articulated, the freedom-of-expression 
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conceptualization does recognized detailed procedures that must be in place in order to 
withhold information.  This is an area that needs to be better defined.       
 
Directions for Further Research   
 The claim that access to government information is a human right is relatively new.  
This research identified and analyzed four conceptualizations of access to information as a 
human right.  These findings suggest several avenues for future research.     
As stated above, it is unclear how the limitations on the right to freedom of expression 
in human rights law might limit the right of access to information.  One way to help clarify 
this would be  to examine how the limitations have been interpreted by the European Court, 
the Inter-American Court, and the Human Rights Committee.  
Research on national constitutions could help illuminate the ways that rights of access 
to information have been conceptualized.  Many countries have added access-to-information 
provisions to their federal constitutions.790  Others have added the right to “seek and receive” 
information.791   Research on how these provisions have been interpreted by national courts 
could add to the understanding of the conceptualizations identified in this study.  Also, several 
national supreme courts have interpreted constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to 
freedom of expression as including a right of access to government information.792  Analysis 
of these ruling also would be illuminating.      
                                                 
790 See, e.g., the Czech Constitution, art 17(5) (stating, “State bodies and territorial self-governing bodies are 
obliged, in an appropriate manner, to provide information with respect to their activities.”). 
 
791 See, e.g., the Slovakian constitution, art 26 (stating that everyone has the right to “freely seek out, receive, and 
spread ideas and information”). 
 
792 See, e.g., S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR SC 149 (1982) (stating that “disclosures of information in 
regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule, and secrecy an exception justified only where the 
strictest requirements of public interest so demands”). 
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Another area that needs to be explored is access to information from private entities 
such as corporations.   The idea that corporations may have legal obligations to provide 
information to the public was a consistent theme within this research, particularly within the 
right-to-a-healthy-environment conceptualization.  This line of research is especially 
important as corporations grow larger and more powerful and as more government functions 
are privatized.        
Finally, this research did not address compliance with human right obligations.  
Research is needed to examine whether there is a difference among conceptualizations 
regarding compliance with the right of access to information.  Such research could reveal 
governments’ views of access to information as a human right.   
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APPE*DIX I 
 
Sources 
 
Documents of the U Charter-based Bodies:  
• Documents of the UN General Assembly, which include: 
o Verbatim records of GA plenary meetings 
o GA resolutions 
o Summary records of the Third Committee of the General Assembly793 
• Documents of the Human Rights Council (replaced Commission on Human Rights in 
2006), a subsidiary organ of the GA.  
o Reports of the HRC to the General Assembly 
o Documents relating the new Universal Periodic Review process in which 
States are reviewed for compliance of human right laws 
• Documents of the Economic and Social Council, which include: 
o Reports of the relevant Functional Commissions794 including the Commission 
on Human Rights, which was a subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social 
Council until it was replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006 
 Resolutions 
 Reports of sessions, which include reports from special rapporteurs795  
 Summary records of sessions  
                                                 
 
793 The Third Committee of the General Assembly is allocated items relating to social, humanitarian, and cultural 
matters. Only summary records are available for this committee. 
 
794 The relevant functional commissions are Commissions on Science and Technology for Development, 
Sustainable Development, Population and Development, Status of Women, and Commission for Social 
Development.  The other Commissions are Narcotic Drugs and Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. 
 
795 Special Rapporteurs include the Special Rapporteurs on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression; on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health; and on violence against women, its causes, and consequences; on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; on the independence of judges and lawyers; on human 
rights and the environment; and on adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous 
products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights. 
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 Documents of the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (Its last report was issued in Aug. 2006. Its duties have 
since been taken over by the Human Rights Council.).  
• United Nations Environment Programme 
o Text of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
o Text of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
 
United ations International Human Rights Treaties and their monitoring bodies  
UN Treaties 
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child  
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  
• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women  
• International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families 
• The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment  
 
General list of documents from the monitoring bodies of treaties (committees): 
• General Comments (General statements from the committees on its interpretations of 
specific articles in the treaty) 
• Sessional/Annual Report of the committees to the UN General Assembly 
• Concluding Observations (Reports from the committees to the states regarding states’ 
compliance with the treaty). 
• State Reports to the committees required by the treaty (Reports from states to the 
committees regarding the State’s implementation of the treaty)  
• List of Issues (Report from committees regarding State reports) 
• Reply to List of Issues (Reports from states regarding committees’ List of Issues) 
• Summary Records of committee meetings about states’ compliance.  
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• Jurisprudence of committees regarding individual complaints of human rights 
violations (Only the Political Covenant and the  Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination have provisions that empower the monitoring 
committees to hear and rule on complaints.). 
 
Regional Human Rights treaties and their monitoring bodies and courts 
• The European Convention on Human Rights 
o Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights 
• The American Convention on Human Rights 
o Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
o Inter-American Commission on Human Rights796 
 Annual reports, reports on session, and special reports 
 Individual petitions to the Commission 
o Advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
• The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
o Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which 
include: 
 Resolutions 
 Mission reports 
 Activities reports 
 Communiqués of commission sessions 
 States’ Periodic Reports to the commission (very limited access) 
o Intersession Activity Reports and resolutions from the special rapporteurs797 
 
International ongovernmental Organizations:  
• Access Info Europe 
• Article 19, Global Campaign for Freedom of Expression  
• Open Society Institute Justice Initiative  
                                                 
 
796 Documents of the commission and the court are limited to those documents that are available in English. 
 
797 There are 10 Special Rapporteurs including one for freedom of expression and access to information.    
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• Transparency International 
• Global Transparency Initiative 
• Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 
• Privacy International 
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